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This thesis develops three essays investigating the feasibility of textual disclosures (which are also 
referred to as narrative-related disclosures) in corporate failure prediction and how such disclosures 
(particularly that of risk) relate to internal control effectiveness and ultimately the usefulness to the 
capital market participants as follows. 
 
First, by creating a comprehensive corporate failure-related lexicon, this thesis explores the incremental 
explanatory power of narrative-related disclosures in predicting corporate failure. We find that 
corporate failure-related narrative disclosures significantly predict firms’ failure up to two years ahead 
of actual failure. Additionally, we find that a financially distressed firm would become more vulnerable 
when financial constraints befall, which in turn would precipitate corporate failure. Various robustness 
tests assure the credibility of the explanatory ability of corporate failure-related narrative disclosures to 
predict corporate failure. Collectively, our results show the feasibility of these narrative-related 
disclosures in improving the explanatory power of models that predict corporate failure. 
 
Second, in 2013, the revised International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 700 (UK and Ireland) mandated 
the expanded audit report. The mandate seems not to be affecting investors’ reactions according to 
recent archival studies, leading regulators and standard-setters all over the world to raise a concern 
regarding the usefulness of the new reporting regulation and the information content of the expanded 
disclosure. Therefore, this thesis addresses this concern as follows. We first document that firms 
receiving an expanded audit report with a higher level of disclosure on risks of material misstatement 
(materiality) exhibit significantly higher (lower) idiosyncratic risk, beta and cost of equity. This finding 
suggests that expanded auditor’s disclosure meaningfully relates to the information risk that a firm 
presents to investors, implying that it is not generic. Thus, firms complying with the new reporting rule, 
which have relatively more reliable financial reporting, can benefit from lower information risk and cost 
of capital. Second, we find evidence that the new reporting regime relatively influences trading volume 
and volatility of market returns. Third, we find that information conveyed by the expanded auditor’s 
report is reflected in bid-ask spread, trading volume, volatility of market returns, and analyst forecast 
dispersion. Collectively, our analyses are consistent with the expanded auditor’s report regime and 
information content are associated with significant economic consequences for both the complying 
firms and capital market participants. This firm-specific and useful disclosure supports the FRC 
decision mandating the expanded audit report and encourages successors (IAASB and PCAOB). 
 
Third, this thesis investigates the impact of internal control effectiveness on the level of textual risk 
disclosure (aggregate risk disclosure and its tone including good news, bad news, and net tone about 
risk). Our findings suggest that firms with an ineffective internal control system exhibit significantly 
lower levels of aggregate risk disclosure and its tone than firms with effective controls. Besides, our 
further analysis shows a significant change in textual risk disclosure behavior (higher levels of aggregate 
risk disclosure and its tone) provided by managers of firms with recurrent ineffective internal controls. 
Pursuant to agency theory, this behavior change is prompted to reduce the expected public uncertainty 
and agency problems that result from having recurrent ineffective internal controls. We also investigate 
the usefulness of the internal control effectiveness reporting and textual risk disclosure through 
observing their impacts on market liquidity and investor-perceived risk. Results suggest that firms 
reporting ineffective internal controls are likely to have more information asymmetry and investor-
perceived risk than control firms. Furthermore, the evidence we find suggests that textual risk disclosure 
decreases information asymmetry, but does not affect investor-perceived risk. Finally, we illustrate that 
the information content of internal control effectiveness reporting and textual risk disclosure affect 
investors’ reaction around the 10-K filing, particularly for firms with a weak communication 
environment. Collectively, the results from our analysis fill an apparent gap in literature on the 
importance of internal control effectiveness, as well as the usefulness of the external auditor’s 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Despite the extensive prior literature on the characteristics of quantitative accounting data, 
particularly earnings, for both the evaluating role ex-ante and monitoring role ex-post, the incremental 
role, determinants (the main incentives), and consequences (the usefulness) of textual disclosures 
have received less attention (e.g., Dyer et al., 2017). Additionally, although risk disclosure is a major 
strand of literature on textual disclosures, less is known about both the underlying drivers of 
corporate risk disclosure and the informativeness of such disclosure (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2018). 
Remarkably, literature offers three unanswered research questions: first, do textual disclosures 
provide an incremental explanatory power that predicts corporate failure? (e.g., Loughran and 
McDonald, 2016); second, does the expanded auditor reporting, that recently became effective in 
the UK and worldwide, have economic benefits for the capital market? (e.g., Gutierrez et al., 2018; 
Lennox et al., 2019); third, do internal control effectiveness drive a firm to externally disclose its 
risks, and if so, how, and does the reporting on those risks and the effectiveness of internal controls 
impact market indicators? (e.g., Schneider et al., 2009; Elshandidy et al., 2018). These unexplored 
research questions leave a considerable gap in literature and thus, this thesis aims to contribute to 
literature by empirically addressing them. 
This thesis, therefore, consists of three essays. These essays are, however, not only motivated 
by academic literature. Regulators, standard-setters, preparers, investors, and other stakeholders 
have paid special attention to textual disclosures in general, and risk disclosure in particular, amid 
the large market-wide downturns and fluctuations, especially during and after the financial crisis of 
2007-2008, and following the accounting irregularities that resulted in high-profile corporate 
failures like Enron (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Dyer et al., 2017). In addition, as indicated by Li 
(2010), the context of textual disclosures, which has significantly developed in both length and 
information content, provides a unique opportunity to understand the financial numbers and test 
relevant economic hypotheses. This communication context is also a powerful setting to 




and performance. For example, prior research (e.g., Kearney and Liu, 2014) suggests that textual 
disclosures are well-reflective of a firm’s internal and external conditions and, as a result, provide a 
powerful explanatory power to predict corporate investment decisions and thus, firm prospects. 
This is also consistent with the suggestions of Li (2006) in relation to textual risk disclosure. 
Accordingly, using the unique context in the UK (see, for example, Taffler, 1984), Chapter 
2 of this thesis examines the feasibility of using narrative-related disclosures to predict corporate 
failure, considering both financial distress and bankruptcy approaches. Consistent with the 
worldwide interest in the new rule (the revised International Standard on Auditing 700 (UK and 
Ireland), see FRC, 2013a) that mandates external auditors’ disclosure on, inter alia, the risk of 
material misstatements, as well as the materiality level used in an audit, Chapter 3 exploits the 
exogenous shock of the FRC’s regulatory changes regarding the auditor report in the UK to 
examine whether the expanded auditor report regime and information content of that report are 
associated with significant economic consequences for both the complying firms and capital market 
participants. Chapter 4 examines whether and how internal control effectiveness drives the level of 
textual risk disclosure using post-SOX US data. The chapter also highlights the usefulness of 
conveying such internal knowledge to the capital market. 
The three essays of this thesis mainly revolve around the insights of agency, signaling, and 
legitimacy theories. More specifically, signaling and legitimacy theories lay out the fundamental 
premises underlying managers’ incentives to voluntarily disclose on their firms’ prospect of failure. 
That is, in order to maintain or repair legitimacy, managers are motivated to voluntarily disclose 
any particular events that would have a detrimental effect on the firm’s legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; 
Deegan, 2002). Additionally, during financial distress exposure, managers are motivated to signal 
their firm’s risks to preserve their reputation, lessen litigation risk, and reduce the cost of finance 
(e.g., Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2007; Cheynel, 2013). Similarly, the information content of the 
expanded audit report, which goes beyond the traditional standardized pass/fail audit opinion on 




of disclosure should alleviate the agency problem (e.g., Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985; Healy 
and Palepu, 2001; Lambert et al., 2007). In line with that, the theoretical framework of Lambert et 
al. (2007) suggests that the quality of a firm’s information systems, including the effectiveness of 
internal control over financial reporting, affects the information asymmetry and risk components 
of the firm’s cost of capital by the increase in the imparted disclosure. Moreover, under normal 
conditions, signaling theory posits that managers are motived to disseminate their firms’ risks so as 
to distinguish their firms from other firms that do not manage risks or do so less effectively (e.g., 
Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016). 
The first essay of this thesis tests the hypothesis that narrative sections of annual reports 
communicate useful information to predict corporate failure. Specifically, this study expects that 
firms with significantly high levels of corporate failure-related narrative disclosures are more likely 
to fail. For this purpose, we create a comprehensive corporate failure-related lexicon to capture the 
corporate failure sentiment in annual report narratives. Creating that lexicon is important in 
accordance with the call by prior textual analysis/disclosures research (e.g., Henry and Leone, 2009; 
Loughran and McDonald, 2016) for developing a wordlist in the context of each textual-subject 
study, since reliance on a wordlist that is derived from a different subject would probably cause 
spurious or less accurate results. Additionally, generating our corporate failure-related lexicon 
within the failure context in the UK avoids potential limitations related to using the commonly-
used wordlists (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2011) outside the US context (Ataullah et al., 2018). 
In addition to the consistency and practical aspects of the corporate failure-related lexicon against 
corporate failure literature and the UK insolvency law, it assures validity and reliability. Consistent 
with our expectations, we find that higher incidence of corporate failure-related narrative 
disclosures in the annual reports is strongly associated with a higher likelihood of corporate failure. 
Specifically, we find that these disclosures offer an incremental predictive ability relative to 
accounting, market and macroeconomic variables that are widely used in the classical corporate 




In order to provide more meaningful information content beyond the boilerplate pass/fail 
model of the audit report, standard-setters and regulators worldwide (with an initiative started by 
the UK in 2013; refer to Chapter 3, Section 3.2. for more details) adopt the expanded audit report. 
Recently, however, the inconclusive evidence on the usefulness of the expanded audit report has 
raised PCAOB’s concern (PCAOB, 2017). Additionally, FRC (2016) has indicated an interest in 
reviewing both the volume and the content of auditor risk disclosure. Exploiting the exogenous 
shock of the FRC’s regulatory changes related to the auditor report in the UK, the second essay of 
this thesis, therefore, investigates whether the expanded auditor’s report exhibits information 
specific to the audited company, thereby yielding benefits to complying firms through lower 
information risk that translates into lower cost of equity. It also considers whether the reporting 
regulation change and information content of the expanded audit report affect information 
asymmetry and risk perceptions. Consistent with our expectations, our cross-sectional and 
intertemporal tests suggest that firms complying with the new reporting rule, which have relatively 
more reliable financial reporting, i.e., have relatively low risks of material misstatement inducing 
the auditor to specify a high level of materiality, can benefit from a lower information risk 
(idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk) and a lower cost of capital. Put differently, the expanded 
auditor reporting is not generic but instead meaningfully reflects the information risk that a firm 
presents to investors. The evidence we find also suggests the usefulness of the audit report regime 
change and the informativeness of the expanded auditor disclosures via observing the relation with 
market liquidity, investors’ perceived risk, and analyst forecast dispersion. 
Moving to the US, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), in particular Section 404, requires 
management to establish and maintain an effective internal control system to significantly and 
positively reveal firm risk factors and uncertainties that affect internal management reports and 
thus decisions based on these reports, so as to ensure the reliability of financial reporting (e.g., 
SEC, 2003b). However, the benefits of this requirement remain controversial and leave an apparent 




efficiency in disclosing its risks externally is an important component of reliable information (e.g., 
SEC, 2003a; PCAOB, 2004). Besides, the regulatory actions (e.g., PCAOB, 2004) and prior research 
(e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008, 2009; Donelson et al., 2017) suggest that the internal control 
system may be ineffective in detecting and disclosing more risk factors and contingencies on a 
timely basis when there is an internal control weakness. The third and final essay of this thesis, 
therefore, hypothesizes that an effective internal control system reveals more risk factors and 
contingencies, thereby enhancing managers’ ability to convey a higher level of textual risk 
disclosure. Additionally, as prior research exploring the usefulness of textual risk disclosure and 
external auditor reporting on internal control effectiveness to the market shows inconclusive results 
(e.g., Schneider et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 2018; Elshandidy et al., 2018), this study also examines 
whether textual risk disclosure and reporting on internal control effectiveness are useful to the 
market participants through observing their impacts on market liquidity and investor-perceived 
risk. Consistent with our expectations, our results suggest that firms with an ineffective internal 
control system exhibit significantly lower levels of aggregate risk disclosure and its tone than firms 
with effective controls. Our further tests also show a significant change in textual risk disclosure 
behavior (higher levels of aggregate risk disclosure and its tone) provided by managers of firms 
with recurrent ineffective internal controls. Pursuant to agency theory, this behavior change is 
prompted to reduce the expected public uncertainty and agency problems that result from having 
recurrent ineffective internal controls. With regard to the usefulness to the market, the evidence 
we find suggests that firms reporting ineffective internal controls are likely to have more 
information asymmetry and investor-perceived risk than control firms. It also suggests that textual 
risk disclosure decreases information asymmetry, but that disclosure is apparently statistically 
insignificant in terms of investor-perceived risk. Finally, we indicate that the information content 
of internal control effectiveness reporting and textual risk disclosure affect investors’ reaction 




Collectively, as offered by the first essay, the additional role of failure-related narratives in 
rendering early warning alerts is imperative to help interested parties (e.g., the FRC, stockholders 
and lenders) to take either preventative or remedial action. Our evidence, as offered by the second 
essay, that the expanded auditor report regime and information content are associated with 
significant economic consequences for both the complying firms and capital market participants 
supports the FRC decision mandating the expanded audit report and encourages its successors of 
IAASB and PCAOB. Our evidence, as offered by the third essay, provides broader implications to 
those previously documented in the literature and rationalizes the debate around the importance 
of internal control effectiveness in improving the financial reporting reliability (e.g., Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2008; Feng et al., 2009). Furthermore, it contributes to the ongoing debate between 
academics (e.g., Gupta et al., 2018; Elshandidy et al., 2018) and regulators (e.g., SEC, 2009) about 
the usefulness of both textual risk disclosure and internal control effectiveness reporting by 
investigating their informativeness to the market participants. Our results contribute to literature 
by: 1- manifesting the feasibility of corporate failure-related narrative disclosures in enhancing the 
explanatory power of the models that predict corporate failure; 2- supporting the view of the FRC 
(followed by others such as IAASB and PCAOB as shown in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.) that the 
expanded auditor’s report regime and information content are associated with significant economic 
consequences for both the complying firms and capital market participants; 3- extending prior 
efforts on examining the importance of internal control effectiveness, as well as the usefulness of 
the external auditor’s attestation on a firm’s internal controls and management textual risk 
disclosure. The theoretical and practical implications of our findings are highlighted in details in 





Ashbaugh‐Skaife, H., Collins, D. W., & Lafond, R. (2009). The effect of SOX internal control 
deficiencies on firm risk and cost of equity. Journal of Accounting Research, 47(1), 1-43. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., Collins, D., LaFond, R., Kinney, W., (2008). The effect of internal control 
deficiencies and their remediation on accrual quality. The Accounting Review, 83 (1), 217–250. 
Ataullah, A., Vivian, A., & Xu, B. (2018). Optimistic disclosure tone and conservative debt policy. 
Abacus, 54(4), 445-484. 
Cheynel, E. (2013). A theory of voluntary disclosure and cost of capital. Review of Accounting Studies, 
18(4), 987-1020. 
Clinton, S. B., Pinello, A. S., & Skaife, H. A. (2014). The implications of ineffective internal control 
and SOX 404 reporting for financial analysts. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 33(4), 303-
327. 
Deegan, C. (2002). Introduction: The legitimising effect of social and environmental disclosures–a 
theoretical foundation. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 15(3), 282-311. 
Diamond, D. W. (1985). Optimal release of information by firms. The Journal of Finance, 40(4), 1071-
1094. 
Donelson, D. C., Ege, M. S., & McInnis, J. M. (2017). Internal control weaknesses and financial 
reporting fraud. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 36(3), 45-69. 
Dyer, T., Lang, M., & Stice-Lawrence, L. (2017). The evolution of 10-K textual disclosure: 
Evidence from Latent Dirichlet Allocation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 64(2-3), 221-
245. 
Elshandidy, T., & Shrives, P. J. (2016). Environmental incentives for and usefulness of textual risk 
reporting: Evidence from Germany. The International Journal of Accounting, 51(4), 464-486. 
Elshandidy, T., Shrives, P., Bamber, M., & Abraham, S. (2018). Risk reporting: A review of the 
literature and implications for future research. Journal of Accounting Literature, 40, 54–82. 
Feng, M., Li, C., & McVay, S. (2009). Internal control and management guidance. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 48(2), 190-209. 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC). (2013a). The independent auditor’s report on financial 
statements. International Standard on Auditing (UK and Ireland) 700 (Revised June 2013). 
London, England: The Financial Reporting Council Limited. Available at: 
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Audit-and-Assurance-Team/ISA-700-
(UK-and-Ireland)-700-(Revised)-File.pdf.  
Financial Reporting Council (FRC). (2016). Report. Extended auditor’s reports: a further review of 
experience. London, England: The Financial Reporting Council Limited. Available at: 
https://frc.org.uk/Extended-auditors-reports.pdf. 
Gupta, P. P., Sami, H., & Zhou, H. (2018). Do companies with effective internal controls over 
financial reporting benefit from Sarbanes–Oxley sections 302 and 404?. Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Finance, 33(2), 200-227. 
Gutierrez, E., Minutti-Meza, M., Tatum, K. W., & Vulcheva, M. (2018). Consequences of adopting 
an expanded auditor’s report in the United Kingdom. Review of Accounting Studies, 23(4), 1543-
1587.  
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital 
markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
31(1-3), 405-440. 
Henry, E., & Leone, A. J. (2009). Measuring qualitative information in capital markets research. Available 
at: SSRN 1470807. 
Holder-Webb, L., & Cohen, J. R. (2007). The association between disclosure, distress, and failure. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 75(3), 301-314. 
Kearney, C., & Liu, S. (2014). Textual sentiment in finance: A survey of methods and models. 




Kravet, T., & Muslu, V. (2013). Textual risk disclosures and investors’ risk perceptions. Review of 
Accounting Studies, 18(4), 1088-1122. 
Lambert, R., Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2007). Accounting information, disclosure, and the cost 
of capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 45(2), 385-420. 
Lennox, C. S., Schmidt, J. J., & Thompson, A. M. (2019). Are expanded audit reports informative 
to investors? Evidence from the U.K. Working paper, University of Southern California, 
University of Texas at Austin, and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
Li, F. (2006). Do stock market investors understand the risk sentiment of corporate annual 
reports?, Working Paper, University of Michigan. 
Li, F. (2010). The information content of forward‐looking statements in corporate filings—A naïve 
Bayesian machine learning approach. Journal of Accounting Research, 48(5), 1049-1102. 
Loughran, T., & McDonald, B. (2011). When is a liability not a liability? Textual analysis, 
dictionaries, and 10‐Ks. The Journal of Finance, 66(1), 35-65. 
Loughran, T., & McDonald, B. (2016). Textual Analysis in Accounting and Finance: A Survey. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 54(4), 1187-230. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). (2004). An Audit of Internal Control 
over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements. 
Auditing Standard No. 2. Washington, D.C.: PCAOB. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. (2017). The auditor’s report on an audit of financial 
statements when the auditor expresses an unqualified opinion; and related amendments to 
PCAOB standards. PCAOB Release No. 2017-001, June 1, 2017. Washington, D.C. 
Available at: https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket034/2017-001-auditors-report-
final-rule.pdf. 
Schneider, A., Gramling, A. A., Hermanson, D. R., & Ye, Z. S. (2009). A review of academic 
literature on internal control reporting under SOX. Journal of Accounting Literature, 28, 1.  
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). (2003a). Financial reporting release no. 72. 
Commission guidance regarding management’s discussion and analysis for financial condition 
and results of operations. Securities Act Release No. 33-8350. Washington, D.C.  
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). (2003b). Management’s report on internal control 
over financial reporting and certification of disclosure in exchange act periodic reports. 
Release No. 33-8238, Washington, D.C. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). (2009). Remarks before the 2009 AICPA National 
Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments (Besch, D.) (December 7). 
Washington, D.C. 
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of 
Management Review, 20(3), 571-610. 
Taffler, R. J. (1984). Empirical models for the monitoring of UK corporations. Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 8(2), 199-227. 
Verrecchia, R. E. (1982). The use of mathematical models in financial accounting. Journal of 





Chapter 2. Do narrative-related disclosures predict corporate failure? UK evidence 
2.1. Introduction 
Several corporate failure (CF) prediction models are developed based on different modeling 
techniques which substantially apply a certain classical methodological approach (for a review see, 
Dimitras et al., 1996; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Altman et al., 2017; Jayasekera, 2018) relying 
principally on accounting, market and/or macroeconomic indicators (e.g., Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 
1980; Taffler, 1983; Goudie and Meeks, 1991; Charitou et al., 2004; Reisz and Perlich, 2007; 
Campbell et al., 2008; Tinoco and Wilson, 2013). However, after the collapse of major corporations 
(e.g., WorldCom, Enron and Lehman Brothers), growing attention has been paid to the prediction 
of business failures since stakeholders have become cautious about risk of business failure (Dean 
and Altman, 2007). Improving the ability to explain and predict CF, therefore, stands central in the 
literature (e.g., Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Jayasekera, 2018). 
Remarkably, while there has recently been an increasing interest in studying the usefulness 
of qualitative information, little attention is paid toward employing qualitative information in CF 
prediction. Moreover, while the UK offers an “ideal” context for CF research (e.g., Taffler, 1984), 
prior research on the link between qualitative information and firm’s status has mainly been 
conducted in the US context (a priori, due to data availability and the relative ease in obtaining 
qualitative data) and concerned the financial constraints (as detailed in Appendix A).1 This chapter 
addresses this gap by exploring the question of whether the narrative sections of annual reports 
communicate useful information to predict CF.2 In doing so, this chapter develops a textual 
measure for CF-related narrative disclosures (CF-Disclosure, hereafter) and examines its ability in 
predicting CF in the UK context. Thus, we expand prior literature in many aspects as follows. 
 
1 Financial distress and bankruptcy, as the main determinants of CF, are distinctive from financial constraints (see 
Whited and Wu, 2006; Senbet and Wang, 2012; Hoberg and Maksimovic, 2015; Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016). 
Although financial constraints examination is not our main interest, our further analysis highlights whether financial 
constraints would promote the incidence of CF. 




First, a few studies have employed qualitative information revealed in the narrative sections 
of annual reports or 10-K filings (narrative-related disclosures) to test its predictive ability for 
financial constraints or to assess (but not to predict) bankruptcy and financial distress. For example, 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010) use narrative-related disclosures of 10-
K to construct indices so as to classify financially constrained firms. Furthermore, Hoberg and 
Maksimovic (2015) conclude that narrative sections have an incremental effect in predicting 
financial constraints. Utilizing the 10-K filing mandatory disclosure, Bodnaruk et al. (2015) indicate 
that there is a positive relationship between managers’ belief of a firm’s future financial constraints 
and the extent of 10-K narratives that reflect this outlook. In the same way, Holder-Webb and 
Cohen (2007) indicate that Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) is the officially 
approved channel for managers to explain the source of financial distress to investors. In a 
contemporaneous paper complementary to our chapter, Gandhi et al. (2019), using an approach 
different from ours and employing a sample of the US banks, suggest the negative sentiment of 
10-K narratives as a new proxy for bank distress. Still, particularly in the UK context, no previous 
study has examined the feasibility of the annual report narratives to directly predict CF and improve 
the explanatory power of the variables widely used in classical CF prediction models. 
Second, there is a major difference between the insolvency laws in the UK (where it is 
creditor-friendly) and the US (where it is debtor-friendly). Consistent with the evidence of 
Davydenko and Franks (2008) that the bankruptcy code is a significant factor in studying CF, it 
seems important to investigate CF prediction outside the US. Second, disclosure type and 
regulations are also different in both countries. As opposed to the US, where narrative disclosure 
is highly regulated, narrative disclosure in the UK is mostly voluntary. These two types of disclosure 
are also provided under different enforcement laws since the common law is dominant in the UK 
while the code law is dominant in the US, which has more enforcement (Muñoz-Izquierdo et al., 
2019). In this respect, prior research (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2015) documents a significant impact 




disclosures, which are influenced more by firm-specific factors. In addition, compared to the US, 
the UK’s companies do not file quarterly, and the UK’s disclosure environment is less rich (Lennox 
et al., 2019). That is, management in UK companies is expected to consider annual report narratives 
as an important source for revealing information about the firm’s prospects.  
Third, UK companies are managed in corporate governance settings that are significantly 
different from their counterparts in the US (Short and Keasey, 1999; Franks and Mayer, 2002; 
Toms and Wright, 2005), and within less severe litigation risk (Lennox et al., 2019). Finally, despite 
the limited research on the relation between qualitative information and CF, the findings of 
research are, however, mixed within a line of research that looks at the information revealed related 
to going concern prospects either in mandatory or voluntary environments. For example, in 
mandatory environments where firms are required to provide information about going concern, 
the evidence shows less compliance (e.g., the Canadian context: Ontario Securities Commission, 
2010) or limited usefulness in predicting CF (e.g., the UK context: Uang et al., 2006). In the US 
context, a recent study by Mayew et al. (2015) finds that the opinions of management about going 
concern revealed in MD&A of 10-K filings along with their tone have explanatory power in 
predicting whether a firm will cease as a going concern.  
These distinctive aspects, collectively, motivate us to investigate the incremental explanatory 
power of narrative-related disclosures in predicting CF in the UK.3 Our findings suggest that higher 
incidence of CF-Disclosure in the annual reports is strongly associated with a higher likelihood of 
CF. Specifically, we find that CF-Disclosure offers an incremental predictive ability relative to 
accounting, market and macroeconomic variables that are widely used in the classical CF prediction 
models. In an economic perspective, results show that the higher incidence of CF-Disclosure is 
 
3 Our motive in visiting the UK is in line with, among others, that of Charitou et al. (2004) who clearly introduce the 
UK context, rather than the US, to be “the main motivation for [their] study” to the incremental information content 
of operating cash flows to predict CF. Nevertheless, we emphasize that our choice for the UK since it provides an 
ideal setting to conduct our research and thus, this does not limit generalizing our results to other regimes. Therefore, 





associated with a 39.7% greater likelihood of CF within a year; 31.9% within two years. In addition, 
the predictive accuracy and explanatory power of CF-Disclosure alone is about 41% and 25% 
relative to that provided by accounting, market and macroeconomic variables combined in the year 
preceding the CF and the penultimate year, respectively. Incorporating CF-Disclosure into a base 
model (representing a classical CF prediction model) that contains accounting, market and 
macroeconomic indicators provides about 16% increase in the explanatory power relative to that 
provided by the base model for the year prior to CF; 9% for the two years prior to CF. Collectively, 
the results imply the feasibility of CF-Disclosure in enhancing the explanatory power of models 
that predict CF. Our results are robust to the inclusion of firm corporate governance factors that 
prior research shows to be related to CF.  
These findings have theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, in view of criticisms 
of CF prediction models based on financial ratios, academics can build on our chapter to improve 
or revise these classical models. Our results can be sound not only for the UK but also for other 
countries (e.g., Germany which has an insolvency regime that, like the UK, reflects the legacy of 
the creditor-in-possession framework). Practically, the additional role of failure-related narratives 
in rendering early warning alerts is imperative to help interested parties (e.g., the Financial 
Reporting Council, stockholders and lenders) to take either preventative or remedial action. 
Information embedded in the annual reports’ narratives can strengthen audit’s analytical review, 
support the issuance of the qualified (going concern) audit opinion and thus reduce litigation and 
reputational loss risks.  
Our chapter contributes to CF literature as follows. Our chapter advances extant literature 
on CF by suggesting the incremental role (explanatory ability) of the annual report narratives as a 
distinct indicator to objectively and directly predict CF. This chapter also contributes to CF 
literature by creating a comprehensive CF-related wordlist. This wordlist aims to capture CF 
sentiment in annual report narratives, as well as assist future CF research to study the likelihood of 




(as summarized in Appendix A), which lacks generalization as it relied on a limited number of firm-
year observations and/or concentrated on certain industries, is subjective as it relied principally on 
manual content analysis, and is outdated as it relied on old empirical data. Our research is large-
scale and relied on an objective textual method to capture the role of qualitative information in 
predicting CF. Our method can be applicable to different contexts (e.g., emerging economies), 
different industries (e.g., financial firms), cross-country (comparative evidence) with a minimum 
cost by relying on our algorithm. In addition, our chapter augments CF literature, which for decades 
has suffered the major deficiency of overlooking the underlying theory of failure (Dean and 
Altman, 2007; Peat, 2007), by postulating the theoretical foundations for explaining the reasons for 
voluntary corporate failure disclosure. Having reasonable theoretical premises provides the initial 
validity of our work (Christenson, 1983). 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2. represents background of CF 
in the UK context. Section 2.3. discusses the theoretical considerations. Section 2.4. reviews 
relevant prior literature and develops the research hypothesis. Section 2.5. designs the research 
methodology including data description, measurement of variables and the multi-period logit 
model formulation. Section 2.6. discusses the empirical results, further analysis and robustness 
checks. Section 2.7. concludes, discusses limitations and suggests avenues for future research. 
2.2. Background 
The UK context offers some unique features, e.g., the amount and quality of financial/non-
financial information about corporate entities, as well as a CF rate among the highest in advanced 
countries, which provide the UK with an environment which is “ideal” for the assessment of 
company solvency and performance (Taffler, 1984; Charitou et al., 2004).  
Furthermore, the UK insolvency law (e.g., Insolvency Act 1986 and Enterprise Act 2002) is 
different from the US Bankruptcy Code (e.g., Chapter 11) where the latter provides a protection 




whereas in the former, such opportunity to stay is not necessarily granted as an administrator would 
replace the management with the assumption that the insolvent firm has a concentrated creditor 
mass. Consequently, under the UK’s insolvency regime, financially distressed firms are more likely 
to go bankrupt compared to those in the US. Similar to the UK, the European insolvency regimes 
have the legacy of creditor-in-possession frameworks, implying that debtors and creditors have 
exhausted all possible remedies. Therefore, liquidation, through selling the company or its assets, 
is assumed to be the principal means of resolving creditor claims (refer, for example, to Broude et 
al. (2007) and Fitch Ratings (2014) for a comparative study of insolvency regimes in the US, the 
UK, and the key markets in the EU).  
The UK insolvency law contains a number of insolvency shelters including: (1) Company 
Voluntary Arrangement (CVA); (2) Administration; (3) Administrative Receivership (AR); (4) 
Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation (CVL); and (5) Compulsory Liquidation (CL).4 As seen, regardless 
of the route by which an insolvent company would endeavor to survive, the UK’s legacy 
assumption predicated on the creditor-in-possession framework remains dominant and basically 
suggests the formal insolvency process for settling the disputes between creditors and financially 
distressed firms. 
This might explain why the UK experienced the highest number and rate of CFs in the world 
from the 1970s-1980s (it was almost double that of the US on average, e.g., Altman, 1984). During 
the 1980s several UK sectors (e.g., small industrial businesses) experienced high failure rates of 
50% for a period of five years (Charitou et al., 2004). Agarwal and Taffler (2007) show that the 
number of UK firms at risk of failure is still growing and the high bankruptcies are expected to 
continue.5 Given these statistics and the increasing criticism of Taffler’s (1983) MDA-based model 
(Charitou et al., 2004; Jayasekera, 2018), there is a need to update CF prediction modeling after 
 
4 For more details regarding the UK insolvency regime see for instance: Insolvency Service and Companies House. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/ and/or Accountant in Bankruptcy (AiB). Available at: https://www.aib.gov.uk/ 
5 For UK companies’ insolvency records, refer to: Insolvency Service and Companies House. Available at: 




considering essential factors such as textual analysis, which will be grounded in theory and literature 
in the following section. 
2.3. Theory 
A theoretical analysis of how capital structure affects risk-related disclosure is introduced by 
Fatemi and Luft (2002) and the possibility that the changes in the financial structure can be linked 
with the managerial incentive to alter the firm’s perceived risk is illustrated by Ross (1997). In 
addition to preserving their reputation, during financial distress exposure, managers (by signaling) 
attempt to mitigate information asymmetry to reduce the cost of finance; in this respect a potential 
CF-Disclosure can be considered as an effective tool (Francis et al., 2005; Holder-Webb and 
Cohen, 2007; Cheynel, 2013; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016). In line with this view, capital need 
theory indicates that voluntary disclosure aids in achieving a company’s need to raise capital at a 
low cost (Francis et al., 2005). Consequently, lowering asymmetry of capital market information to 
reduce the cost of capital represents a major incentive for managers to voluntarily disclose risk, 
particularly ahead of bankruptcy or during financial distress periods. 
According to Holder-Webb and Cohen (2007), managers have impetuses to relieve 
stakeholders’ responses toward the financial distress risk by disclosing the event of distress risk. 
Furthermore, they argue that managers’ incentives to disclose such information could be a function 
of the ethics-economic formula, which assumes that managers’ intent to render a more complete 
disclosure that enables stakeholders to react wisely is driven by economic or ethical considerations. 
Additionally, legitimacy theory, which assumes that there is a “social contract” between firms and 
society which can be threatened or revoked, leading the firm to cease to exist if its legitimacy is in 
question (Mathews, 1993), can explain the incentives to reveal information about CF. Seeking to 
maintain or repair legitimacy, managers are motivated to voluntarily disclose any particular events 
that would have a detrimental effect on the firm’s legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Deegan, 2002). In 




Clarke, 2005; Samkin and Schneider, 2010) allowing managers to formulate a normalizing account 
(that is, deny, excuse, justify or explain the event, apologize or express remorse and guilt) and 
perform strategic restructuring (involving disassociation).6  
Pursuant to legitimacy theory, where a firm’s legitimacy is threatened, any strategy that 
managers implement to maintain or repair legitimacy “must” be accompanied by voluntary 
disclosure, especially in the annual reports (Deegan, 2002). In relation to legitimacy, legal 
compliance and the concept of accountability, which are consistent with the regulatory and 
cognitive legitimacy dimensions proposed by Scott (1995), offer a further explanation of managers’ 
motive to employ voluntary narrative disclosure to report threats to a firm’s legitimacy (Samkin 
and Schneider, 2010). With a belief in the responsibility to report, ethical management is pledged 
to completely disclose all relevant information regardless of the impact on the firm’s image 
(Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2007). Otherwise, through the legitimacy process, managers of firms 
with a high level of public monitoring would have incentives to increase risk disclosure in order to 
reduce litigation and reputational risks (Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Oliveira et al., 2011a). Prior 
research (e.g., Skinner, 1994, 1997; Francis et al., 1994) indicates that managers’ incentives to 
voluntarily disclose firms’ prospects lie in obviating concurrent legal actions such as litigation risk, 
especially if the firm fails. 
Overall, the theoretical framework based on a confluence of corporate structure theory and 
managers’ incentives as formulated by signaling and legitimacy theories is consistent with the call 
by Roberts et al. (2005, p. 6) “for greater theoretical pluralism and more detailed attention to board 
processes and dynamics.” Such a framework was also proposed by Aguilera (2005) and is adopted 
by some previous research such as Elshandidy and Shrives (2016) and Oliveira et al. (2011b). 
 
6 Impression management is a conscious or unconscious attempt by managers to manage the real or imagined image 




2.4. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Since the seminal work by Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968), widespread literature classifies, 
assesses or predicts CF by developing financial distress and bankruptcy models. Nevertheless, prior 
research basically focuses on utilizing financial or accounting ratios (e.g., Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 
1980; Taffler, 1983), testing market-based information (e.g., Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974; 
Reisz and Perlich, 2007), or studying macroeconomic determinants (e.g., Liu, 2004) to predict CF. 
Meanwhile, due to several criticisms (e.g., Dimitras et al., 1996; Christidis and Gregory, 2010; 
Jayasekera, 2018), many serious drawbacks (e.g., Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006) and structural and 
assumption deficits (e.g., Agarwal and Taffler, 2008), the findings of previous CF research are 
debatable. That is why, on the one hand, recent studies (e.g., Campbell et al., 2008; Christidis and 
Gregory, 2010) resort to a so-called “combined approach” (Tinoco and Wilson, 2013) on the basis 
of incorporating variables from different aspects (such as accounting-based variables and market-
based variables) in order to increase the predictive ability and accuracy of CF models. 
On the other hand, the inclusion of non-accounting or qualitative measures in the classical 
failure prediction models is suggested by some authors (e.g., Ohlson, 1980; Zavgren, 1983; Keasey 
and Watson, 1987; Beaver et al., 2005; Shuai and Li, 2005). The majority of evidence (e.g., Hoberg 
and Maksimovic, 2015; Bodnaruk et al., 2015) related to employing qualitative data in prediction 
has been concentrated on financial constraints, suggesting a predictive contribution can go beyond 
the traditional financial-based measures.  
Arguably, qualitative information provides useful content that can be employed to objectively 
and directly predict CF in addition to improving the explanatory power of the classical CF 
prediction models. Consistent with this notion, some studies shed light on the information content 
of the narrative-related disclosures and its usefulness in elucidating the source or the nature of 
financial distress and bankruptcy. Within the UK context, Smith and Taffler (2000) study manually 




narrative disclosure to predict failure.7 For a sample of financially distressed firms, Holder-Webb 
and Cohen (2007) measure the disclosure quality and find that on average firms increase the quality 
of disclosure in the year of distress onset, and that change in disclosure behavior is fundamentally 
driven by the managers’ economic considerations, instead of ethical status. In addition, Hanley and 
Hoberg (2012) conclude that the likelihood of litigation risk is decreased by managers’ strong 
strategic disclosure in the initial public offerings prospectus. This means that narrative-related 
disclosures regarding distress would be used to reduce the likelihood of litigation exposure. 
Supporting these purposes, the SEC, for example, designates the MD&A to present an exhaustive 
view of the firm’s financial conditions and prospects. In the Australian context, Boo and Simnett 
(2002) investigate the tone of management’s prospective comments in the annual report, and they 
find that the information content and tone of these comments are significantly associated with CF. 
Within the US context, using a different type of firms (financial rather than non-financial) and 
different type of outlet (10-Ks filings rather than annual reports), Gandhi et al. (2019) find that 
negative tone is significantly indicative of delisting probability, increase in loan loss, and decrease 
in future performance.  
The above-mentioned papers use mostly the text tone (positive and/or negative) in annual 
reports/10-K filings to examine its association with CF. There is another line of research focusing 
on audit and/or management reports/opinions on the firm’s ability to continue as going concern. 
For example, Uang et al. (2006) examine the information content of auditors’ and managers’ reports 
on going concern and find that audit opinions are more informative in predicting CF than 
managers’ reports. They further find that managers of firms with effective governance monitoring 
are likely to convey messages consistent with those of auditors regarding going concern disclosures. 
Similarly, within the US context, a recent study by Mayew et al. (2015) analyzes the text of the 
 
7 Furthermore, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) find systematic patterns in reporting good and bad news (in the 
Chairman’s statements in the UK) regardless of company performance. In this, managers attribute good news to 
themselves, while blaming the external environment for bad news, which is consistent with impression management 




MD&A section of 10-K filings to examine its ability to predict a firm’s ability to continue. They 
find that the managers’ going concern opinions revealed in the MD&A section, along with the tone 
of that section, are significantly indicative of a firm’s ability to continue as a going concern. In 
another context, the Spanish, Muñoz-Izquierdo et al. (2019) find that auditor’s report contains 
informational content which significantly explains the causes of CF.  
Logically, we infer that the qualitative data contained within annual report narratives have an 
explanatory benefit that can be exploited to predict CF. Therefore, based on the above arguments, 
ceteris paribus, we hypothesize that management in firms with a prospect of failure will use a higher 
frequency of CF-related words in their annual report narratives. 
Consistent with the literature on general disclosure (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Kothari et al., 2009; 
Bao et al., 2019) and/or timeliness of such disclosure (e.g., Clatworthy and Peel, 2016; Luypaert et 
al., 2016; Lukason and Camacho-Minano, 2019), managers’ tendency to withhold bad news and/or 
delay annual reporting (particularly for financially distressed firms) may be seen as a competing 
argument (or implied as a plausible null hypothesis). However, managers’ concerns owing to 
financial sanctions, as well as litigation risk and reputation loss when CF approaches are still 
supportive of our alternative hypothesis (above). Besides, the compliance levels with filing times 
are around 100% for publicly quoted firms (employed in our study) (e.g., Clatworthy and Peel, 
2016). That said, the competing argument derived from this broad theme still plausibly motivates 
our research questions about: first, whether firms with significantly high levels of CF-Disclosure 
are more likely to fail; second, whether CF-Disclosure offers incremental predictive ability relative 
to that offered by the traditional CF predictors (i.e., accounting, market and macroeconomic 




2.5. Research Design  
2.5.1. Sample selection and data collection 
The present study investigates the contribution of CF-Disclosure to predict CF for a matched 
sample of non-financial publicly quoted firms in the UK over a period of sixteen years from January 
2000 to December 2016. We choose this span for our sample because corporate governance data 
starts to be available on the BoardEx database in 1999, while 2016 is chosen due to data availability. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Charitou et al. 2004), we establish our sample of Public Limited 
Companies (PLCs) whose shares are publicly traded under the UK Companies Act 2006, as well 
as Alternative Investment Market (AIM) companies. In addition, financial firms with Standard 
Industrial Classification Code (SIC) between 6000 and 6999 (i.e., finance, insurance and real estate) 
are excluded due to their distinctive regulations and accounting practices (e.g., Bodnaruk et al., 
2015). In terms of failed firms, we include observations only for firms that failed during our sample 
span (i.e., from January 2000 to December 2016). 
Our final sample comprises a group of 272 failed firms and a group of 272 matched healthy 
firms. We implement this technique because it provides a systematic method to define our sample 
of healthy firms (e.g., Charitou et al., 2004; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Hsu and Wu, 2014).8 In 
accordance with most previous CF literature (e.g., Hsu and Wu, 2014; for multiple references see 
Charitou et al., 2004), both groups are matched based on firm size (measured by total assets 
specified from the last complete filed account before CF) and industry classification (utilizing SIC). 
In every year of our sample, firms are coded zero until the failure event, when a failed firm takes 
one, which implies that healthy firms take zero in every year. Following prior research (e.g., Beaver 
et al., 2005; Peat, 2007; Mayew et al., 2015), this approach enables us to estimate a hazard model, 
or as known by survival analysis, as discrete-time logit model (shown later). Shumway (2001) 
 
8 Employing a matched control sample is a common practice in CF prediction research. Particularly in our chapter, it 
helps to cut the cost of data collection because compared to financial data and the US 10-Ks (inclusively available at 
SEC EDGAR database), the manual collection of UK annual reports to retrieve qualitative data is substantially time 




indicates that considering multiple firm-year observations for both failed and healthy firms 
enhances efficiency, and mitigates the bias and inconsistency of the estimated coefficients as 
compared to a static model, particularly when the sample period is long, like ours.  
Following prior literature (e.g., Campbell et al. 2008; Tinoco and Wilson 2013) we adopt a 
CF definition that incorporates the legal approach and financial distress approach. This definition 
is advantageous for considering the practical perspectives of CF and thus, improves the scope and 
predictive power of the empirical models (Campbell et al. 2008; Tinoco and Wilson 2013).9 A firm 
is defined as legally failed (i.e., bankrupt) if its status is in administrative receivership, administration, 
company voluntary arrangement, voluntary liquidation, liquidation or when there is a cancellation 
of the firm and it is assumed valueless (e.g., Charitou et al., 2004; Christidis and Gregory, 2010). In 
addition to the previous legal approach, a firm is identified as financially distressed (financial approach) 
whenever it concurrently experiences, for two successive years, the following conditions (e.g., 
Pindado et al., 2008; Tinoco and Wilson, 2013): first, a negative growth in the market value; second, 
its financial expenses surpass its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. 
Applying these two measures jointly, besides requiring two consecutive years, provides a strong 
basis (the confluence and continuity of the two measures together) for regarding the firm as 
financially distressed. In order to ensure the accuracy of the analysis, the healthy group retains only 
the non-failed firms that are not exposed to financial distress.10 
We gather the study’s data from several sources as follows. Consistent with Charitou et al. 
(2004), the bankruptcy data are obtained from the UK Companies House – GOV.UK 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house) and the Bloomberg 
database. The accounting, market and macroeconomic data are collected from Datastream and 
Thomson One Banker (Worldscope), while the BoardEx database is used to compile the corporate 
 
9 Technical insolvency (financial distress) and legal insolvency (bankruptcy) describe the practical definitions used for 
CF in the UK. See, for example, https://www.businessrescueexpert.co.uk/insolvency-vs-bankruptcy-uk/  
10 Both sets of failed and healthy firms are also traced to verify their fate and that the latter have not become failing 
over the next few years. Observations related to failed firms are excluded after the event of failure (e.g., Shumway, 




governance data. Furthermore, the annual reports for UK publicly quoted firms are collected from 
multiple sources including the Thomson One Banker database, the Bloomberg database, the UK 
Companies House website, as well as the companies’ official websites. In this respect, we 
operationalize the annual report as our source of narratives because it is perceived to be the major 
and most credible source of information for the informed parties (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). 
Diction version 7 is employed to extract the scores from the annual report narratives. 
2.5.2. Variables measurement  
2.5.2.1. Textual analysis proceedings and CF-Disclosure 
This chapter creates a comprehensive list of CF-related keywords to capture the CF 
sentiment in annual report narratives. In line with most prior textual analysis studies in accounting 
and finance (e.g., Bodnaruk et al., 2015), we adopt the bag of words method (Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011), in which the annual reports are parsed into a matrix composed of words and 
word count vectors.11 Our approach is consistent with Loughran and McDonald’s (2016) assertion 
of the importance of developing a wordlist in the context of each textual-subject study, as reliance 
on a wordlist that is derived from a different subject would probably cause spurious results 
(Loughran and McDonald, 2011). 
The following procedures are applied to establish the wordlist (see figure 2.1.). (1) We review 
CF academic studies (e.g., Dimitras et al., 1996; Charitou et al., 2004; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; 
Altman and Hotchkiss, 2010), the UK insolvency law (e.g., Insolvency Act 1986 and Enterprise 
Act 2002), the online information published at Insolvency Service and Companies House 
(https://www.gov.uk/), company news and announcements at Bloomberg Terminal and 
professionals online sites such as INVESTEGATE  (http://www.investegate.co.uk/). This step 
enables us to identify the initial wordlist. (2) Following Elshandidy and Shrives (2016), the initial 
wordlist is expanded by including related synonyms using Roget’s Thesaurus 
 




(http://www.roget.org/). (3) To develop the wordlist further, following prior research (e.g., 
Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Kravet and Muslu, 2013), twenty annual reports for firms that failed 
after being financially distressed are randomly selected and carefully read to recognize words that 
are indicative of the CF. (4) To check the extent to which the CF identified words are featured, the 
word is omitted if: a) it is not repeated in at least two annual reports, or b) it does not appear in at 
least one annual report, as well as any leading wordlists of risk-related disclosures (Elshandidy and 
Shrives, 2016). (5) Consistent with CF literature (e.g., Casey et al., 1986; Altman and Hotchkiss, 
2010) and practical aspects of the UK insolvency law, the CF aggregate wordlist is assessed and 
classified into three categories, which are warning, reorganizational and statistical-related concepts. 
The reorganizational group reflects the company’s attempts to survive. The warning group 
reveals management signals to stakeholders. Both show consistency with management intentions 
to rehabilitate a distressed firm and warn related parties about a prospect of failure. This in turn is 
consistent with legitimacy and signaling theories. Besides, both groups are consistent with the 
context of liquidation (Chapter 7) and reorganization (Chapter 11) that is effectuated through the 
UK (US) CF procedures (e.g., Broude et al., 2007). The statistical group represents neutral words 
(such as significant, probable and differ) that reflect neither warning nor reorganization. 
Collectively, this ensures that the CF wordlist reliably connotes the context from which it is derived, 
i.e., the CF context. The final CF wordlist is presented in Appendix B. Notably, in line with 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) and Bodnaruk et al. (2015), the words require*, loss*, risk* and 
impairment* are the most frequent words contributing to CF-related measure.12 In addition, as a 
further check of the validity of our wordlist, 76% of the wordlist of CF is correlated with the leading 
risk-related wordlists.13 More specifically, since in a contemporaneous paper complementary to our 
 
12 * Means any other derivatives from the original word, as consistent with previous wordlists suffixes are allowed. 
Although some loss, risk and fail derivatives do not meet the stage number 4/b, they are retained because these words 
have a strong echo in predicting CF (see Li, 2006).  
13 The aggregate risk, bad, good news and statistical wordlists of Elshandidy and Shrives (2016) are explicitly provided 
in their paper. Similarly, the papers of Kravet and Muslu (2013) and Campbell et al. (2014) contain their risk wordlists 
(with risk subcategories of financial, litigation, tax, other-systematic and other-idiosyncratic). Moreover, the six 




chapter, Gandhi et al. (2019) use the negative wordlist of Loughran and McDonald (2011) and 
show the 10-K’s negative sentiment as a proxy for financial distress in the US banks, we test the 
correlation between the scores generated by our CF wordlist (comprising 267 words) and the 
negative wordlist of Loughran and McDonald (2011) (comprising 2,355 words). Results show that 
the correlation between the two wordlists is significantly high (around 62% at the 1% significance 
level), which implies that the two wordlists in common capture a large proportion of CF-Disclosure 
from the narrative sections of annual reports. The similarity with the work of Gandhi et al. (2019) 
provides further evidence of our wordlist’s validity. Additionally, the negative wordlist of Loughran 
and McDonald (2011) is widely used in both the accounting and finance literature to measure the 
overall negative sentiment in business settings (e.g., Mayew et al., 2015; Loughran and McDonald, 
2016). Consistent with the power law probability distribution (or so-called Zipf’s law; see Loughran 
and McDonald (2016) for more details), this highly significant correlation suggests that our CF 
wordlist is important to identify words most related to CF in narratives’ overall negative 
sentiment.14 
To measure the CF-Disclosure score, as is typically done in textual analysis literature (see the 
review of Loughran and McDonald, 2016), we calculate the percentage of words indicating the 
likelihood of CF in the narrative sections of annual reports (i.e., number indicating the likelihood 
of CF scaled by the total number of words in the annual report). The reliability of the CF-Disclosure 
and its tones of warning and reorganization are statistically examined using Cronbach’s alpha 
(Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016). The Cronbach’s alpha of 87% for the computed scores of the CF-
Disclosure, as well as its sub-tones, implies that the internal consistency between the CF-Disclosure 
and its sub-tones is high relative to the generally accepted value in social science of 70% 
 
and the constraining wordlist of Bodnaruk et al. (2015) are available at Bill McDonald’s web page 
(http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html). 
14 We also test the incremental predictive and explanatory ability of our CF-related warning category against Loughran 
and McDonald’s (2011) negative category, refer to the robustness checks in Section 2.6.3. It is worth noting that having 
our CF wordlist generated within the failure context in the UK, on its own, avoids potential limitations related to using 




(Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016). It is, therefore, concluded that the computed CF-Disclosure is 
reliable. To ensure the validity of our measure, we introduce Appendix 2.C where we show how 
our wordlist performs in predicting two major collapses in the UK market in 2018-2019 (the cases 
of Carillion PLC and Thomas Cook PLC). 
2.5.2.2. Control variables 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Charitou et al., 2004; Christidis and Gregory, 2010; 
Campbell et al., 2008; Tinoco and Wilson, 2013; Hsu and Wu, 2014; Darrat et al., 2016), we control 
for accounting-based variables (profitability, liquidity, leverage and performance). These are ROA 
(profitability) = net income/total assets, Current Ratio (liquidity) = current assets/ current liabilities, 
Capital Structure (leverage) = total debt/total equity capital, Funds from Operations (performance) = 
total funds from operations/total liabilities. Consistent with prior research, the present study 
expects that firms with higher profitability, liquidity and performance have a lower probability of 
failure, whereas higher leverage raises the possibility of failure. 
We further control for market and macroeconomic-based variables following prior research 
(e.g., Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; Campbell et al., 2008; Christidis and Gregory, 2010; Tinoco and 
Wilson, 2013; Darrat et al., 2016). The market-based control variables are: PRICE = log firm’s 
equity price, Abnormal Returns = the firm’s cumulative annual returns minus the FTSE All Share 
return index for the same period of time, Market Cap = log the firm’s market capitalization relative 
to the total market capitalization of the FTSE All Share index, MB = market value equity to book 
value equity and the Volatility of market returns is used as a measure of total risk, which is in turn 
measured by the standard deviation (sigma). Then, we add these two macroeconomic-based 
variables: the Retail Price Index (RPI) in base 100 as a measure of inflation rate in addition to the 
3-Treasury Bill Rate (TBR) as a proxy for interest rates. Following the aforementioned studies, the 
present study expects that firms with larger market capitalization, higher stock price, abnormal 
stock returns and lower volatility, while market value is unusually low relative to book value, during 




Figure 2.1. Textual analysis procedures to capture CF-Disclosure 
This figure describes the three main steps taken to generate CF-Disclosure and CF-Disclosure sub-tones. A detailed 
discussion can be found in Section 2.5.2.1. 
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Additionally, we control for a number of different possible corporate governance variables 
that are broadly used in previous CF research (e.g., Daily and Dalton, 1994, 1995; Fich and Slezak, 
2008; Platt and Platt, 2012; Hsu and Wu, 2014; Darrat et al., 2016). These variables include Board 
Size as measured by the log of the total number of board members, Board Independence as the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors to the board size, CEO Turnover as a 
dichotomous variable coded as one if the firm experienced a change in CEO and zero otherwise, 
CEO Duality as a dummy variable set to one if the CEO is also chairman of the board of directors 
or the executive chairman is present on the board and zero otherwise, and Board Diversity as 
captured by the proportion of female directors on the board of directors. Following the above-
mentioned studies, the present study expects a negative (positive) relationship between board size, 
board independence, and board gender diversity (CEO turnover, and CEO duality) and the 
likelihood of CF. 
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for all explanatory variables for the final sample, which 
consists of 3,941 firm-year observations (272 healthy firms with 2,371 firm-year observations and 
272 failed firms with 1,570 firm-year observations). Panels A, B and C of Table 2.1 present the 
descriptive statistics for the entire dataset, healthy firms and failed firms, respectively. To mitigate 
the outlier statistical problem, all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails 
(Shumway, 2001). The t-test statistics suggest that the means of all explanatory variables, except 
MB, are significantly different between the healthy and failed firms.15 Table 2.2 displays the pair-
wise correlations, where Pearson product moment correlations are displayed above the diagonal 
and Spearman rank-order correlations are displayed below. Collectively, CF is significantly 
correlated with the predicted signs with most control variables, where CF is coded as one if the 
firm is classified as failed and zero otherwise. Specifically, the CF variable is positively correlated 
with CF-Disclosure (p < 0.01). We also note that there is a positive correlation (p < 0.01) between 
 
15 Since multivariate analysis provides a better basis for drawing inferences related to the extent to which CF-Disclosure 
predicts CF and whether CF-Disclosure incrementally predicts CF over the classical CF prediction variables (e.g., 




the level of aggregate CF-Disclosure and its sub-tones (untabulated for brevity), which thereby 
suggests that UK non-financial publicly quoted firms employ the tone in narrative-related 
disclosures to communicate their effort to face the probable failure or to convey a warning message 
about the CF likelihood.16 
Table 2.1. 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Entire data set 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Median Q1 Q3 
Accounting, market and macroeconomic control variables (serve as a base model): 
ROA 3941 -3.812 28.220 4.400 -4.950 9.010 
Current Ratio  3941 2.458 3.385 1.450 0.990 2.360 
Capital Structure  3941 25.255 31.896 17.940 0.330 39.030 
Funds from Operation 3941 -0.132 1.212 0.138 -0.021 0.281 
PRICE  3941 4.352 1.797 4.554 3.314 5.587 
Market Cap 3941 6.938 0.559 6.930 6.715 7.173 
Abnormal Returns   3941 0.159 13.505 -0.775 -6.652 5.759 
MB 3941 2.429 4.285 1.560 0.880 2.890 
Volatility  3941 0.497 0.247 0.435 0.316 0.626 
TBR 3941 2.713 2.174 3.871 0.389 4.746 
PRI 3941 213.288 27.711 208.500 188.200 242.000 
CF- Disclosure (explanatory variable): 
CF-Disclosure 3941 2.527 0.385 2.517 2.254 2.783 
Corporate governance control factors: 
Board Size  3941 1.834 0.335 1.792 1.609 2.079 
Board Independence 3941 0.347 0.234 0.400 0.167 0.500 
CEO Turnover  3941 0.103 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Duality Role 3941 0.285 0.451 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Gender Diversity  3941 0.051 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.100 
 
 Panel B: Healthy firms 
 
Panel C: Failed firms 
 
Difference 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Median Obs. Mean S.D. Median t-statistics 
ROA 2371 3.196 17.409 6.110 1570 -14.395 36.821 -1.510 20.115*** 
Current Ratio  2371 2.345 2.971 1.530 1570 2.629 3.922 1.335 -2.587*** 
Capital Structure  2371 23.706 26.843 18.110 1570 27.595 38.174 17.730 -3.753*** 
Funds from 
Operation 
2371 0.074 0.923 0.180 1570 -0.443 1.497 0.034 13.394*** 
PRICE  2371 4.679 1.600 4.840 1570 3.857 1.958 4.052 14.441*** 
Market Cap 2371 6.983 0.489 6.958 1570 6.869 0.646 6.882 6.290*** 
Abnormal  
Returns   
2371 0.709 11.645 -0.548 1570 -0.671 15.875 -1.380 3.143*** 
 
16 In addition, the correlation coefficients for both independent and control variables that are included in the logit 
analyses are also used to diagnose multicollinearity (untabulated). With Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics less 
than 10 (or its alternate tolerance (TOL) statistics above 0.1), the unreported tests suggest that multicollinearity is not 




MB 2371 2.474 3.719 1.620 1570 2.360 5.021 1.425 0.816 
Volatility  2371 0.429 0.213 0.374 1570 0.599 0.259 0.563 -22.515*** 
TBR 2371 2.278 2.164 0.501 1570 3.370 2.020 4.476 -15.911*** 
PRI 2371 218.834 28.748 222.700 1570 204.911 23.733 199.900 15.929*** 
CF-Disclosure 2371 2.495 0.379 2.493 1570 2.574 0.390 2.549 -6.268*** 
Board Size  2371 1.869 0.320 1.792 1570 1.781 0.349 1.792 8.221*** 
Board 
Independence 
2371 0.371 0.225 0.400 1570 0.310 0.243 0.333 8.177*** 
CEO Turnover  2371 0.083 0.276 0.000 1570 0.134 0.341 0.000 -5.133*** 
Duality Role 2371 0.274 0.446 0.000 1570 0.301 0.459 0.000 -1.847* 
Gender Diversity  2371 0.056 0.097 0.000 1570 0.044 0.085 0.000 3.974*** 
This table presents summary statistics for all independent variables and scores over the period 2000 to 2016. The entire sample 
of 544 firms comprises 272 failed firms matched with 272 healthy firms. ROA is the return on assets as a measure of firm 
profitability = net income/total assets. Current Ratio is a measure of firm liquidity = current assets/current liabilities. Capital 
Structure is measured by firm leverage = total debt/total equity. Funds from Operation is a measure of firm performance = total 
funds from operations/total liabilities. PRICE is measured as the log of firm's equity price. Market Cap measures the firm's relative 
value as the log of the firm's market capitalization relative to the total market capitalization of the FTSE All Share index. Abnormal 
Returns represents the firm's cumulative annual returns minus the FTSE All Share return index for the same period of time. 
Volatility is the sigma of market returns used as a measure of total risk, which is in turn measured by the standard deviation. MB 
is market to book ratio = market value equity/book value equity. RPI is the Retail Price Index (RPI) in base 100 as a measure of 
the inflation rate. TBR is the 3-Treasury Bill Rate as a proxy for interest rates. CF-Disclosure is the aggregate information regarding 
CF, measured by the percentage of words that indicate the likelihood of CF in the narrative sections of annual reports. Board Size 
is measured by the log of the total number of board of directors. Board Independence is measured by the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors to the board size. CEO Turnover is a dichotomous variable coded as one if the firm experienced a change 
in CEO and zero otherwise. Duality Role is a dummy variable set to one if the CEO is also chairman of the board of directors or 
executive chairman presents on the board and zero otherwise. Gender Diversity is measured by the proportion of female directors 
on the board of directors. In addition, for these variables, t-statistics report the differences between healthy and failed firms.        








Pearson (top) and Spearman (bottom) correlation coefficients 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 CF  -0.283 0.034 0.058 -0.188 -0.226 -0.113 -0.043 -0.015 0.214 0.025 0.038 0.208 -0.167 -0.115 0.094 0.015 -0.025 
2 ROA -0.273  -0.069 -0.024 0.536 0.292 0.153 0.043 -0.101 -0.432 -0.038 0.017 -0.203 0.263 0.216 -0.086 -0.053 0.103 
3 Current Ratio  -0.064 0.055  -0.271 -0.468 -0.139 0.048 0.002 -0.015 0.123 0.005 0.017 -0.067 -0.140 -0.150 -0.038 0.022 -0.068 
4 Capital Structure  -0.020 0.048 -0.498  0.113 0.087 -0.066 -0.019 -0.052 -0.048 0.051 -0.053 0.076 0.144 0.131 0.066 -0.015 0.011 
5 Funds from Operation -0.256 0.739 0.119 -0.095  0.289 0.055 0.012 -0.092 -0.322 -0.056 0.039 -0.085 0.226 0.235 -0.024 -0.031 0.100 
6 PRICE -0.209 0.424 -0.045 0.178 0.357  -0.033 -0.023 0.188 -0.469 0.028 -0.010 -0.210 0.458 0.351 -0.028 -0.028 0.104 
7 Market Cap -0.115 0.176 0.045 -0.028 0.141 -0.003  0.163 -0.146 -0.040 -0.120 0.005 -0.154 0.053 0.007 -0.062 0.051 0.015 
8 Abnormal Returns   -0.045 0.090 0.015 -0.011 0.075 0.005 0.148  -0.031 0.024 -0.128 0.080 0.014 -0.009 0.020 -0.033 -0.009 0.050 
9 MB -0.083 0.221 0.053 0.047 0.144 0.387 -0.172 -0.058  -0.003 0.016 0.002 -0.055 0.082 0.049 -0.020 -0.034 0.056 
10 Volatility  0.209 -0.453 0.010 -0.160 -0.399 -0.520 -0.076 -0.029 -0.212  -0.025 -0.037 0.235 -0.346 -0.262 0.075 0.099 -0.145 
11 TBR 0.047 -0.012 -0.018 0.059 -0.085 0.005 -0.144 -0.129 0.061 -0.018  -0.848 -0.315 0.022 -0.127 0.011 0.092 -0.190 
12 RPI 0.053 0.008 0.045 -0.078 0.054 -0.004 0.016 0.101 -0.036 -0.041 -0.768  0.356 -0.059 0.125 0.021 -0.110 0.232 
13 CF-Disclosure 0.198 -0.308 -0.144 0.050 -0.278 -0.204 -0.145 0.013 -0.160 0.233 -0.283 0.375  -0.199 -0.001 0.100 -0.020 0.062 
14 Board Size -0.151 0.268 -0.105 0.229 0.211 0.464 0.068 0.025 0.205 -0.365 0.018 -0.072 -0.193  0.377 0.007 -0.089 0.144 
15 Board Independence -0.109 0.234 -0.087 0.213 0.211 0.346 0.017 0.052 0.107 -0.266 -0.136 0.137 0.016 0.360  0.021 -0.202 0.186 
16 CEO Turnover 0.094 -0.107 -0.032 0.026 -0.078 -0.028 -0.059 -0.034 -0.041 0.076 0.005 0.021 0.096 0.011 0.020  0.004 0.016 
17 Duality Role 0.015 -0.065 -0.023 -0.036 -0.018 -0.026 0.030 -0.027 -0.084 0.088 0.078 -0.114 -0.017 -0.100 -0.209 0.004  -0.067 
18 Gender Diversity -0.039 0.146 -0.051 0.064 0.116 0.163 0.027 0.056 0.112 -0.181 -0.197 0.225 0.060 0.216 0.226 0.008 -0.073  
This table reports the correlation coefficients for regression variables. Bold text indicates significance based on two-tailed t-tests, at the 0.05 level or better. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
1% on both tails. Refer to Table 2.1 and Appendix 2.D for the variable descriptions, measures, and sources. 
 




2.5.3. The empirical model 
To estimate a multi-period (i.e., dynamic) logit model, we (following: Shumway, 2001; Chava 
and Jarrow, 2004; Campbell et al., 2008; Tinoco and Wilson, 2013; Darrat et al., 2016) employ a 
binary indicator of CF. The CF indicator is given a value of one if the company is classified as 
failed and zero otherwise. As pointed out earlier, we establish our analysis on both approaches to 
failure, i.e., the financial approach and the legal approach. Since there are multiple observations of 
the same firm, following Petersen (2009), we employ robust standard errors estimation and adjust 
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].  (2.1) 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 denotes the conditional probability in time 𝑡 that the firm 𝑖 will fail within one year. This 
conditional probability is based on the observed value of y𝑖,𝑡, which is a linear set of the 
independent variables. 𝑋1,𝑡−1 denotes the value of the first independent variable at the year that 
immediately precedes CF, and so on. As a result, conditional on the observed values of our 
predictors, the multi-period logit model predicts the probability of CF during a year. Following 
prior studies (e.g., Tinoco and Wilson, 2013; Darrat et al., 2016), we estimate the probability of CF 
for one year and two years before the event of failure. The model description is identical when 
predicting for two years prior to CF. 
2.6. Empirical Results and Discussion  
2.6.1. Empirical results 
Panel A of Table 2.3 reports the results of logit regression models for examining the ability 




year and two years prior to CF, we introduce first Model 1 and Model 5 that give the impact of 
accounting, market and macroeconomic variables, as the base model, on CF. In one year before 
the CF, the results suggest that firms with larger market capitalization, higher profitability and stock 
prices, as well as lower leverage and volatility during low levels of inflation and interest rates are 
less likely to fail than other firms. In two years prior to CF, the signs of coefficients are not changed 
and results remain at the 1% significance level, except leverage and market capitalization, where 
significance is decreased to 5%, and abnormal returns, which becomes negatively significant at the 
10% level. These results are consistent with our expectations and prior CF literature (e.g., Tinoco 
and Wilson, 2013). 
The following models report the CF-Disclosure estimates in a sequential fashion showing the 
incremental predictive ability of CF-Disclosure relative to the base model predictors. Following prior 
research (e.g., Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Campbell et al., 2008; Mayew et al., 2015), we, in a first 
round, also show the incremental explanatory ability and predictive accuracy using the McFadden 
Pseudo R2 (Pseudo R2) in addition to the p-values of the both Wald Chi-squared test (Wald χ2 Test) 
and likelihood ratio test statistics (LRT). As a first step, we investigate the role of our main variable 
of interest, CF-Disclosure, alone. In Model 2 and Model 6 in a year and two years prior to CF, CF-
Disclosure is significant at the 1% level (Z-statistics are 10.150 and 7.301, respectively). In addition, 
the Pseudo R2 statistics suggest that CF-Disclosure alone has predictive accuracy and provides 
explanatory power of about 41% (0.069 under Model 2 / 0.167 under Model 1) and 25% (0.040 
under Model 6 / 0.160 under Model 5) relative to that provided by accounting, market and 
macroeconomic variables combined.17 This implies the feasible predictive ability of CF-Disclosure as 
compared to the CF predictors widely used in the classical models.  
In Model 3 and Model 7, representing our expanded model, CF-Disclosure is added as the key 
explanatory variable to the variables of the base model. In both models in a year and two years 
 
17 Caution should be exercised in interpreting the Pseudo R2. However, its values are comparable and indicative when 




prior to CF, CF-Disclosure is significant at the 1% level (Z-statistics are 6.811 and 4.655, 
respectively). To put this in an economic perspective, we estimate the average marginal effects 
(unreported).18 With a standard deviation of 0.385, the marginal effects of the CF-Disclosure are 
0.097 and 0.076 in the year preceding the CF and the penultimate year, respectively. That is, other 
things being equal, a one-standard-deviation increase in the CF-Disclosure is associated with a 39.7% 
(0.097 * 0.385 / CF binary dependent sample mean of 0.094) greater likelihood of CF within a year. 
Similarly, a one-standard-deviation increase in the CF-Disclosure is associated with a 31.9% greater 
likelihood of CF within two years. Thus, the presence of more CF-related words in the annual 
report narratives is associated with a higher probability of CF in the first or second following year. 
These results support the study’s hypothesis. 
These results are consistent with signaling and legitimacy theories as where a firm’s solvency 
is in question, managers are motivated to signal threats to the firm’s legitimacy in order to formulate 
a normalizing account, perform strategic restructuring, mitigate information asymmetry, reduce 
stakeholders’ responses and lessen litigation and reputational risks. Furthermore, our findings 
support previous arguments (e.g., Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2007) that annual report narratives 
provide the official channel for managers to disclose potential CF to stakeholders. These results 
confirm prior studies’ (e.g., Ohlson, 1980; Shuai and Li, 2005) call for the recognition of qualitative 
variables to enhance the predictive power of CF models. 
Furthermore, the Pseudo R2 statistics in addition to the p-values of the both Wald χ2 Test 
and LRT report the significance of incorporating the CF-Disclosure variable into the traditional base 
model. Relative to the base model (Models 1 and 5), the p-values reported under Model 3 and 
Model 7 for one year and two years prior to CF, respectively, indicate the high significance of CF-
Disclosure at the 1% level. Besides, the enhancement in Pseudo R2 statistic by about 16% (from 
0.167 for Model 1 to 0.193 for Model 3) for the year prior to CF, as well as by about 9% (from 
 
18 Marginal effects are the average of discrete or partial changes in the quantities of interest (i.e., the probability of CF) 





0.160 for Model 5 to 0.174 for Model 7) for the two years prior to CF underscores the incremental 
explanatory ability of CF-Disclosure. 
Taken all together, these findings empirically indicate that annual report narratives are an 
important factor in predicting the likelihood of CF. The theoretical implications of this finding 
contribute in enriching the continuing discussion about the usefulness of information conveyed in 
annual report narratives (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2018) by underscoring its importance in predicting 
CF and improving or revising CF classical prediction models. These implications are also extended 
to the auditors to strengthen audit’s analytical review, especially for the sake of going concern 
reporting. In addition, the results have practical implications for investors and other market 
participants who are likely to look for early warning alerts of CF. In Models 3 and 7, the control 
variables that are included in the base model retain their statistical significance, except capital 
structure and market capitalization, which become significant at the 5% and 10% levels in one year 
and two years prior to CF, respectively. 
Model 4 and Model 8 include further corporate governance factors (board size, board 
independence, CEO turnover, duality role and gender diversity), which were of interest in previous CF studies 
such as Daily and Dalton (1994, 1995), Fich and Slezak (2008), and Hsu and Wu (2014). This 
inclusion is important to revise our results from possible endogeneity attributable to omitted 
variables (Darrat et al., 2016), as well as considering the influence of conventional corporate 
governance factors that appear in the prior CF literature. The exhibited models for one year and 
two years prior to CF indicate, as before, that the positive relationship between CF-Disclosure and 
the likelihood of CF remains highly significant with a stable Z-statistic at the 1% level, even in the 
presence of corporate governance attributes. Thus, this finding suggests that the present study’s 
key variable of CF-Disclosure is a powerful and consistent predictor over time of the possibility of 
CF. Regarding corporate governance control variables, interestingly none is statistically significant 
in its association with the likelihood of CF, either for the penultimate year or the year preceding 




statistic of 2.435), which suggests that CEO instability increases for failed firms (Daily and Dalton, 
1995). In sum, the observed corporate governance results are consistent with the findings of Hsu 
and Wu (2014) related to board composition in the UK context. 
Panel B of Table 2.3 displays a comparison of model performance statistics from the base 
model (Model 1 and Model 5 in panel A) and the expanded model that includes CF-Disclosure 
(Model 3 and Model 7 in panel A) as estimated in a year and two years prior to CF. Following prior 
CF research (e.g., Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; Tinoco and Wilson, 2013; 
Darrat et al., 2016) this chapter employs five widely used measures to assess the model’s fit and 
predictive ability: Pseudo R2 (reported under panel A), Wald χ2 Test, Hosmer and Lemeshow 
goodness-of-fit test (H&L Test), LRT and Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
(ROC) Curve (AUC). 
Typically, the higher absolute values of the Pseudo R2 statistic, as a proportion of change in 
terms of the log likelihood, imply that the model, as a whole, provides a superior fit to the data. 
The Wald χ2 Test restricts the parameters of interest to zero and checking if the fit of the model is 
significantly reduced. Similarly, LRT compares the difference between the nested models. 
Accordingly, if the difference is statistically significant, it is indicative that the unconstrained model 
statistically fits the data better than the constrained model; thus, including the variables is 
imperative. AUC gauges the discriminating ability and accuracy of the model relative to the perfect 
model with a value of 1. AUC shows the probability of detecting true and false outcomes for an 
entire range of possible cut-points. Thus, it is a complete and leading measure to assess the model’s 
ability to discriminate between the subjects of the binary outcomes, with a higher score suggesting 
better predictive ability (Hosmer et al., 2013). In the H&L Test the sample is divided up, as is 
commonly done (e.g., Tinoco and Wilson, 2013), into ten groups (g) based on the predicted 




and the observed frequency. Thus, the more closely these frequencies match, the better fitted is 
the model to predict the binary outcome (i.e., CF) (Agresti, 2002).19  
With the exception of the H&L Test statistics, panel B of Table 2.3 shows that both base 
and expanded models have significant performance in predicting CF for a year and two years before 
CF. However, the superior statistics for the expanded model (relative to the base model) clearly 
indicate that adding the CF-Disclosure variable contributes positively and significantly to the 
performance of the CF prediction models (the AUC of the model contains CF-Disclosure alone is 
virtually 85% of the base model). This, in other words, also means that it is preferable to consider 
CF-Disclosure alongside the traditional accounting, market and macroeconomic variables in order to 
increase the CF prediction ability. 
In terms of H&L Test statistics, in t - 1, the large chi-square (14.710) with a p-value slightly 
above 0.05 implies that the base model hardly fits the data. In t - 2, the chi-square exceeds 15 and 
the p-value is significantly lower than 0.05, obviously suggesting that the base model does not fit 
well. This, in turn, implies that the base model lacks other explanatory variables needed to 
accurately discriminate between the binary response (i.e., the CF). Turning to the expanded model, 
in both t - 1 and t - 2, the small chi-square (<15) and the large p-value (>0.05) clearly suggest that 
the model fit is good. Therefore, it can be concluded that incorporating the CF-Disclosure variable 
significantly assists the traditional variables in adequately discriminating between failed and healthy 
firms and better predicting CF. We also check the external validity of our multi-period logit model 
by undertaking an out-of-sample-period ex-ante test (Charitou et al., 2004). Our validation sample 
takes place in the 2011-2016 period. In t -1 and t - 2, the predictive ability of the base model is 




19 The H&L Test statistic approximately follows a chi-squared distribution with g−2 degrees of freedom and a good 
fit yields a large p-value. Therefore, a small chi-square (<15) and a large p-value (>0.05) indicate that the model fits 





Logit regressions and model performance measures 
Panel A: Logit regression of CF indicator on CF-Disclosure, corporate governance and complete predictor variables 
  
VARIABLES 
One year prior to CF  Two years prior to CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 ‘Further’  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 ‘Further’ 
ROA -0.011***  -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010***  -0.014***  -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 
(-5.041)  (-5.508) (-5.113) (-5.159)  (-5.778)  (-6.153) (-6.009) (-6.014) 
Current Ratio  -0.002  0.011 0.011 0.009  0.003  0.014 0.014 0.014 
 
(-0.086)  (0.584) (0.580) (0.484)  (0.141)  (0.641) (0.624) (0.612) 
Capital Structure 0.005***  0.004** 0.004** 0.004**  0.004**  0.003* 0.004* 0.004* 
 
(2.903)  (2.326) (2.497) (2.528)  (2.304)  (1.783) (1.892) (1.890) 
Funds from Operation -0.081  -0.093 -0.088 -0.105*  -0.055  -0.059 -0.060 -0.063 
 
(-1.285)  (-1.550) (-1.459) (-1.722)  (-0.800)  (-0.878) (-0.901) (-0.935) 
PRICE  -0.252***  -0.221*** -0.198*** -0.190***  -0.219***  -0.202*** -0.200*** -0.199*** 
 
(-5.146)  (-4.683) (-4.199) (-4.008)  (-4.450)  (-4.216) (-4.215) (-4.186) 
Market Cap -0.348***  -0.234** -0.229** -0.208**  -0.274**  -0.188* -0.181 -0.180 
 
(-3.340)  (-2.249) (-2.182) (-1.994)  (-2.494)  (-1.708) (-1.644) (-1.641) 
Abnormal Returns -0.003  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003  -0.009*  -0.008* -0.008* -0.008* 
 
(-0.855)  (-0.872) (-0.874) (-0.841)  (-1.736)  (-1.724) (-1.724) (-1.726) 
MB -0.017  -0.010 -0.008 -0.008  0.001  0.007 0.007 0.007 
 
(-1.210)  (-0.726) (-0.587) (-0.581)  (0.077)  (0.553) (0.549) (0.541) 
Volatility  1.178***  0.943*** 0.866*** 0.868***  1.141***  0.944*** 0.995*** 0.995*** 
 
(3.882)  (3.290) (2.992) (3.007)  (3.727)  (3.206) (3.271) (3.269) 
TBR 0.307***  0.328*** 0.311*** 0.302***  0.401***  0.422*** 0.421*** 0.419*** 
 
(5.297)  (5.758) (5.440) (5.397)  (7.297)  (7.665) (7.658) (7.592) 
RPI 0.027***  0.022*** 0.021*** 0.017***  0.033***  0.031*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 
 
(5.985)  (5.049) (4.749) (3.632)  (7.101)  (6.638) (6.419) (5.857) 
FC-proxy     2.432***      0.300 
     (3.119)      (0.347) 





 (10.150) (6.811) (6.682) (4.757)   (7.301) (4.655) (4.789) (4.112) 
Board Size     -0.358 -0.357     0.243 0.239 
 
   (-1.240) (-1.231)     (0.870) (0.856) 
Board Independence    -0.311 -0.310     -0.491 -0.492 
 
   (-0.949) (-0.929)     (-1.413) (-1.414) 
CEO Turnover     0.460*** 0.464***     0.168 0.168 
 
   (2.870) (2.894)     (0.816) (0.815) 
Duality Role    -0.122 -0.112     -0.142 -0.141 
 
   (-0.759) (-0.692)     (-0.906) (-0.899) 
Gender Diversity    0.557 0.676     0.675 0.698 
 
   (0.679) (0.823)     (0.768) (0.799) 
Constant -6.477*** -7.164*** -9.972*** -8.956*** -8.471***  -8.600*** -5.863*** -11.250*** -11.650*** -11.530*** 
 
(-4.111) (-14.193) (-6.057) (-5.098) (-4.789)  (-5.385) (-11.215) (-6.482) (-6.376) (-6.221) 
Observations 3,941 3,941 3,941 3,941 3,941  3,441 3,441 3,441 3,441 3,441 
LRT (p-value)   < 0.001      < 0.001   
Wald χ2 Test (p-value)   < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001    < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Pseudo R2 0.167 0.069 0.193 0.198 0.203  0.160 0.040 0.174 0.177 0.177 
Panel B: Model performance measures 
Wald χ2 Test:            
χ2 [11,12,11,12]a 292.300  353.170    240.510  287.530   
(p-value) < 0.001  < 0.001    < 0.001  < 0.001   
H&L Test:            
χ2 [8]a 14.710  4.710    16.880  13.06   
(p-value) 0.065  0.789    0.031  0.1100   
LRT:            
χ2  [1]a   64.650      21.670   
(p-value)   < 0.001      < 0.001   
AUCb 0.808 0.696 0.819 0.817 0.820  0.797 0.648 0.800 0.808 0.808 




Panel A of this table reports the results from logit CF prediction models. The ‘Further’ model reports the results of further analysis inspecting the role of financial constraints. FC-
proxy is the percentage of words that indicate financial constraints in annual reports narratives. LRT is the likelihood ratio test statistics between the Base Model and the Expanded 
Model that includes CF-Disclosure in one and two years prior to CF (i.e., Model 1 and Model 3, and Model 5 and Model 7, respectively). Wald χ2 Test represents the significance 
of including the CF-Disclosure parameter in the model. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Z-statistics are in parentheses. Significance level: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. Refer to Table 2.1 and Appendix 2.D for the variable descriptions, measures, and sources. 
The performance statistics of Base Model (1 and 5) and Expanded Model (3 and 7) are reported in Panel B for a year and two years prior to CF. Pseudo R2 (reported under Panel 
A), Wald χ2 Test and H&L Test are calculated individually for each model. In terms of H&L Test, each model’s covariates are tested under the criteria that a small chi-square 
(<15) and a large p-value (>0.05) infer that the model fits the covariates well so that it can be employed appropriately to predict the binary outcome (i.e., CF). LRT is the likelihood 
ratio test statistics between the base and the complete models in a year and two years prior to CF. The AUC measures the model power to discriminate between failed and healthy 
firms with a higher score suggesting improved predictive ability. External validity reports models’ predictive ability using an out-of-sample-period ex-ante test. b For comparison 
purpose, AUC reports the area under the curve for the four models using the same observations under H0: the under-curves areas are equal. The overall p-value <0.001 for the 
four models, as well as models in t - 1 and t - 2 demonstrates the strong rejection of the null hypothesis. AUC of other models is also denoted. a The degrees of freedom for each 





2.6.2. Further analysis 
Motivated by the present study’s theoretical foundation, in addition to considering the 
difficulty in distinguishing financial constraints from CF in some of the previous research (Whited 
and Wu, 2006), we investigate whether financial constraints would promote the incidence of CF. 
We thus use Bodnaruk et al.’s (2015) financial constraints wordlist to calculate the percentage of 
words that indicate financial constraints in annual reports narratives (i.e., FC-proxy).20 The ‘Further’ 
models of Table 2.3 illustrate that failed firms suffer severely from financial constraints in the year 
that directly precedes the failure (Z-statistic is 3.119 at the 1% significance level). The variable’s 
unreported marginal effect of 0.170 indicates that it has a non-trivial economic impact on CF 
(18.9%). However, in two years prior to the CF, the FC-proxy statistically shows an insignificant 
role in the CF. Simultaneously, CF-Disclosure is significantly associated with the probability of CF 
in both the year that directly precedes the CF (Z-statistic is 4.757 at the 1% significance level; 
economically 28.7%) and the penultimate year (Z-statistic is 4.112 at the 1% significance level; 
economically 30.3%). These results, consequently, confirm our supposition that a financially 
distressed firm becomes more vulnerable when financial constraints take place, which as a result, 
would promote the incidence of CF. In the same context, this evidence provides empirical support 
to prior research (e.g., Senbet and Wang, 2012) showing that a firm can be financially distressed 
without being financially constrained.  
2.6.3. Robustness checks  
We validate our findings and test the robustness in various ways. First, to account for the 
effect of the recent financial crisis (2007-2008), we employ dummy variables for the periods prior, 
during and post the crisis. Based on Models 1 and 2 of Table 2.4, the results suggest that the 
probability of failure has significantly increased both during and after the crisis relative to before 
the crisis. Yet, our earlier findings individually and collectively remain strongly consistent. These 
 
20 The multicollinearity (unreported) tests suggest that the predictors remain independent and do not suffer this 




results are consistent with the UK’s companies’ insolvency records and the evidence of Agarwal 
and Taffler (2007) on growing bankruptcies in the UK.  
Turning to Model 3 of Table 2.4, the coefficient estimates of CF-Disclosure, (CF-Disclosure + 
CF-Disclosure*Crisis) and (CF-Disclosure + CF-Disclosure*PostCrisis) report the sign and the 
significance of the relationship between CF-Disclosure and the likelihood of CF considering the 
impacts of the period pre, during and post-crisis, respectively. The evidence clearly indicates that 
CF-Disclosure is positively and significantly able to capture the probability of CF before, during and 
after the financial crisis at the 10-1% level of significance. Moreover, the positive and significant 
sums of the parameters of (CF-Disclosure + CF-Disclosure*Crisis) and (CF-Disclosure + CF-
Disclosure*PostCrisis) indicate that firms increasingly use annual report narratives to communicate 
potential CF during and after the financial crisis (relative to before the financial crisis), respectively. 
To sum up, it can be argued that the annual report narrative-related disclosures imply a very strong 
alarm for CF with a 90-99% confidence level, before, during and after the financial crisis.21  
Table 2.4. 
Logit regression of CF indicator on complete predictor variables with the financial crisis effects 
 VARIABLES 
  
One year prior to CF  Two years prior to CF  One year prior to CF 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Crisis 0.980***  0.845***  0.521* 
 (4.160)  (3.180)  (1.942) 
PostCrisis 1.136***  0.634*  0.318 
 (3.665)  (1.762)  (0.864) 
CF-Disclosure 1.285***  1.016***  0.992*** 
 
(6.580)  (4.835)  (4.303) 
CF-Disclosure*Crisis     0.347*** 
 
    (3.014) 
CF-Disclosure*PostCrisis     0.383* 
 
    (1.758) 
Constant -6.306***  -10.363***  -4.349** 
 
(-3.362)  (-4.602)  (-2.021) 
‘Base & CG controls’ Included  Included  Included 
Observations 3,941  3,941  3,941 
 
21 To verify this conclusion, we also employ the difference-in-differences test to investigate the significance of 
differences in CF-Disclosure between the failed and the healthy firms before, during and after the financial crisis. The 
unreported results are in line with our previous results at the 1% significance level. Notably, we run our test for the 
interactions between CF-Disclosure and crisis dummy variables for only one year before CF since going further would 




Pseudo R2 0.207  0.182  0.212 
AUC 0.820  0.810  0.822 
This table reports the results from logit CF prediction models over the sample period 2000–2016 considering the 
financial crisis effects. Relative to the period before the crisis, Crisis (PostCrisis) is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of one for years 2007 and 2008 (years 2009 to 2016) and zero otherwise. In one year and two years prior to CF, 
Models 1 and 2 are estimated to examine the impact of the financial crisis on the ability of CF-Disclosure variable to 
predict CF. For Model 3, parameter estimates for CF-Disclosure, CF-Disclosure*Crisis and CF-Disclosure*PostCrisis 
indicate the link between CF-Disclosure and CF pre, during and post-crisis, respectively. ‘Base & CG controls’ 
indicates the inclusion of accounting, market, macroeconomic, and corporate governance control variables shown 
in Model 4, Panel A of Table 2.3. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Z-statistics are 
in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. Refer to Table 2.1 and Appendix 2.D for the 
variable descriptions, measures, and sources. 
 
Second, following Chava and Jarrow (2004), we validate our results by investigating the 
influence of industry effects. Thus, in Table 2.5 we run the logit models with an intercept and slope 
dummy variables for each specific industry grouping. Further, for one year and two years before 
CF, slope shifting dummies for CF-Disclosure are applied in Models 3 and 4 to test the link between 
the industry groupings and CF-Disclosure. Chava and Jarrow (2004) indicate that the original four-
digit industry separation is too fine for estimation purposes. Therefore, we follow them and 
combine the four-digit SIC code into three unique groups as follows: IND1 represents 
miscellaneous industries (SIC code is in the ranges 1–1000, 1500–1800, 5000–6000, 7000–8900), 
IND2 represents manufacturing and mineral industries (SIC code is in the ranges 1000–1500, 
2000–4000), and IND3 represents transportation, communications and utilities (SIC code is in the 
range 4000–5000). In addition, as mentioned earlier, the finance, insurance and real estate sector 
(SIC code is in the range 6000-6999) is excluded from our analysis.  
In Table 2.5, it is observed that the CF-Disclosure findings remain consistent with our original 
results discussed earlier. Focusing on Models 3 and 4 where IND3 is employed as the base value, 
the resulting estimates report the significance of IND1. It is, therefore, suggested that IND1 is the 
industry group most exposed to CF, followed by IND2 and IND3, respectively. With respect to 
the interactions between CF-Disclosure and industry groups, CF-Disclosure is positively significant in 
all industry groups, suggesting that CF-Disclosure retains its predictive power to capture the 




Disclosure is more sensitive to the likelihood of CF in IND3 and IND2, respectively, compared to 
IND1. 
Table 2.5. 
Logit regression of CF indicator on complete predictor variables with the industry effects 
 VARIABLES One year prior to CF  Two years prior to CF  One year prior to CF Two years prior to CF 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
IND1   -0.387  -0.464  5.938** 4.963* 
 (-1.158)  (-1.263)  (2.256) (1.796) 
IND2 -0.634*  -0.683*  4.139 2.957 
 (-1.847)  (-1.826)  (1.603) (1.077) 
CF-Disclosure 1.257***  0.949***  3.020*** 2.402***  
(6.496)  (4.607)  (3.648) (2.724) 
CF-Disclosure*IND1     -2.180** -1.921**   
 
 
 (-2.481) (-2.075) 
CF-Disclosure*IND2     -1.608* -1.241   
 
 
 (-1.874) (-1.354) 
Constant -8.200***  -10.824***  -13.426*** -15.043***  
(-4.477)  (-5.730)  (-4.466) (-4.615) 
‘Base & CG controls’ Included  Included  Included Included 
Observations 3,941  3,441  3,941 3,441 
Pseudo R2 0.201  0.180  0.205 0.184 
AUC 0.819  0.811  0.821 0.814 
This table reports the results from logit CF prediction models with the inclusion of industry effects. Consistent with Chava and Jarrow 
(2004), Models 3 and 4 are estimated in one year and two years prior to CF, respectively. IND1 represents miscellaneous industries (SIC 
code is in the ranges 1–1000, 1500–1800, 5000–6000, 7000–8900), IND2 represents manufacturing and mineral industries (SIC code is in 
the ranges 1000–1500, 2000–4000)) and IND3 represents transportation, communications and utilities (SIC code is in the range 4000–
5000). ‘Base & CG controls’ indicates the inclusion of accounting, market, macroeconomic, and corporate governance control variables shown 
in Model 4, Panel A of Table 2.3. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Z-statistics are in parentheses. 
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. Refer to Table 2.1 and Appendix 2.D for the variable descriptions, measures, and 
sources. 
 
Third, to further test the robustness of our results, we perform a univariate analysis for CF-
Disclosure in order to determine its discriminating ability using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
F-test. We also conduct multiple discriminate analysis (MDA) to check the total significance of the 
expanded (and the base) discriminant model. The Wilks’ lambda statistic in panel A of Table 2.6 
suggests that CF-Disclosure is able to explain 4‰ (1 - 0.996) of the total variability between the failed 
and healthy firms.22 In line with that, the F-test statistic suggests that CF-Disclosure has a high ability 
to discriminate between the failed and the healthy firms at the 1% significance level. 
 
22 The value of Wilks’ lambda has a range from 0 to 1. A lower value of Wilks’ lambda implies a greater ability to 
discriminate between the groups (i.e., between the failed and healthy firms). The after CF-Disclosure unexplained total 





In terms of the MDA, panel B in Table 2.6 reports the estimates resulting from our expanded 
model (which involves the variables in Model 3 of Table 2.3) in addition to the base model (which 
involves the variables in Model 1 of Table 2.3). The Wilks’ lambda statistic of the expanded model 
(0.767) implies that the model has a high significance in discriminating between the failed and the 
healthy firms at the 1% significance level. Besides, the reduction in the unexplained proportion of 
the groups’ total variability from 0.772, as is indicated for the base model, to 0.767, as is indicated 
for the expanded model, implies that CF-Disclosure contributes to the discriminating model. These 
results, in sum, accord with the previous findings derived from the logit analysis. 
Fifth, as we noted earlier, Gandhi et al. (2019) in a contemporaneous paper, using an 
approach different from ours, show a significant association between the negative sentiment 
category proposed by Loughran and McDonald (2011), as a proxy for financial distress, and a US 
bank’s omission of dividends and experience of lower return on assets (ROA) in the following year. 
Similarly, we check CF-Disclosure ability to predict dividend omission and ROA decrease in the 
subsequent year. In Model 1 and Model 2 of Table 2.7, the significantly positive (negative) 
 
than its counterpart (0.995) for Altman’s (1968) original Z-score model, that contains five popular financial ratios, 
tested in the UK context (for more details see Almamy et al., 2016). 
Table 2.6. 
F-Test summary and Wilks’ Lambda for CF-Disclosure, base and complete models, as well as the classification results 
Panel A: The univariate analysis for the key variable CF-Disclosure 
 
Variable Wilks’ lambda  F  p-value 
 
CF-Disclosure 0.996 16.890 < 0.001 
 
Panel B: The multiple discriminate analyses for the overall significance of the discriminant models 
Model Test of function(s) Wilks’ lambda Chi-square p-value 
Base Model 1 0.772 1127.045 < 0.001 
Expanded Model 1 0.767 1156.584 < 0.001 
Panel A of this table reports the results of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) F-test for the CF-Disclosure key variable 
on an individual basis to test for the discriminating ability. Panel B reports the explanatory results as well as the 
significance resulting from the multiple discriminate analyses (MDA). Wilk’s lambda is used to test the significance of 
the discriminant functions (i.e., the class centers separation in addition to the proportion of variance); when the value 
of Wilks’ lambda for a function is small, the function is significant. F-test statistic is the ratio of variances. The Base 
Model incorporates the variables in Model 1, Panel A of Table 2.3. The Expanded Model incorporates the variables 





coefficient on CF-Disclosure with a Z(T)-statistic of 3.674 (-2.827) at the 1% significance level 
suggests that CF-Disclosure is significantly predictive of a following year dividends omission and 
lower ROA due to a firm’s financial distress. In unreported tests to predict dividend omission and 
ROA using the negative sentiment category of Loughran and McDonald (2011), our sample fails 
to find significant result for ROA. A plausible reason for this insignificant result is that the negative 
category of Loughran and McDonald (2011) does not recognize CF-related reorganization tone, 
which we find negatively significant with ROA with a T-statistic of -2.585 at the 5% level. 
 
In Model 3 and Model 4 of Table 2.7, we replace the aggregate score of CF-Disclosure with 
Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) negative category (which contains 2,355 words) and our warning 
category to predict CF (which contains 196 words). As expected, the overall pessimistic sentiment 
in the annual report narratives is significantly related to higher probability of subsequent CF (under 
Model 3, Negative_Tone is significantly positive with a Z-statistic of 7.915 at the 1% level). Model 4 
Table 2.7. 
Logit and fixed effects panel regressions using alternative proxies 
 VARIABLES 
  
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Dividend_Omissionit+1 ROAit+1  CFit+1 CFit+1 
CF-Disclosure 0.703*** -5.199***    
 
(3.674) (-2.827)    
Negative_Tone      2.337***  
    (7.915)  
Warning_Tone      1.914*** 
     (8.046) 
Constant -1.624 5.566  -9.324*** -9.901*** 
 
(-1.221) (0.495)  (-5.202) (-5.547) 
‘Base & CG controls’ Included Included  Included Included 
Observations 3,941 3,708  3,941 3,941 
Pseudo (R2)  0.313 (0.293)  0.203 0.207 
This table reports the results from logit (Models 1, 3, and 4) and fixed effects (Model 2) panel estimations. In Models 1 and 2 we replace 
our CF indicator with Dividend_Omission and ROA as financial distress indicators, respectively. In Models 3 and 4 we replace the CF-
Disclosure with the negative sentiment category proposed by Loughran and McDonald (2011) and our warning category, respectively. 
Dividend_Omission is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm does not pay dividends in the subsequent year, and zero otherwise. 
ROA is the subsequent year return on assets = net income/total assets. Negative_Tone is the percentage of negative words in the annual 
report narratives captured using Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) negative wordlist 
(http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html). Warning_Tone represents a CF-Disclosure subgroup that reveals management 
warning signals captured by the percentage of warning words in the annual report narratives. ‘Base & CG controls’ indicates the inclusion 
of accounting, market, macroeconomic, and corporate governance control variables shown in Model 4, Panel A of Table 2.3. Robust 
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Z(T)-statistics are in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 




reveals a relatively higher predictive ability of our CF-related warning category (Warning_Tone is 
significantly positive with a Z-statistic of 8.046 at the 1% level). Additionally, the marginally higher 
Pseudo R2 higher (0.207 > 0.203) illustrates the accuracy of our CF wordlist in capturing the 
warning messages conveyed in annual report narratives about the CF likelihood. Overall, results 
suggest that our CF wordlist is well-established for the CF context, and importantly complementary 
to Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) negative wordlist to identify words most related to CF in the 
overall negative sentiment narratives.  
 
Sixth, we use a multinomial logit model (which is often referred to as conditional logit model) 
to clarify the predictive power of CF-Disclosure to capture the probability of CF while recognizing 
financial distress (FD) and bankruptcy (BR) risks separately. For both tests in a year and two years 
prior to CF, Table 2.8 indicates that CF-Disclosure retains its high significance (at the 1% level) in 
predicting the probability of FD (Z-statistics are 5.707 and 4.388, respectively) and BR (Z-statistics 
are 4.630 and 2.972, respectively). Collectively, the qualitatively immutable and systematic 
inferences provided by Table 2.8 are consistent with our previous results. This also demonstrates 
Table 2.8. 
Multinomial logit regression of financial distress (FD) and bankruptcy (BR) on CF-Disclosure  
 VARIABLES 
  
One year prior to FD/BR  Two years prior to FD/BR 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
 
FD BR  FD BR 
CF-Disclosure 1.865*** 0.985***  1.649*** 0.683*** 
 
(5.707) (4.630)  (4.388) (2.972) 
Constant -2.071 -14.719***  -6.222* -16.325*** 
 
(-0.812) (-6.274)  (-1.941) (-7.753) 
‘Base & CG controls’ Included  Included 
Observations 3,941  3,441 
Pseudo R2 0.205  0.186 
This table reports the results from multinomial logit financial distress/bankruptcy prediction models. Thus, it shows the link between 
the CF-Disclosure variable and the probability of CF while financial distress and bankruptcy risks are recognized separately. Financial 
distress (FD) is defined as whenever a firm simultaneously experiences, for two consecutive years, the following conditions: first, 
negative growth in the market value; second, its financial expenses surpass its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization. Bankruptcy (BR) is defined as when a firm’s status is under administrative receivership, administration, company 
voluntary arrangement, voluntary liquidation, liquidation or when there is a cancellation of the firm and it is assumed valueless. ‘Base 
& CG controls’ indicates the inclusion of accounting, market, macroeconomic, and corporate governance control variables shown in 
Model 4, Panel A of Table 2.3. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Z-statistics are in parentheses. 





the power and practicality of the CF definition that includes the financial distress and bankruptcy 
risks (Campbell et al., 2008; Tinoco and Wilson 2013). 
Furthermore, above, we use a multinomial logit model because the categories of our 
dependent variable convey no natural ordering. In unreported tests, however, we assume that our 
dependent variable conveys ordinal categories (bankruptcy, financial distress, or healthy) 
hypothetically like that, for instance, of a firm’s credit ratings (say: in default, speculative, or 
investment) (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). Accordingly, we estimate an ordered logit model 
investigating the ability of CF-Disclosure to predict the probability of failure in such a setting. The 
untabulated results (Z-statistics are 6.856 and 4.747 at the 1% level for tests in one year and two 
years prior to CF, respectively) are collectively consistent with those previously drawn from our 
prior analyses. Besides, we rerun all models presented in Table 2.3 using two sub-samples in which 
we consider financial distress and bankruptcy separately. All unreported results are robust and 
consistent with that derived from the previous analyses (CF-Disclosure is significant at the 1% level 
in predicting the probability of either FD or BR). As a final robustness check, controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity, the unreported results of our principal analyses with year and industry 
fixed effects collectively and generally are consistent. Overall, our sensitivity tests illustrate that our 
inferences are robust to using alternative measures and estimation procedures.23 
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the literature on CF prediction by examining the predictive ability 
of narrative-related disclosures. To gauge narrative-related disclosures, we established a 
comprehensive list of CF-related keywords capturing the CF sentiment in annual report narratives. 
Regarding CF-Disclosure and CF prediction, we find that greater incidence of CF-Disclosure in 
 
23 Predicting CF for one year and/or two years before the event of failure is common in literature because data 
availability for failed companies is limited; most typically have three firm-year observations prior to CF (e.g., Darrat et 
al., 2016). Interestingly, our untabulated results from a limited sample show that CF-Disclosure can predict CF up to 
six years in advance, which accords with the trend presented in Appendix C for the Carillion case. Although this 
predictive ability is consistent with the forward-looking pattern of narrative disclosures, it should be viewed with 




the annual reports is strongly associated with a higher likelihood of CF, in both the year 
immediately prior to failure and the penultimate year. Our study also provides evidence suggesting 
that CF-Disclosure offers an incremental predictive ability relative to accounting, market and 
macroeconomic variables that are widely used in the classical CF prediction models. Thus, CF-
Disclosure is feasible in enhancing the explanatory power of the models that predict CF. 
Additionally, we observe that a financially distressed firm becomes more vulnerable when financial 
constraints occur, which thereby would accelerate the CF incident. Various robustness tests verify 
the credibility of the incremental explanatory power of CF-Disclosure for CF prediction.  
Despite the importance of our results, they should be interpreted taking into consideration 
the following limitations. First, despite the rational premise of our legal and financial definition of 
CF, it could be a consequence of various reasons such as an ethical problem of management, like 
committing fraud (Hsu and Wu, 2014). Second, annual reports are used because they represent a 
key source of information for investors. However, other outlets of corporate communication (e.g., 
financial analysts’ reports, conference calls and/or online resources) could contain unique signals 
of the likelihood of failure. Third, our chapter adopts a quantity-based methodology in measuring 
CF-Disclosure, without gauging the quality. These limitations might provide avenues for future 
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Appendices of Chapter 2 
Appendix 2.A. 
Summary of empirical work, presented in chronological order, on the relation between qualitative information and firm’s status 
Panel A: Accounting and finance domain 
Study name (year) Journal Jurisdiction Sample Approach 
Tennyson et al. 
(1990) 
JBFA USA 46 firms during 1978-
1980. 
Using automated textual analysis for the 10-Ks’ president’s letters and the management analysis, 
authors identify different themes (e.g., internal operations, growth and expansion) and link them 
to bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms.   
Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) 
QJE USA 49 low-dividend 
paying firms during 
1970-1984. 
Using automated textual analysis for the 10-Ks’ the Liquidity and Capitalization Resource 
Subsection (CAP+LIQ) in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section, authors use 
the firms’ qualitative information to classify each firm-year into one of five categories based on its 
financial constraint status in order to investigate whether firm's financial (health or constraints) 
status interrupts the association between the firm's investment and cash flow. 
Smith and Taffler 
(2000) 
AAAJ UK 66 manufacturing and 
construction firms 
during 1978-1985. 
Using automated textual analysis for the chairman’s discretionary statement, authors employ form 
oriented and meaning oriented means of analysis to explain corporate failure. Notably, authors call 
future research to examine the incremental explanatory ability of the discretionary narrative 
disclosure to that obtained by financial variables alone. They also invite future research to examine 
beyond the chairman’s statement because narrative-related disclosure was a very recent innovation 
in UK reporting practice of the time of the study.    
Boo and Simnett 
(2002) 
ABACUS Australia 140 non-financial 
firms during 1990-
1991. 
Using manual textual analysis for content of management’s prospective comments in financially 
distressed companies, authors categorize management’s comments into optimistic, pessimistic, 
mixed or silent and find that management’s prospective comments are useful to predict firms’ 
future viability. 
Uang et al. (2006) EFM UK 179 non-financial 
firms during 1994-
2000. 
Using automated textual analysis for the tone of the going concern statements by management and 
auditor, authors examine whether auditor and management going concern narratives signal the 
severity of subsequent outcomes appropriately. They find the tone of the auditor does, while that 
of the management does not.  
Holder-Webb and 
Cohen (2007) 
JBE USA 136 non-financial 
firms during 1990-
1995. 
Using a proprietary index based on SEC reporting requirements and practitioner guidelines, authors 
measure the quality of MD&A disclosures for a sample of firms entering financial distress in an 
effort to determine whether changes in the disclosure appear to be motivated primarily by 
economic or ethical concerns. 
Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010) 




Using manual textual analysis for the 10-Ks, authors use qualitative data as a means to categorize a 
firm’s financial constraints. Then, the qualitative categories are incorporated with some proper 
financial ratios. Using this qualitatively determined financial constraint status, authors employ 











Using automated textual analysis for the 10-Ks’ CAP+LIQ in the MD&A section, authors acquire 
continuous measures of financial constraints to investigate the association between the different 
external finance constraints and firms’ characteristics, besides studying the link between these 
constraints and investment and issuance policies following unexpected negative shocks. 
Bodnaruk et al. 
(2015) 




Using automated textual analysis for the 10-Ks, authors use qualitative information to first create 
financial constraints wordlist, then use their wordlist to construct a measure of financial constraints 
as the percentage of constraining words in 10-K narratives. Finally, they use that measure to directly 
predict financial constraints events (dividend omissions, dividend increases, equity recycling, and 
underfunded pension plans). 
Mayew et al. (2015) AR USA 45,725 firm-year 
observations during 
1995–2012. 
Using the mandatory going concern opinion by the management under FASB’s requirements, as 
well as the overall linguistic tone of the MD&A utilizing LM (2011) negative and positive wordlists, 
authors measure a firm’s ability to continue as a going concern. 
Gandhi et al. 
(2019) 
JBF USA 6,223 bank-year 
observations during 
1997-2014. 
Using LM (2011) negative wordlist, authors examine the link between the proportion of negative 
words in the US banks’ 10-Ks and four separate variables of financial distress (subsequent 
distressed delisting, dividends omission, loan losses, and ROA) to introduce negative sentiment in 
banks’ 10-K narratives as a new proxy for bank distress.  
Muñoz-Izquierdo 
et al. (2019) 




Using manual textual analysis for comments disclosed in auditor’s unqualified opinions, unqualified 
opinions with emphasis paragraphs, and qualified opinions, authors indicate that auditor’s report 
can reveal the causes of business failure, where 11 causes are studied.  
Panel B: Machin learning domain* 
Study name (year) Journal Jurisdiction Sample Approach 
Cecchini et al. 
(2010) 
DSS USA 156 manufacturing 
firms during 1994-
1999. 
Using a complex vector space model, authors analyze the textual content in MD&A disclosures to 
predict bankruptcy and fraud outcomes. To predict bankruptcy, the algorithm they use incorporates 
word sense disambiguation that considers the context of a sentence and employs the WordNet 
program to create a concept score to identify classifiers of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. Later, 
a Support Vector Machine classification method is used to identify phrases that ultimately 
discriminate between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. 
Shirata et al. (2011) JETA Japan 180 firms during 
1999-2005. 
Using text mining methods (morphological analysis and conditional probability), authors analyze 
the sentences in annual reports and extract key phrases/descriptions, where they show that a 
distinguishing between bankrupt firms and non-bankrupt firms can be done using some particular 
expressions when appear together with the word “dividend” or “retained earnings”.  
Yang et al. (2018) JETA USA 168 firms from 2014. Using SAS Text Miner and a latent semantic analysis algorithm, authors extract high-frequency 
words, related concept links, and topics from MD&As to identify differences in textual expressions 
used by bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. They only observe that some high-frequency words 
appear to suggest differences between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms regarding their financial 




Mai et al. (2019) EJOR USA 94,994 firm-year 
observations during 
1994–2014. 
Designing a deep learning approach, i.e., a machine learning paradigm that combines multiple layers 
of neural networks to learn representations of data with multiple levels of abstraction, authors 
employ different model set-ups using varying input data (based on an end-to- end machine-learning 
model, in which the learning algorithm goes directly from the raw textual input to the prediction) 
and find that MD&A information content is useful for bankruptcy prediction. They also suggest 
that a simple deep learning model using an average of the embedding layer is better than other data 
mining models when textual information is used. 
Tang et al. (2020) JF China 424 firms during 
2014-2018. 
Extracting valuable features by using the wrapper-based method, followed by constructing multiple 
single classifiers, ensemble classifiers, and deep learning models, authors propose a framework 
(incorporating the integration of financial, management, and textual factors) to reveal the financial 
distress features of listed Chinese firms. Their experiment results (which indicate the superiority of 
ensemble classifiers and deep learning models) suggest that management and textual factors are the 
key factors in the financial distress prediction of listed Chinese companies. 
Appendix A gives a summary of recent research on the relation between narratives and CF.  
* There are various methods for modeling using machine learning methods, with several purported advantages (e.g., improved predictive performance). However, machine learning 
methods are “black boxes” preventing from understanding the role of each independent variable and thus, making results interpretation a big problem. Additionally, many of 
these methods are complex (and potentially add more noise than signal) and have many important drawbacks. Refer, for example, to Loughran and McDonald (2016) and Jayasekera 






The final wordlist of corporate failure 
Reorganization  
Opportunity Opportunities Revised Strategy Strategic Strategies Restructuring Restructure Restructured Resolution 
Resolutions Comply Complying Compliance Complied Complies Agreement Agreements Agreed Agreeing 
Administrator Administration Contractual Join Joined Appoint Appointed Appointment Appointing Renegotiate 
Renegotiated Negotiations Negotiating Negotiate Negotiated Diversify Diversified Facilities Facility Reorganization 
Reorganized Refinancing 
Warning  
Require Requires Requiring Required Requirement Requirements Competition Competitive Competitors Reduce 
Reducing Reductions Reduced Reduction Delist Delisted Delisting Incurred Incur Mitigate Mitigated Mitigation 
Reversed Reverse Fell Fallen Fall Falls Falling Exposure Exposures Exposed Problems Non-compliance 
Misstatements Misstatement Limitations Limits Limited Insufficient Suspension Suspend Suspended Suspensive 
Court Courts Delay Delays Obligation Obligations Legal Termination Retired Left Resigned Resignation 
Resignations Contract Contracts Contracted Restricted Restrictions Liquidation Liquidating Liquidated Liquidator 
Litigation Divestment Dependent Depend Depends Depending Critical Difficult Difficulties Unexpected Need 
Needs Needed Slower Slowly Slow Instability Suffered Hindered Downturn Cancel Cancelled Cancellation 
Obstacles Low Lower Lowest Discontinued Uncertain Uncertainty Uncertainties Pressure Pressures Forced 
Concern Concerning Tough Bankruptcy Commitment Commitments Committed Defer Doubtful Doubt Unable 
Inability Negatively Negative Dispute Disputed Drop Sever Severely Severe Imposed Adverse Adversely Challenging 
Challenges Challenge Unpaid Decline Declined Declining Lack Lacked Threat Constraints Constrain Constraint 
Tight  Illiquid Illiquidity Volatile Volatility Depressed Hazards Hazardous Legislation Conflict Conflicted Conflicts 
Penalties Injunctions Damages Damaging Damage Damaged Revocation Turmoil Against Unfortunately Decrease 
Decreased Less Drawn down Draw-down Step down Stepped down Losing Loses Loss Losses Lose Lost Risk Risks 
Riskier Riskiest Risky Riskiness Fail Failed Failing Failings Fails Failure Failures Fragile Poorly Poor Recession 
Impairment Impairments Impaired Necessary Disappointing Complaints Default Closed Covenant Covenants 
Statistical 
Changes Change Potentially Potential Significance Significant Significantly Anticipate Anticipated Likelihood Likely 
Material Materially Differ Differed Differing Differs Conditional Fluctuation Fluctuations Affect Affected Affecting 
Susceptible Believed Believe Viable 
This list presents CF-related keywords used to capture the CF sentiment in annual report narratives. The total sum 

















This figure gives the timeline of CF sentiment in annual report narratives of two sudden high-profile corporate collapses in the UK. Carillion PLC 
went into liquidation on 15 January 2018 (it is officially the largest ever trading liquidation in the UK; www.gov.uk/). Thomas Cook PLC (the world’s most 
iconic travel brand) went into liquidation on 23 September 2019. Data based on the last available annual reports. The percentage of words are 
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Variable descriptions, measures, sources, and examples of prior literature 
  
 
Sort Variable Definition and measurement Source Ex. sign Examples of relevant literature 
 
Dependent Corporate Failure Binary outcome variable, one = event of financial distress or bankruptcy; zero 
= otherwise. 
































Accounting ROA Return on Assets is a measure for firm profitability = net income/total assets. Worldscope (-) Campbell et al. (2008) 
Current Ratio  It is a measure of firm liquidity = current assets/current liabilities. Worldscope (-) Chava and Jarrow (2004) 
Capital Structure  Measured by firm leverage = total debt/total equity. Worldscope (+) Darrat et al. (2016) 
Funds from Operation It is a measure of firm performance = total funds from operations/total 
liabilities. 
Worldscope (-) Almamy et al. (2016) 
Market PRICE  Measured as the log of firm’s equity price. Datastream (-) Tinoco and Wilson (2013) 
Abnormal Returns   It is the firm’s cumulative monthly abnormal returns on an annual basis = the 
firm's cumulative annual returns minus the FTSE All Share return index for 
the same period of time. 
Datastream (-) Tinoco and Wilson (2013) 
Market Cap Measures the firm's relative value as log the firm’s market capitalization relative 
to the total market capitalization of the FTSE All Share index 
Worldscope (-) Mayew et al. (2015) 
Volatility  Sigma of market returns is used as a measure of total risk, which is in turn 
measured by the standard deviation. 
Datastream (+) Mayew et al. (2015) 
MB Represents market to book ratio = Market value equity/book value equity. Datastream (+) Campbell et al. (2008) 
Macroeconomic RPI Represents the Retail Price Index (RPI) in base 100 as a measure of inflation 
rate. 
Datastream (+) Tinoco and Wilson (2013) 





























Board Size  Measured by the log of the total number of board of directors. BoardEx (-) Platt and Platt (2012) 
Board Independence Measured by the proportion of independent non-executive directors to the 
board size. 
BoardEx (-) Daily and Dalton (1994) 
CEO Turnover  It is a dichotomous variable coded as one if the firm experienced a change in 
CEO and zero otherwise. 
BoardEx (+) Daily & Dalton (1995) 
Gender Diversity  Measured by the proportion of female directors on the board of directors. BoardEx (-) Darrat et al. (2016) 
Duality Role It is a dummy variable set to one if the CEO is also chairman of the board of 
directors or executive chairman presents on the board and zero otherwise.  























CF-Disclosure It reflects the aggregate information regarding corporate failure that can be 
found in the narrative sections of annual reports. This typically relates to the 
discussion sections, which exclude the financial statements but include the 
notes to the accounts. The scores are generated based on textual analysis using 
Diction version 7 to count the number of words that exists in the final CF-




using Diction 7 













Chapter 3. Is expanded auditor reporting meaningful? UK evidence 
3.1. Introduction 
In June 2013, the revised ISA 700 (UK and Ireland) (FRC 2013a) mandated the independent 
auditor of companies with a premium listing of equity shares on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
Main Market with fiscal year-ends on or after September 30, 2013 to disclose risks of material 
misstatement (for simplicity, auditor risk disclosure, ARD henceforth) with the greatest effect on 
the audit, the application of materiality, and the scope of the audit.24 Consistent with the main 
objective of ISA 700 of enhancing the informativeness of the auditor report (e.g., FRC 2012; FRC 
2013b; ACCA 2013), the switch from the boilerplate pass/fail model to the expanded audit report 
is thought to be useful for the users of financial statements.25 So far, archival studies seeking to 
relate the enhanced disclosure of the expanded auditor reporting in the UK to measurable 
economic benefits for the capital market have, however, produced insignificant or mixed results 
(e.g., Lennox et al., 2019; Gutierrez et al., 2018; Reid et al., 2015). Therefore, this chapter explores: 
1- whether the expanded auditor’s report is not generic (i.e., exhibits information specific to the 
audited company) and thus, the new audit report regime may yield benefits to complying firms 
through lower information risk that translates into lower cost of equity, and 2- whether the 
reporting regulation change and information content of the expanded audit report affect 
information asymmetry and risk perceptions.26 
 
24 Auditor exercise of professional judgment on materiality is mainly related to the assessed and identified ARD. In 
this relationship, a higher (lower) level of current or expected risks of material misstatement provides a basis for the 
auditor to set a lower (higher) materiality threshold and vice versa (FRC 2009). Thus, throughout the chapter, ARD 
discussion is also related to materiality. 
25 A similar new auditor report model is also required by the International Auditing and Assurance Standard Board 
(IAASB) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), where it is compulsory for the auditor to 
communicate the key or critical audit matters (IAASB 2015; PCAOB 2017). Among the three standards issued by FRC, 
IAASB, and PCAOB, ARD is common, whilst materiality and scope disclosures are not required for IAASB and 
PCAOB compliers. For this reason, like Lennox et al. (2019), we focus our discussion and content analysis on ARD. 
Our additional analysis, however, concerns auditor disclosed materiality. 
26 According to PCAOB (2016), expanded auditor’s disclosure that does not exhibit information specific to the audited 
company, avoiding standardized language, is less likely to impact information asymmetry. Therefore, it is important to 
initially document that there is a relationship between the expanded disclosure and the information risk specific to the 




In the beginning, we explore the relation between ARD (i.e., the revealed risks of material 
misstatement or key/critical audit matters) and idiosyncratic and systematic risk, and the cost of 
capital. In this exploration, we posit that higher ARD is associated with a firm’s less reliable 
financial reporting, and hence information risk borne by investors, resulting in a higher cost of 
capital (Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al., 2009; Kothari et al., 2009).27 Therefore, consistent with the 
theoretical work in Lambert et al. (2007) and empirical tests of Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al. (2009) and 
Kotheri et al. (2009), we conduct cross-sectional tests (mitigating endogeneity concerns related to 
correlated omitted covariates) to examine whether firms with higher ARD present higher 
systematic risk (beta), higher idiosyncratic risk, and higher cost of capital. Following prior research 
(e.g., Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al., 2009), we postulate that ARD first disclosed in 2013-expanded audit 
reports existed for some time before auditor disclosure. Additionally, we postulate that the market 
is able to form expectations about the disclosed risks based on observable firm characteristics, and 
that these expectations are incorporated in the information risk measures mentioned above. 
If our conjecture is true, and as the first public revelation of risks of material misstatement 
credibly affirms the relative level of financial reporting reliability,28 so the new reporting rule may 
yield benefits to the complying firms (that have relatively low risks of material misstatement, i.e., 
more reliable financial reporting) through a lower information risk and a lower cost of capital. 
Importantly, this suggests that the expanded auditor’s disclosures are not generic, but meaningfully 
and credibly capture the information risk that a firm presents to investors. This also leads us to 
expect consequences of the reporting regulation change and information content of the expanded 
 
27 In the expanded audit report, auditors in the UK become able to describe key/critical audit matters or risks such as 
the effectiveness of internal controls. In the US, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) expect and find that firms that disclose 
internal control deficiencies (an indicator of less reliable financial reporting) show higher systematic risk, higher 
idiosyncratic risk, and higher cost of equity. 
28 Information is typically provided by managers and/or information intermediaries such as financial analysts and press 
releases. These sources of information, however, are either informal or lack the credibility required to assure 
information reliability. The capital market, therefore, is likely to consider the expanded disclosures conveyed by the 
independent auditor due to the credibility and formal form that they entail. The effects of such disclosures ultimately 
are expected to be manifested in the firm’s beta, higher idiosyncratic risk, and cost of capital (see Kothari et al. (2009) 




audit report on information asymmetry and risk perceptions when this credible information 
becomes publicly available, which drives to explore the second research question as follows. 
One explanation for the recent academic failure to find any benefits or finding mixed 
evidence around this audit report regime change or the content of the expanded auditor’s report is 
that the few prior archival studies employ short-window analysis for investors’ reaction (e.g., 
Lennox et al., 2019; Gutierrez et al., 2018; Reid et al., 2015).29 Given the greater amount of 
information contained in the expanded auditor’s report, we expect that investors cannot promptly 
interpret it and update their judgments (Miller, 2010; You and Zhang, 2009). Another explanation 
is that expanded auditor’s disclosure is generic and thus, is not informative to the market 
participants.30 Therefore, in answering the second research question, we adopt an examination 
period of six months (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Elsahndidy and Shrives, 2016; Lennox et 
al., 2019). This is long enough to permit investors and analysts to assess expanded auditor’s 
disclosure and so to investigate the effects on their real investment and forecast decisions, but short 
enough to limit the influence of confounding events, such as the disclosure of other information 
about corporate risk. Consequently, if the new audit report regime is useful to the firm’s capital 
market and/or the increased content of the expanded audit report (focusing on ARD and the 
materiality level) is informative, we expect an impact on the firm’s capital market environment, 
proxied by the return volatility, and analyst forecast dispersion as surrogates of users’ perceptions 
of firm risk (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009), as well as bid-ask spread and trading volume as surrogates 
for firm market liquidity (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
 
29 Testing long-window abnormal stock performance (a span up to six months), employing buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHARs), Lennox et al. (2019) find no significant effect of expanded auditor’s disclosure. We, however, do 
not think that is definitive because using BHARs for statistical inferences in its traditional form is criticized for serious 
issues (e.g., Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Bessembinder and Zhang, 2013; Dutta et al., 2018). 
30 Responding to FRC Revision to ISA (UK and Ireland) 700, KPMG (2013) demonstrates that expanded auditor’s 
disclosure may well be of benefit to shareholders depending on, among others, “the time they are able to spend 
analyzing the information.” Archival studies (Lennox et al. 2019; Gutierrez et al., 2018) on the expanded audit report 
suggest potential reasons for their insignificant results about market reaction including market inability to understand 
the implications of the disclosed risks, which supports our postulation that market needs a longer period to interpret 
it and update their judgments. Furthermore, our cross-sectional tests are employed to investigate that the expanded 




Exploiting the exogenous shock of the FRC’s regulatory change of the auditor report in the 
UK to control for simultaneity and self-selection-based endogeneity concern (Carcello and Li, 
2013; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016), we archivally investigate the economic usefulness of audit report 
regime change. We employ pre- to post-regulatory period analysis (i.e., two years before and two 
years after the expanded audit report adoption) for complying companies (i.e., companies with 
premium listing). This design, therefore, focuses on compilers with the regulation to test the overall 
influence of expanded auditor’s disclosure on decision usefulness linked to a firm’s capital market 
environment. Using this time-series difference design, where each company works as its own 
control, enables a powerful examination of variations related to complying companies, and control 
for endogeneity bias resulting from firm-level correlated omitted characteristics (Doyle and 
Magilke, 2013).31 In this investigation, we have two competing expectations. Literature on general 
disclosure drives us to expect that under the new reporting regime, the companies adopting the 
regulation benefit from lower information asymmetry and risk perceptions (e.g., Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000). Conversely, prior risk disclosure literature suggests an increase in the perceived 
risk (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016).32  
For exploring the informativeness of the ARD content, following Lennox et al. (2019), we 
employ the number of risks disclosed in the audit report, as well as an automated textual analysis 
utilizing Elshandidy and Shrives’ (2016) risk wordlist to inspect the information content of risk-
related disclosure. We run post-regulatory period analysis on the premium listed companies (i.e., 
the expanded audit report adopters) in the two years after the new reporting regulation. We expect 
 
31 ISA (700) was released in June 2013, only four months before becoming effective. Thus, both complying companies 
and the capital market had little chance to pre-empt FRC’s regulatory changes, which implies that our staggered design 
works well because the economic outcome variables are not anticipatory in nature (see Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). 
32 More details are provided in Section 3.4. and as the chapter proceeds. Notably, prior studies show that employing 
companies listed on UK AIM (which are not required to comply with the expanded audit report) or other country 
companies (e.g., US) as a control group is not an appropriate empirical practice in this setting for the following reasons. 
AIM companies are not reasonable counterfactuals since they typically are smaller, growing, and likely have a different 
information environment than premium-listed companies (e.g., Gutierrez et al., 2018). Using other country companies 
is risky because of important differences in culture, law, institutions, and regulatory regimes. These differences can 
lead to the ceteris paribus fallacy, the potential for significant omitted country-specific variables, and limit the generality 
of the findings (Reid et al., 2019). Thus, using staggered adoption of the new auditor reporting rule to create a control 




to find impact of ARD on information asymmetry and risk perceptions among market participants 
if they do not see it as boilerplate. 
Consistent with our predictions, our cross-sectional examinations indicate that firms 
receiving an expanded audit report with a higher level of risk disclosure exhibit significantly higher 
beta and cost of equity. In addition, we find significantly negative associations between auditor 
disclosed materiality (which is negatively related to the assessed and identified risks of material 
misstatement) and idiosyncratic risk, beta, and cost of equity. These findings suggest that expanded 
auditor’s disclosure is meaningfully associated with the information risk that a firm presents to 
investors. That is, the expanded auditor’s report is not generic. Thus, firms complying with the new 
reporting rule, which have relatively more reliable financial reporting, i.e., have relatively low risks 
of material misstatement inducing the auditor to specify a high level of materiality, can benefit from 
a lower information risk and a lower cost of capital. 
As to the intertemporal tests of the economic usefulness of audit report regime change, and 
the information content of auditor disclosures, the evidence we find suggests that the new reporting 
regime is, on average, related to higher market liquidity (trading volume) and investors’ perceived 
risk (volatility of market returns). More specifically, the intertemporal results on the 
informativeness of the expanded audit disclosures indicate that the high level of ARD positively 
and significantly impacts the trading volume, volatility of market returns, and analyst forecast 
dispersion. Consistent with the assumption that auditor determined materiality is negatively related 
to audit effort (Livne et al., 2018), our intertemporal results further indicate that market participants 
appreciate the firm with a lower level of disclosed materiality due to the higher credibility it indicates 
about the audited outputs. Specifically, we find a significantly positive (negative) impact of the 
determined materiality threshold (i.e., low audit effort) on bid-ask spread, (trading volume), and 
analyst forecast dispersion. 
Overall, our cross-sectional and intertemporal analysis results document that the expanded 




is also consistent with the view of FRC (followed by others such as IAASB and PCAOB as shown 
later) that the expanded auditor’s report regime and information content are associated with 
significant economic consequences for both the complying firms and capital market participants. 
Our study provides several contributions to the growing literature on the informativeness 
and economic consequences of the expanded audit report, which is a focus of attention in the UK, 
the US and many other jurisdictions, as follows. First, exploiting the real context of the expanded 
audit reports, we augment the evidence derived from the experimental studies (discussed later) by 
employing archival research methods on actual firm and market behavior. Second, we complement 
the archival studies on the effect of the expanded auditor’s report regime and information content 
on the investors’ reaction by examining the impacts on the firm’s market liquidity and users’ risk 
perceptions. Third, our results offer some explanation for the mixed evidence on the benefits of 
the changes to the audit report. Fourth, in examining the economic consequences for: 1- firms that 
have switched to the new audit reporting standard, and 2- the information content of the expanded 
audit report, we provide comprehensive evidence and thus, contribute to the global concern from 
standard-setters, regulators and capital market participants.33 Finally, findings related to auditor 
disclosure on the determined materiality speak directly to the concerned parties (e.g., IAASB and 
PCAOB) about its importance as a component of the expanded audit disclosures. The findings 
also suggest that future research should not confine its attention only to the number of risks 
disclosed by the auditor but should consider the content of risk disclosure as well. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2. represents the expanded 
auditor reporting background. Section 3.3. discusses the theoretical considerations. Section 3.4. 
reviews relevant prior literature and develops the research hypothesis. Section 3.5. explains research 
design. Section 3.6. discusses the empirical results, additional analyses and robustness checks. 
Section 3.7. concludes. 
 
33 Recently, the inconclusive evidence on the usefulness of the expanded audit report raises PCAOB’s concern 




3.2. Background  
In order to provide more meaningful information content beyond the traditional 
standardized pass/fail audit opinion on the financial statements, standard-setters and regulators all 
over the world adopt the expanded audit report. Taking the initiative in 2013, FRC in the UK 
issued the revised ISA (UK and Ireland) 700 requiring auditors of companies with a premium listing 
of equity shares on the LSE Main Market with fiscal year commencing on or after October 1, 2012 
to report on: 1- the risks of material misstatement which had the greatest effect on the audit’s 
strategy,  allocation of resources and engagement team efforts; 2- how the concept of materiality is 
applied in planning and performing the audit; and 3- the scope of the audit in relation to how the 
risks of material misstatement are addressed and the influence of materiality (FRC 2013a). The 
form and content of the auditor’s report have also undergone changes outside of the UK. The 
IAASB, the European Union (EU) and the PCAOB have all adopted requirements that expanded 
the auditor’s report.  
The IAASB’s ISA 701 became effective for audits of listed entities for periods ending on or 
after December 15, 2016 in many jurisdictions all over the world, where auditors are responsible 
to communicate the key audit matters (KAMs) in their reports (IAASB 2015).34 Similarly, PCAOB’s 
Auditing Standard (AS) 3101 requires the audit report to communicate the critical audit matters 
(CAMs) beginning on fiscal year-ends on or after June 30, 2019 (December 15, 2020) for audits of 
the US’s large accelerated filers (all other companies) (PCAOB 2017). ARD, CAMs, and KAMs, 
which are defined under auditing standards issued by FRC, PCAOB, and IAASB, respectively, are 
very similar and have commonalities in purpose and content.35 In addition to the availability of 
historical data, the UK setting motivates our study for several reasons. Compared to the US, the 
UK’s disclosure environment is less rich. For example, annual report narratives in the UK are 
 
34 As of June 17, 2017, auditors of the public interest entities (PIEs) in the UK include KAMs in their audit reports 
(FRC 2016). On the same date, the Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 April 2014, under Article 10, which acts in accordance with ISA 701, became effective in the EU.  





voluntary while their counterpart in the US (10-K) is mandatory. In contrast to the US accelerated 
filers, companies and external auditors in the UK are not mandated to disclose the effectiveness of 
the internal controls. In a further difference to the US setting, the UK companies are not obligated 
to file quarterly financial reports (this also reduces the problem of confounding corporate 
disclosures for our study). Finally, the UK auditors are less prone to litigation risk and regulatory 
sanctions, compared to those in the US, making it more likely for them to release information 
content disclosure and thus, the changes to the audit report would be found useful to companies’ 
capital market environment (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Carcello and Li, 2013; Doyle and Magilke, 
2013; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Lennox et al., 2019). The release of the UK ISA (700) only four 
months before the effective date, reducing complying companies’ and capital market anticipation, 
strengthens this expectation and, importantly, enables a powerful research design. 
3.3. Theory 
The information content of the expanded audit report, which focuses on the risk of material 
misstatements and goes beyond the traditional standardized pass/fail audit opinion on the financial 
statements, is consistent with the notion that a firm’s commitment to expanded levels of disclosure 
should alleviate the agency problem (e.g., Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985; Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Lambert et al., 2007). Broadly, conveying risk information allows market participants to 
assess the riskiness and uncertainties regarding the firm’s future cash flows (Linsley and Shrives, 
2006). Ryan (2012) indicates that risk-related information is informative when it reflects exposures 
to market, credit, liquidity, information risks, and variation in firms’ future economic performance. 
According to Thai and Birt (2019), conveying risk-related information is of particular interest to 
market participants for several reasons. For example, risk disclosure shows a firm’s riskiness that 
may affect the discount rate in valuation models, mitigates the risk of adverse selection (Akerlof, 
1970), reduces information asymmetry and uncertainty over the variance of the firm’s cash flows, 




Prior research indicates that risk-related information is important to market participants to 
allow assessment of the firm risk profile (Linsley et al., 2006). It helps in monitoring purposes and 
assessing risks that a firm encounters and, thus, reflects management competency (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2005; Lajili and Zéghal, 2005). For example, information disclosed by the expanded audit 
report that reflects the firm’s internal control mechanisms can be useful to market participants in 
terms of the decision-making process. Such information is valued by the market since it enhances 
the understanding of the firm’s risk and reliability of its information (e.g., Jizi and Dixon, 2017). 
Thus, market participants are expected to use auditor expanded disclosures to analyze the firm, 
predict its performance, and in turn evolve their assessments. Then, disclosures might change 
market expectations, and this would be observed through the trading decisions (e.g., the gap 
between bid and ask prices) and the volatility of stock prices (Benston, 1967; Lajili and Zéghal, 
2005). 
Independent auditors are credible and formal intermediaries between managers and capital 
market participants. Therefore, the capital market participants are likely to look beyond the static 
accounting numbers, which are limited in detailing firm risk, and to consider the auditor’s expanded 
reporting to understand the firm’s risk and value of its equity (Jizi and Dixon, 2017). Having 
insights about the risk of material misstatements gives an understanding of the firm’s risk exposure 
in relation to many factors such as internal controls effectiveness, changes in interest rates, 
commodities market values, and currency rates, and thence financial reporting reliability (e.g., 
Scholes, 2000). The market is, therefore, expected to respond to the credible information 
disseminated by the independent auditor. This response can be observed in the form of impacts 
on information asymmetry and risk perceptions (e.g., Lambert et al., 2007; Easley and O’Hara, 




3.4. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
Evidence on the possible benefits of the expanded audit report derives largely from 
experimental studies relating to CAMs/KAMs, with mixed results (for a review see Bédard et al., 
2016). For example, Doxey (2015) and Kohler et al., (2016) find that experiment participants 
respond positively to CAMs/KAMs, which raises their perception about the company’s financial 
reporting quality and economic position, leading them to increase their investment. Conversely, 
Christensen et al. (2014) and Kachelmeier et al. (2019) find that the participants become less 
confident in a company’s accounts and decrease their investment. Further, Boolaky and Quick 
(2016) and Carver and Trinkle (2017) find that CAMs/KAMs do not represent a decision useful 
for participants. Moreover, experiments on auditors’ disclaimers of responsibility or legal liability 
suggest that CAMs can either reduce auditor liability toward financial statement users (Brasel et al., 
2016; Kachelmeier et al., 2019) or increase their perceived liability toward jurors (Gimbar, 2016; 
Backof et al., 2018). 
Since the coming into effect of the expanded auditor’s report in the UK, an emerging branch 
of studies exploits this real context to archivally explore its effect on investors’ reaction.36 Reid et 
al. (2015) find that complying companies significantly benefit from an increase in abnormal trading 
volume in the year following the adoption.37 For a sample of two years surrounding the rule 
adoption, Gutierrez et al. (2018) find that neither the regulatory change nor the expanded auditor 
disclosure content significantly affect investors’ reaction, proxied by cumulative absolute abnormal 
returns, abnormal trading volume, cumulative signed abnormal returns and abnormal return 
volatility. Similarly, Lennox et al. (2019) find that the number of risks disclosed by the auditors of 
the premium listed companies in the year following the rule adoption does not affect the signed 
cumulative abnormal returns. However, in Lennox et al.’s long-window tests using equity valuation 
 
36 As the expanded audit report becomes fully applicable in many countries in addition to the UK, a growing body of 
archival studies is expected to appear. 
37 The results of Reid et al. (2015) are, however, questionable because of the doubt about using mistaken event dates 
and because other measures of investors’ reaction are not employed for robustness checks (see Lennox et al., 2019; 




models, the evidence they find suggests that ARD reliably reflects relevant financial reporting risks. 
Collectively, the short-window analysis seems to fail in finding a significant investors’ reaction to 
the application of the expanded audit report or to the disclosure content. However, the theoretical 
foundation and prior empirical research on the economic consequences of disclosure, in general, 
and particularly risk disclosure suggest that more work can be done in exploring the possible 
benefits of the changes to the auditor’s reporting. 
In economic theory, principal-agent conflicts and information asymmetry result in a demand 
for a greater level of disclosure to narrow this informational gap and thus, alleviate the agency 
problem (e.g., Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Lambert et al., 2007). 
The extant body of literature (e.g., Lev, 1988; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000; Verrecchia, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Core, 2001; Easley et 
al., 2002; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2007; Kothari et al., 2009; Leuz and Wysocki, 
2016; Liu and Wysocki, 2017) posits that a higher level of public disclosure is associated with many 
economic benefits, including a reduction in a firm’s information asymmetry (i.e., higher market 
liquidity), stock return volatility, analyst forecast dispersion, and cost of capital (i.e., a decrease in 
firm’s risk). Kothari et al. (2009), additionally, provide evidence that the link between disclosure 
and its consequences (e.g., firm’s risk) is strengthened when the source of that disclosure is credible 
and timely. Although the timeliness of independent auditor disclosure is questionable (Lennox et 
al., 2019), the credibility of this disclosure drives us to expect its usefulness to the firm’s capital 
market environment.38 
Therefore, consistent with the economic theory that considers the quality and quantity of 
accounting information and disclosure, we set forth the following prediction on firms’ benefit from 
the new reporting rule. The theoretical model of Lambert et al. (2007) outlines that the quality of 
accounting information and disclosure negatively affects market participants’ assessments of the 
variance of a firm’s cash flow (idiosyncratic risk), and the covariance of the firm’s cash flows with 
 




the sum of all the cash flows in the market (beta risk) and thus, cost of capital. Following this, we 
develop a similar conjecture to that of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) that, after all, the quality of 
accounting information and disclosure drives the risks of material misstatement disclosed by the 
auditor. In other words, high risks of material misstatement reflect the low quality of a firm’s 
accounting disclosures and information systems. This low quality (expressed in high risks of 
material misstatement or less reliable financial reporting) is linked to a firm’s information risk that 
manifests in cost of capital as defined in Lambert et al.’s (2007) framework, for several reasons. 
For example, within Lambert et al.’s (2007) framework, low quality of accounting information and 
disclosure influences the quality of a firm’s real decisions such as operating decisions and 
managerial misappropriation, like the cash flow appropriated by the managers. Empirically 
consistent with this view, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) posit and find that firms that disclose 
internal control deficiencies (resulting from a low-quality accounting information and disclosure 
system) show higher systematic risk, higher idiosyncratic risk, and higher cost of equity. Similarly, 
ceteris paribus, we postulate that the existence of higher risks of material misstatement is associated 
with greater information risk that translates into higher cost of equity. That is, the expanded 
auditor’s report is not generic. Thus, the new reporting rule may yield benefits to the complying 
firms (those having relatively low risks of material misstatement, i.e., more reliable financial 
reporting) through lower systematic (beta) and unsystematic (idiosyncratic) risk and thus, a lower 
cost of capital. 
Similar to the debate about the economic benefits of the expanded auditor’s report, a policy 
debate arose around the usefulness of Section 404 of SOX (2002), which obligates both 
management and the independent auditor of accelerated filers in the US to separately disclose on 
the effectiveness of internal controls (for a review see Schneideret et al. (2009) and Chalmers et al. 
(2019)). Prior archival studies on the usefulness of internal control disclosure suggest that the 
disclosure of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which was not available 




equity (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009), negative stock return reactions (Beneish et al., 2008; 
Hammersley et al., 2008), and lower market liquidity (El-Mahdy and Park, 2014; Gupta et al., 2018). 
Likewise, as FRC’s regulatory change makes valuable audit knowledge available to the market 
participants for the first time, aiming at affecting market information asymmetry and uncertainties, 
we expect to find the decision-usefulness of the expanded auditor’s disclosure. Put differently, the 
economic consequences of the independent auditor disseminating credible risks of material 
misstatement (which reports the audited company’s reporting reliability) to the investment 
community is thought likely to have a significant effect on market information asymmetry and 
financial statement users’ risk perceptions. 
Prior literature on corporate risk disclosure shows that market participants recognize risk 
information, as appears in their investment behaviors or assessment (for a review see Elshandidy 
et al. (2018)). For example, Kravet and Muslu (2013) argue that informative risk disclosure is likely 
to decrease (increase) investors’ perceived risk if it is (un)expected and related to (un)known risk 
factors. Consistent with their expectations, the evidence they find suggests that a greater amount 
of risk disclosure in the 10-K filings is likely to diverge investors’ risk perceptions, proxied by 
volatility of stock returns; implying that risk disclosure is informative.39 Beyond that, Kothari et al. 
(2009) and Elshandidy and Shrives (2016) demonstrate that the tone of general and risk disclosures, 
reflecting favorable news, or unfavorable news, is directionally associated with the cost of capital, 
stock-return volatility, analyst forecast accuracy, and bid-ask spread. Focusing on risk-factor 
disclosure (Item 1A of the US 10-K filings), which became mandatory from December 2005, 
Campbell et al. (2014) find that the higher quantity of risk information is positively associated with 
the volatility of market returns, market beta, and market liquidity (proxied by bid-ask spread). Hope 
 
39 Similarly, longstanding audit research (e.g., Frost, 1997; Taffler et al., 2004; Citron et al., 2008; Menon and Williams, 
2010) indicates that the market reacts negatively to auditor modified opinion, e.g., providing additional explanatory 
language casting doubt about a company's ability to remain as a going concern, particularly if it is not expected. 
Compared to the expanded auditor disclosure, a going concern opinion is, however, rare and represents a mere 
modification of the auditor’s unqualified opinion, which implies that it is not significantly different from a pass/fail 




et al. (2016), further, find that risk-factor disclosure is useful for financial statement users when it 
becomes more specific. It is noticeable that Item 1A is qualitatively similar to the first objective of 
FRC (2013a, paragraph 19A (a)), which requires the auditor to describe risks of material 
misstatement which had the greatest effect on the audit, in that it requires management to discuss 
the most significant factors that make the company uncertain or risky (SEC 2005, Regulation S-K, 
Item 503(c)). That is, corporate risk disclosure, which may lack both timeliness and credibility 
(Kothari et al., 2009), is meaningful to the market participants. These premises lead us to expect 
that the most credible risk disclosure, ARD, may also be useful and informative to the firm’s capital 
market environment. 
Given the above discussion, we hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, the new audit report regime 
and the content of the expanded audit report affect the information asymmetry and risk 
perceptions. It is worth noting that the risk information content of the expanded audit report 
basically relates to bad news, while auditor addressing of the risk would be regarded as good news 
about the risk. Interpreting each piece of risk information might be complicated or confusing to 
the average investor and thus, the signs related to the tone of the risk can be puzzling or 
insignificant (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009; KPMG 2013). Thus, to avoid this empirically problematic 
issue, we utilize auditor aggregate risk disclosure—examining the overall effect—without 
distinguishing the risk tone. With meaningful ARD, financial statement users’ risk assessments are, 
therefore, expected to result in increase in a firm’s market liquidity and users’ risk perceptions. This 
expectation is consistent with the maintained assumptions of corporate general and risk disclosures 
(for more details see for example: Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Kothari et al., 2009; Kravet and 
Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016).40  
 
40 This also accords with the evidence provided by Akhigbe and Martin (2008) regarding capital market measures of 
risk following the passage of SOX for US financial services firms, where risk estimations are increased consistent with 




3.5. Research Design 
3.5.1. Sample selection and data collection 
Table 3.1 displays the subsamples used to conduct our cross-sectional and intertemporal 
(panel) analyses. We first define the UK (equity) companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) on September 30, 2013, and their listing type (i.e., companies on the LSE Main Market with 
premium listing, and on the LSE AIM) using the Bloomberg database and LSE website.41 We 
exclude financial companies (508) defined by the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) system 
adopted by LSE (this also excludes SIC 6000-6999) because of their distinct regulations and 
accounting practices (e.g., Carcello and Li, 2013; Gutierrez et al., 2018). Companies listed on UK 
AIM (624) are also excluded since they are not required to adopt the expanded audit report. Annual 
reports for companies with premium listing are collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon database 
(which we employ to manually collect data that are not available on electronic sources, like auditor 
fees). From each annual report, we extract the expanded audit report and manually and using a 
computer-aided text analysis program (Diction 7) we analyze ARD and materiality level (further 
details with definitions of variables are provided later). Financial and market data are obtained from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream database; we use IBES on Datastream to compile analysts data. 
Because the new auditor reporting regime is effective for companies with premium listing for fiscal 
years ending on or after September 30, 2013, in our cross-sectional analyses of idiosyncratic risk, 
systematic risk, and cost of equity, we keep only these companies (188; 376 firm-year observations) 
that have the necessary data for 2013 and 2014. 
For our intertemporal analyses, our strongly balanced panel sample keeps only premium 
listed companies that have necessary data for our tests for the first two years of adopting the 
expanded auditor repot and the two prior years (i.e., for four full years from 2011 to 2014). Prior 
research (e.g., Lennox et al. 2019; Gutierrez et al., 2018; Reid et al., 2019; Livne et al., 2018) on the 
 





expanded auditor’s report suggests that using a sample of companies with different fiscal year ends 
and/or of early adopted companies along with later adopters as a possible reason for mixed and 
probably biased results. Therefore, our sample retains only firms with a fiscal year end on 
December 31 to synchronize the time period of premium listed companies, as well as to explore 
the impact of the new reporting regulation and ARD on the market assessments in a precise and 
timely fashion (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Elshandidiy and Shrives, 2016). Table 3.1 reports 
the construction of our final panel sample, where there are 143 (139) companies with premium 
listing that have the necessary data to conduct our intertemporal tests of bid-ask spread, trading 
volume, and volatility (analyst forecast dispersion).42 The following section sets out more insights 
into the research design. 
Table 3.1.   





UK (equity) companies on the LSE on September 30, 2013 1597  
Exclude Sector (ICB) = Financials -508  
Exclude companies listed on UK AIM  -624  
Non-financial UK premium listing companies on the LSE on September 30, 2013 465  
Less firms without identifiers (ISIN, SEDOL, or DS codes) or accessible annual 
reports 
-68  
Revised sample (forwarded to A and B separately as follows) 397  
   
A- Cross-sectional sample for premium listed companies with FYE on or after 
September 30, 2013 
  
Less firms with missing necessary data, missing FYE, or FYE other than September 
30 or after 
-209  
Final sample of firms having the necessary data to conduct the cross-sectional 
analyses for idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, and cost of equity  
188 376 
   
B- Panel sample for companies with FYE on December 31 and have complete data 
in the four years surrounding the regulatory rule in 2013 
  
Less firms with missing necessary data, missing FYE, changing FYE, or FYE other 
than December 31 
-254  
Final sample of firms having the necessary data to conduct the intertemporal 
analyses for bid-ask spread, trading volume, and volatility 
143 572 
Final sample of firms having the necessary data to conduct the intertemporal 
analyses for analyst forecast dispersion 
139 556 
This table describes sample construction for our cross-sectional and intertemporal analyses. Our analyses employ 
premium listed companies that are required to comply with the expanded audit report. 
 
42 The number of observations employed in our analyses is not a possible limitation in this setting since it is consistent 
with practice of others in the similar contexts, e.g., Lennox et al. (2019) with 488, Thai and Birt (2019) with 91, Reid 
et al. (2015) with 582, Elshandidy and Shrives (2016) with 667, Eng and Mak (2003) with 158, Beretta and Bozzolan 




3.6. Empirical Results and Discussion  
3.6.1. Cross-sectional idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, and cost of equity analyses 
3.6.1.1. Descriptive statistics  
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics for 188 premium listed companies in the first year 
of adopting the expanded auditor’s report, where Panel A shows the distributional properties of 
variables used in 2013 cross-sectional analyses of the relationship between the ARD (and 
materiality employed in the additional analyses) and idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk (beta) and 
cost of capital. We capture ARD using two measures: first, #RISK = the number of risks of 
material misstatement disclosed in the audit report (Lennox et al., 2019), second, %RISK = the 
percentage of the number of words indicating risk in the audit report scaled by the total number 
of words in the audit report, where textual analysis of the audit report is processed using Diction 
7 software employing the risk wordlist of Elshandidy and Shrives (2016; see Appendix A).43 
Following Gutierrez et al. (2018), we measure materiality (MAT) = auditor disclosed materiality 
amount (£) for the financial statements as a whole, scaled by total assets. 
Consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009), we measure Idiosyncratic risk (I_RISK) and 
systematic risk (BETA) by estimating the following market model using monthly returns from 2013 
and the prior four years (requiring a minimum of 24 and maximum of 60 months): 
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹 + 𝑒,     (3.1) 
where I_RISK = standard deviation of residuals from the estimated market model; BETA 
= estimate of 𝐵1 from the estimated market model; EXRET = the firm’s monthly return minus 
the risk-free rate; RMRF = excess return on the market. Monthly data are obtained from 
(http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/centres/xfi/famafrench/files/). 
 
43 Literature on risk disclosure provides other risk wordlists (e.g., that of Kravet and Muslu (2013)) without suggesting 
a most appropriate one. We utilize that of Elshandidy and Shrives (2016) because of its proven validity and reliability 
in many contexts including the UK (e.g., Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). Additionally, as it represents a developed and 
extended form of that of Kravet and Muslu (2013), we are able to test its validity in our context, where we find both 
risk wordlists in common capture a large proportion of ARD from the expanded audit report narratives (r = 83.3% at 




Following Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009), we control for firm fundamentals that are indicated 
to be related to I_RISK and BETA, as well as variables that are likely to impact corporate risk 
disclosure (Campbell et al., 2014) and ARD (Lennox et al., 2019). This helps to ensure that our 
measures of ARD are not proxying for other inherent risk determinants. These control variables 
are as follows: 
SIZE = the natural log of market value of equity; BM = book value of equity divided by 
market value of equity; LEV = total debt divided by total assets; STD_CFO = five-year standard 
deviation of cash flow from operations divided by total assets, requiring a minimum of three years 
of data; CFO = cash flow from operations divided by total assets; RET = 12-month stock return 
over the firm’s fiscal year, a continuous stream of 12 monthly returns is required; DIVPAY = one 
if the firm pays dividends, and zero otherwise; BIG4 = one for firms with a Big 4 auditor, and zero 
otherwise. INC = net income before extraordinary items divided by the lagged market value of 
equity; ANALYSTS = the natural log of the number of analysts, plus one, following the firm; GC 
= one if the auditor issues a going concern modification, and zero otherwise; CATA = current 
assets to total assets. Variables are measured as of a firm’s 2013 fiscal year-end, unless otherwise 
mentioned. In addition, following prior studies (e.g., Lennox et al., 2019) all continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1% on both tails to mitigate the influence of outliers.  
Consistent with Kothari et al. (2009), we measure the equity cost of capital (C_CAP) using 
Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model as follows:44 




44 Compared to other approaches to estimate cost of capital, such as the implied cost of capital estimation, Kothari et 
al. (2009) demonstrate that Fama and French three-factor model is the most appropriate for studying the association 
between cost of capital and disclosures. They also indicate how the three-factor model is consistent with the analysis 
in Lambert et al. (2007). Furthermore, the three-factor model enables us to obtain sufficient sample size since utilizing 






Panel A: Descriptive statistics on variables used in the cross-sectional analyses 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
Dependent variables:      
I_RISK 0.099 0.083 0.050 0.068 0.119 
BETA 0.985 0.908 0.624 0.499 1.377 
C_CAP 0.072 0.060 0.054 0.033 0.099 
Explanatory variables:      
#RISK 4.101 4.000 1.374 3.000 5.000 
%RISK 1.232 1.228 0.359 0.955 1.487 
MAT 0.009 0.006 0.016 0.004 0.010 
Control variables:      
SIZE 13.671 13.804 2.102 12.372 14.988 
BM 0.594 0.429 0.722 0.239 0.726 
LEV 0.196 0.170 0.200 0.061 0.276 
STD_CFO 0.047 0.025 0.081 0.015 0.046 
CFO 0.094 0.099 0.117 0.059 0.143 
RET 0.020 0.021 0.031 0.005 0.037 
DIVPAY 0.819 1.000 0.386 1.000 1.000 
BIG4 0.931 1.000 0.254 1.000 1.000 
INC 0.025 0.057 0.164 0.025 0.084 
ANALYSTS 2.256 2.441 0.895 1.609 2.944 
DISTRESS 0.170 0.000 0.377 0.000 0.000 
GC 0.032 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.000 
CATA 0.422 0.382 0.210 0.270 0.543 
Panel B: Pearson (top) and Spearman (bottom) correlation coefficients 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 I_RISK  0.272 0.383 -0.016 0.071 0.195 -0.452 0.267 0.208 0.350 -0.409 -0.008 -0.456 -0.116 -0.333 -0.348 0.429 0.502 0.122 
2 BETA 0.227  0.944 0.068 0.106 -0.135 0.261 -0.031 0.051 -0.084 0.097 0.081 0.020 0.268 -0.008 0.246 0.010 -0.033 -0.137 
3 C_CAP 0.305 0.945  0.055 0.137 -0.105 0.137 -0.007 0.099 -0.031 -0.014 0.047 -0.063 0.211 -0.122 0.159 0.143 0.024 -0.100 




5 %RISK 0.039 0.144 0.124 0.118  -0.030 0.048 0.025 0.107 -0.032 -0.100 -0.139 -0.160 0.005 -0.189 0.037 0.265 0.083 -0.044 
6 MAT 0.013 -0.063 -0.085 -0.062 -0.014  -0.134 -0.126 0.172 0.810 -0.228 0.038 -0.141 -0.183 -0.082 -0.070 0.180 0.382 0.242 
7 SIZE -0.563 0.261 0.149 0.209 0.054 0.058  -0.374 0.017 -0.249 0.390 -0.019 0.282 0.433 0.211 0.771 -0.199 -0.252 -0.306 
8 BM 0.263 0.034 0.119 0.021 0.024 -0.273 -0.407  -0.219 -0.007 -0.256 -0.392 -0.353 -0.196 -0.347 -0.198 0.273 0.346 -0.118 
9 LEV -0.110 0.158 0.123 0.285 0.138 -0.180 0.231 -0.165  0.168 -0.227 -0.140 -0.165 -0.037 -0.175 0.063 0.285 0.188 -0.171 
10 STD_CFO 0.366 0.030 0.021 -0.043 0.009 0.515 -0.137 -0.104 -0.229  -0.359 -0.035 -0.338 -0.197 -0.210 -0.154 0.220 0.391 0.299 
11 CFO -0.263 0.026 -0.070 -0.047 -0.123 0.452 0.352 -0.571 -0.060 0.318  0.201 0.417 0.254 0.418 0.315 -0.430 -0.595 -0.083 
12 RET 0.131 0.173 0.177 -0.160 -0.040 -0.169 -0.052 -0.255 -0.182 -0.085 0.104  0.244 0.011 0.395 -0.147 -0.342 -0.226 0.224 
13 DIVPAY -0.387 0.064 0.013 -0.022 -0.156 -0.098 0.268 -0.286 -0.027 -0.321 0.337 0.168  0.035 0.477 0.184 -0.523 -0.386 0.034 
14 BIG4 -0.104 0.253 0.223 0.024 0.021 -0.118 0.372 -0.193 0.066 -0.056 0.152 0.010 0.035  0.073 0.252 -0.100 -0.189 -0.176 
15 INC -0.080 0.156 0.116 -0.091 -0.099 -0.100 0.001 0.015 -0.139 -0.071 0.234 0.412 0.380 -0.004  0.056 -0.662 -0.345 0.034 
16 ANALYSTS -0.468 0.199 0.109 0.165 0.033 0.150 0.845 -0.284 0.242 -0.052 0.323 -0.196 0.179 0.233 -0.078  -0.075 -0.160 -0.297 
17 DISTRESS 0.340 -0.025 0.071 0.100 0.237 0.109 -0.157 0.177 0.158 0.156 -0.394 -0.257 -0.523 -0.100 -0.632 -0.061  0.401 -0.053 
18 GC 0.287 -0.070 -0.029 0.080 0.099 0.245 -0.204 0.052 0.069 0.207 -0.283 -0.144 -0.386 -0.189 -0.274 -0.151 0.401  0.057 
19 CATA 0.165 -0.102 -0.092 -0.181 -0.031 0.129 -0.264 -0.165 -0.342 0.159 0.008 0.263 0.028 -0.148 0.089 -0.292 -0.045 0.051   
Panel A of this table presents summary statistics for variables used in 2013 cross-sectional analyses of idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk (beta) and cost of capital (firm 
observations = 188 premium listed companies). Panel B of this table reports the correlation coefficients. Bold numbers in Panel B indicate significance based on two-
tailed t-tests, at the 0.1 level or better. Variable definitions and measures are as follows.  
I_RISK = standard deviation of residuals from estimating market model 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹 + 𝑒 using monthly returns from 2013 and the prior four years 
(requiring a minimum of 24 months), where EXRET  = the firm’s monthly return minus the risk-free rate; RMRF = excess return on the market; BETA = estimate 
of 𝐵1 from the mentioned market model using monthly returns requiring a minimum of 24 and maximum of 60 months over 2013 and the prior four fiscal years; 
C_CAP = expected annual cost of capital calculated based on the Fama-French three-factor model 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝐵3𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑒 using 
monthly returns requiring a minimum of 24 and maximum of 60 months over 2013 and the prior four fiscal years; where SMB = the size factor defined as small minus 
big firm returns; HML = the book-to-market factor defined as high minus low book-to-market firm returns; EXRET and  RMRF as previously defined. Monthly data 
obtained from (http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/centres/xfi/famafrench/files/). #RISK = the number of risks of material statement disclosed in the 
audit report; %RISK = the percentage of the number of words indicating risk in the audit report scaled by the total number of words in the audit report, where textual 
analysis of the audit report is processed using Diction 7 software employing the risk wordlist of Elshandidy and Shrives (2016). MAT = auditor disclosed materiality 
amount (£) for the financial statements as a whole, scaled by total assets; SIZE = the natural log of market value of equity; BM = book value of equity divided by 
market value of equity; LEV = total debt divided by total assets; STD_CFO = five-year standard deviation of cash flow from operations divided by total assets, 
requiring a minimum of three years of data; CFO = cash flow from operations divided by total assets; RET = 12-month stock return over the firm’s fiscal year, a 
continuous stream of 12 monthly returns is required; DIVPAY = one if the firm pays dividends, and zero otherwise; BIG4 = one for firms with a Big 4 auditor, and 
zero otherwise. INC = net income before extraordinary items divided by the lagged market value of equity; ANALYSTS = the natural log of the number of analysts, 
plus one, following the firm; GC = one if the auditor issues a going concern modification, and zero otherwise; CATA = current assets to total assets. 




Consistent with Kothari et al. (2009), we measure the equity cost of capital (C_CAP) using 
Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model as follows:45 
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝐵3𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑒,   (3.2) 
where 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇 and RMRF are as previously defined under Eq. (3.1). SMB = the size factor 
defined as small minus big firm returns; HML = the book-to-market factor defined as high minus 
low book-to-market firm returns. Eq. (3.2) is also estimated using monthly returns requiring a 
minimum of 24 and maximum of 60 months over 2013 and the prior four fiscal years, where data 
are obtained from (http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/centres/xfi/famafrench/files/). 
In order to estimate C_CAP, the estimated coefficients loading on RMRF, SMB, and HML are 
multiplied by the average returns for the three factors from 1981-2012. For each firm, this number 
is then annualized giving our measure of C_CAP. As in Kothari et al. (2009), we also control for 
SIZE, BM, and LEV with a definition as previously displayed under Eq. (3.1). 
The descriptive statistics (means) reported in Table 3.2 indicate that auditor disclosures show 
about 4, 1.232%, and 0.9% #RISK, %RISK, and MAT, respectively. These variables’ inter-quartiles 
ranging from 3, 0.955%, and 0.4% to 5, 1.487%, and 1%, respectively, imply a significant cross-
sectional variation in the content of the expanded audit report. These descriptive statistics are 
qualitatively consistent with prior research (e.g., Lennox et al., 2019; Gutierrez et al., 2018), 
suggesting that our sample firms are representative of prior studies. Additionally, for information 
risk measures, I_RISK, BETA, and C_CAP for the sample firms are, on average, 0.099, 0.985, and 
0.072, respectively. Also, these variables’ inter-quartiles ranging from 0.068, 0.499, and 0.033 to 
0.119, 1.377, and 0.099, respectively, imply a significant cross-sectional variation in the information 
risk measures. 
 
45 Compared to other approaches to estimate cost of capital, such as the implied cost of capital estimation, Kothari et 
al. (2009) demonstrate that Fama and French three-factor model is the most appropriate for studying the association 
between cost of capital and disclosures. They also indicate how the three-factor model is consistent with the analysis 
in Lambert et al. (2007). Furthermore, the three-factor model enables us to obtain sufficient sample size since utilizing 





Panel B of Table 3.2 reports the bivariate correlations for all variables used in 2013 cross-
sectional analyses, where Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal. As 
expected, and consistent with prior research (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009), the three 
information risk measures of I_RISK, BETA, and C_CAP are strongly correlated. In addition, 
while #RISK shows no significant correlation, %RISK and MAT show significant correlations 
with information risk measures, particularly with BETA, and C_CAP. In order to assess the extent 
to which ARD (and later the disclosed materiality) relate to the information risk measures, we turn 
to multivariate analyses.46 
3.6.1.2. Cross-sectional information risk and cost of equity results 
We start our empirical analysis by testing the relationship between ARD and I_RISK, BETA, 
and C_CAP since these information risk measures predate the first ARD. Thus, they show whether 
market participants’ assessment of idiosyncratic risk, beta, and cost of equity incorporates 
expectations about the risks of material misstatement based on observable firm characteristics prior 
to the auditor’s initial disclosure of that material risks (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009). Accordingly, 
we examine whether firms with higher ARD (#RISK, and %RISK) present higher I_RISK, BETA, 
and C_CAP using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that controls for other variables that 
previous studies show to be related to I_RISK, BETA, and C_CAP (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2009; Kothari et al., 2009; Campbell et al., 2014). Specifically, we estimate the following models: 
𝐼 _ 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1#𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 𝑜𝑟 %𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉 +
𝛽5𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌 + 𝛽9𝐵𝐼𝐺4 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐶 + 𝛽11𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑆 +
𝛽12𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽13𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽14𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐴 + ,   (3.3)  
𝐶 _ 𝐶𝐴𝑃 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1#𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 𝑜𝑟 %𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉 + ,   (3.4) 
where all variables are as previously defined. 
 
46 Throughout the cross-sectional and intertemporal analyses, we evaluate the effects of multicollinearity by calculating 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each independent variable entered in the multivariate regressions. With VIFs 






Cross-sectional analyses of firm’s information risk and auditor risk disclosure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



























SIZE -0.009*** -0.008*** 0.021 0.017 0.003 0.003 
 
(-3.390) (-3.282) (0.527) (0.446) (1.418) (1.418) 
BM 0.004 0.005 0.084 0.098 0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.786) (1.009) (0.969) (1.160) (0.079) (-0.015) 
LEV 0.038** 0.042** 0.201 0.239 0.015 0.013 
 
(2.258) (2.529) (0.757) (0.922) (0.721) (0.609) 
STD_CFO 0.038 0.034 -0.335 -0.275 
  
 
(0.923) (0.827) (-0.517) (-0.431) 
  
CFO -0.008 -0.008 -0.305 -0.300 
  
 
(-0.256) (-0.245) (-0.602) (-0.598) 
  
RET 0.536*** 0.550*** 6.455*** 6.940*** 
  
 
(4.608) (4.675) (3.514) (3.783) 
  
DIVPAY -0.012 -0.012 -0.028 0.002 
  
 
(-1.281) (-1.191) (-0.180) (0.012) 
  
BIG4 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.635*** 0.656*** 
  
 
(2.924) (2.871) (3.266) (3.425) 
  
INC 0.001 -0.003 -0.048 -0.061 
  
 
(0.035) (-0.114) (-0.129) (-0.166) 
  
ANALYSTS -0.001 -0.001 0.106 0.111 
  
 
(-0.184) (-0.252) (1.357) (1.441) 
  
DISTRESS 0.021** 0.019* 0.008 -0.050 
  
 
(2.003) (1.780) (0.048) (-0.305) 
  
GC 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.109 0.117 
  
 
(4.068) (4.101) (0.338) (0.368) 
  
CATA 0.005 0.005 -0.108 -0.120 
  
 
(0.307) (0.312) (-0.447) (-0.500) 
  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.163*** 0.158*** -0.359 -0.593 0.019 0.001 
 
(4.986) (4.683) (-0.697) (-1.130) (0.500) (0.027) 
       
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Adj. R-squared 0.494 0.492 0.186 0.203 0.0610 0.0770 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the OLS estimation of I_RISK (idiosyncratic risk), BETA (systematic 
risk), and C_CAP (cost of equity capital) on the #RISK and %RISK (measures of auditor risk disclosure). Following 
Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al. (2009), I_RISK and BETA are estimated from the market model (CAPM), while following 
Kothari et al. (2009), C_CAP is estimated from the Fama-French three-factor model. See Table 3.2 for variable details. 





Following prior literature (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Kothari et al., 2009; Campbell 
et al., 2014; Lennox et al., 2019), we predict #RISK, %RISK, LEV, STD_CFO, DISTRESS, GC 
(SIZE, CFO, DIVPAY, and INC) to have positive (negative) coefficients with I_RISK, and BETA. 
Following that literature also, we draw no predictions for BM, RET, BIG4, ANALYSTS, and 
CATA since both directions are expected. For C_CAP, we predict a positive (negative) coefficient 
on #RISK, %RISK, BM, and LEV (SIZE). 
The six models of Table 3.3 report the results of estimating Eq. (3.3) and Eq. (3.4), where 
we find a significantly positive association only between %RISK and both BETA and C_CAP (t-
statistics are 1.977 and 1.769 at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively). The statistically insignificant 
estimates for #RISK are consistent with the descriptive statistics. #RISK results are also in line 
with prior research focusing only on the number of risks disclosed by the auditor (e.g., Gutierrez 
et al., 2018; Lennox et al., 2019). Therefore, considering the information content of the expanded 
audit report, rather than focusing only on the number of risks, seems important to derive significant 
inferences about ARD. We also aim to verify this in the following analyses. Turning to %RISK, 
the positive and significant finding suggests that firms that receive an expanded audit report with 
higher level of risk disclosure exhibit higher BETA and C_CAP. That is, auditors devote a greater 
amount of risk disclosure to firms that present higher information risk to shareholders in terms of 
the covariances in cash flows (BETA) and cost of capital (C_CAP).47 Specifically, the economic 
significance of our finding suggests that, all else being equal, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
the %RISK variable is associated with about 8.8% (0.359 * 0.246), and 0.7% (0.359 * 0.019) increase 
in BETA, and C_CAP, respectively. 
 
47 In untabulated analyses, following the empirical work by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009), we expand C_CAP Eq. (3.4) 
by first including the additional control variables used in I_RISK and BETA Eq. (3.3), where we find qualitatively 
similar findings (only %RISK is significant with a t-statistic of 1.7 at the 10% level). Second, we run Eq. (3.4) 
incorporating I_RISK and BETA. Consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009), and as expected, coefficient estimates 
for both risk factors are found highly significant at 1%. We also derive qualitatively similar findings for ARD where 




These results support the notion that the new reporting rule may yield benefits to the 
complying firms, which have relatively low risks of material misstatement, through a lower 
information risk and a lower cost of capital. They also suggest that such information is not 
generic, leading to expect economic usefulness of the reporting regulation change and 
informative content of the expanded audit report.  
3.6.1.3. Materiality disclosure cross-sectional analysis (auditor perspective) 
As stated earlier, in addition to disclosing the risks of material misstatement, the revised ISA 
700 (UK and Ireland) requires the independent auditor of the premium listed companies to explain 
the concept of materiality in planning and performing. Specifically, the auditor is required to 
determine the materiality threshold used for the financial statements as a whole. In the context of 
the audit, materiality is organized by ISA (UK and Ireland) 320 (FRC 2009), and accordingly 
affected by the procedures, nature, and the extent of the risk assessment and misstatements 
identified in the previous and current audits. Therefore, as noted earlier, auditor exercise of 
professional judgment on materiality is mainly related to the assessed and identified risks of material 
misstatement. In this relationship, a higher (lower) level of current or expected risks of material 
misstatement provides a basis for the auditor to set a lower (higher) materiality threshold and vice 
versa (FRC 2009).  
Consequently, in order to validate our cross-sectional results of ARD and information risk 
measures, in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4), we replace #RISK, and %RISK by MAT with the expectation of 
finding negative association with I_RISK, BETA, and C_CAP. Consistent with our expectation, 
models 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3.4 show significantly negative association between MAT and I_RISK 
(t-statistic of -2.056 at the 5% level), BETA (t-statistic of -1.897 at the 10% level), and C_CAP (t-
statistic of -1.667 at the 10% level). The economic significance of this finding indicates that auditors 
determine a higher level of materiality for firms that exhibit lower information risk to shareholders 




increase in MAT variable is associated with about -1% (0.016 * -0.650), -15.1% (0.016 * -9.464), 
and -0.7% (0.016 * -0.418) decrease in I_RISK, BETA, and C_CAP, respectively.48 These findings 
uphold our previous ARD results and our assumption that firms complying with the new reporting 
rule can benefit from a lower information risk and a lower cost of capital. Again, this evidence 
leads us to expect economic consequences contingent on the disclosed materiality level.  
Table 3.4. 
Cross-sectional analyses of firm’s information risk and auditor disclosed materiality 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES I_RISK BETA C_CAP 
MAT -0.650** -9.464* -0.418* 
 
(-2.056) (-1.897) (-1.667) 
SIZE -0.008*** 0.027 0.003 
 
(-3.229) (0.713) (1.158) 
BM 0.003 0.060 -0.001 
 
(0.567) (0.696) (-0.192) 
LEV 0.040** 0.210 0.021 
 
(2.449) (0.809) (1.007) 
STD_CFO 0.134** 1.115  
 
(2.074) (1.093)  
CFO 0.005 -0.110  
 
(0.163) (-0.215)  
RET 0.525*** 6.293***  
 
(4.543) (3.456)  
DIVPAY -0.009 0.027  
 
(-0.893) (0.172)  
BIG4 0.032** 0.584***  
 
(2.605) (3.043)  
INC 0.001 -0.015  
 
(0.054) (-0.042)  
ANALYSTS -0.002 0.100  
 
(-0.331) (1.299)  
DISTRESS 0.025** 0.071  
 
(2.373) (0.429)  
GC 0.097*** 0.301  
 
(4.561) (0.903)  
CATA 0.004 -0.120  
 
(0.271) (-0.501)  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
48 Again, when we run Eq. (3.4) incorporating I_RISK and BETA, the unreported results are consistent with 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) where coefficient estimates for both risk factors are found highly significant at 1%. We 
also find a qualitatively similar finding, where MAT is significant with a better t-statistic of -2.3 at the 5% level. This 




Constant 0.167*** -0.312 0.039 
 
(5.168) (-0.613) (1.014) 
 
   
Observations 188 188 188 
Adj. R-squared 0.503 0.201 0.0751 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the OLS estimation of I_RISK (idiosyncratic risk), BETA (systematic 
risk), and C_CAP (cost of equity capital) on MAT (auditor disclosed materiality). Following Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al. (2009), 
I_RISK and BETA are estimated from the usual market model (CAPM), while following Kothari et al. (2009), C_CAP 
is estimated from the Fama-French three-factor model. See Table 3.2 for variable details. T-statistics are clustered at the 
firm level and reported in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. 
3.6.1.4. An extended analysis through successive years 
The above-reported cross-sectional results suggest that information disseminated by the 
expanded audit report is associated with variances in cash flows (I_RISK), covariances in cash 
flows (BETA) and thus, the cost of capital (Lambert et al., 2007). We, however, consider it useful 
to extend this analysis by conducting two-year examinations for the cause-effect relation between 
ARD (i.e., #RISK and %RISK) and MAT and information risk measures (i.e., I_RISK, BETA, and 
C_CAP).49 We start by expanding our cross-sectional sample to include firms with complete data 
for 2013 and 2014 (376 firm-year observations). In Panel A of Table 3.5, where we run Eq. (3) and 
Eq. (4) through 2013 and 2014, we find confirmation of the cross-sectional results. Specifically, we 
find significantly positive relations between #RISK and I_RISK (t-statistic of 2.083 at the 5% 
level), %RISK and BETA (t-statistic of 2.524 at the 5% level) and C_CAP (t-statistic of 1.929 at 
the 10% level), and significantly negative relations between MAT and BETA (t-statistic of -1.927 
at the 10% level) and C_CAP (t-statistic of -1.716 at the 10% level). 
As a further test, we examine whether #RISK, %RISK, and MAT are proxying for the 
information risk that a firm may present to investors in the future. Therefore, we re-estimate Eq. 
(3.3) and Eq. (3.4) with the dependent information risk measures (i.e., I_RISK, BETA, and 
C_CAP) measured in y = t+1 (i.e., 2014 and 2015), whilst #RISK, %RISK and MAT (as well as 
the control variables) are measured in y = t through 2013 and 2014. The results reported by Panel 
 
49 In these tests, we measure I_RISK, BETA, and C_CAP using Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.2) employing a rolling window of 





B of Table 3.5, as expected, indicate that firms with relatively higher (lower) level of ARD 
(materiality) are associated with higher information risk measures in the following period. 
Specifically, we find significant positive coefficients on #RISK in I_RISKit+1 analysis (t-statistic of 
2.017 at the 5% level), %RISK in BETA it+1 (t-statistic of 3.433 at the 1% level) and C_CAPit+1  
analyses (t-statistic of 2.826 at the 1% level). Additionally, we find significant negative coefficients 
on MAT in I_RISKit+1 (t-statistic of -1.859 at the 10% level) and BETA it+1 (t-statistic of -1.881 at 
the 10% level) analyses.    
Table 3.5.  
Panel A: Cross-sectional analyses of firm’s information risk and auditor risk and materiality disclosures  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES I_RISK I_RISK I_RISK BETA BETA BETA C_CAP C_CAP C_CAP 
#RISK 0.003**   0.020   0.000   
 
(2.083)   (0.759)   (0.213)   
%RISK  0.002   0.230**   0.017*  
 
 (0.438)   (2.524)   (1.929)  
MAT   -0.359   -10.928*   -0.466* 
   (-1.138)   (-1.927)   (-1.716) 
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.178*** 0.168 -0.086 0.268 0.063* 0.047 0.082** 
 
(7.400) (6.687) (7.717) (0.364) (-0.191) (0.612) (1.831) (1.445) (2.234) 
 
         
Observations 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 
Adj. R-squared 0.536 0.528 0.531 0.195 0.214 0.209 0.103 0.118 0.112 
Panel B: Cross-sectional analyses of firm’s information risk measures in the period following auditor risk and materiality disclosures  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES I_RISKt+1 I_RISKt+1 I_RISKt+1 BETAt+1 BETAt+1 BETAt+1 C_CAPt+1 C_CAPt+1 C_CAPt+1 
#RISK 0.003**   0.010   -0.000   
 
(2.017)   (0.397)   (-0.039)   
%RISK  -0.001   0.270***   0.023***  
 
 (-0.137)   (3.433)   (2.826)  
MAT   -0.628*   -11.013*   -0.415 
   (-1.859)   (-1.881)   (-1.469) 
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.182*** 0.184*** 0.188*** 0.068 -0.235 0.165 0.103*** 0.081** 0.120*** 
 
(8.268) (7.648) (8.804) (0.163) (-0.580) (0.406) (3.166) (2.544) (3.301) 
 




Observations 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 
Adj. R-squared 0.624 0.615 0.625 0.261 0.294 0.279 0.130 0.158 0.138 
Panels A and B of this table report the coefficient estimates from the OLS estimation of I_RISK (idiosyncratic risk), BETA (systematic 
risk), and C_CAP (cost of equity capital) on the #RISK, %RISK (measures of auditor risk disclosure) and MAT (auditor disclosed 
materiality). Following Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al. (2009), I_RISK and BETA are estimated from the market model (CAPM), while following 
Kothari et al. (2009), C_CAP is estimated from the Fama-French three-factor model. I_RISK, BETA, and C_CAP are measured using a 
rolling window of five years of monthly returns (requiring a minimum of 24 and a maximum of 60 months) ending on the fiscal year-end 
under examination. Panel A presents I_RISK, BETA, C_CAP as measured in (y = t) 2013 and 2014. Panel B presents I_RISKt+1, BETAt+1, 
C_CAPt+1 as measured in (y = t+1) 2014 and 2015. Other variables are measured (in y = t) as of a firm’s fiscal year-ending on 2013 and 
2014. Control variables are included as shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. See Table 3.2 for variable details. T-statistics are clustered at the firm 
level and reported in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1 
 
To sum up, the results presented in Table 3.3 through Table 3.5 show evidence consistent 
with expanded auditor’s disclosure is not generic, rather it is associated with the information risk 
that a firm presents to investors. Therefore, firms complying with the new reporting rule, which 
have relatively more reliable financial reporting, i.e., have relatively low risks of material 
misstatement inducing the auditor to specify a high level of materiality, can benefit from a lower 
information risk and a lower cost of capital. 
3.6.2. Intertemporal analyses of the usefulness of auditor reporting regime change and 
the informativeness of auditor risk disclosures 
3.6.2.1. Descriptive statistics 
In the cross-sectional analyses we investigate whether a firm’s risks attributable to systematic, 
unsystematic and cost of capital risks are manifest in ARD (and materiality threshold). Now, we 
move to examine the usefulness of auditor reporting regime change and the informativeness of 
ARD using intertemporal analyses. The descriptive statistics reported in Table 3.6 display the 
distributional properties of the variables used in the intertemporal analyses. These distributional 
properties are shown for premium listed companies during the period before (POST=0) and the 
period after (POST=1) the reporting regulation. The difference-in-means using t-test are also 
reported. The usefulness of the new audit report regime to the capital market environment is 







Descriptive statistics on variables used in the intertemporal analyses 
VARIABLE Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3  Diff t-stat. 
 POST=0  POST=1   
Dependent variables: 
SPREADit+1 286 0.013 0.002 0.032 0.001 0.011  286 0.011 0.002 0.023 0.001 0.008  0.756 
TVOLit+1 286 1.913 1.686 1.204 1.169 2.454 
 
286 2.031 1.685 1.430 1.017 2.772 
 
-1.066 
SDit+1 286 0.017 0.016 0.008 0.013 0.020 
 
286 0.020 0.017 0.010 0.014 0.023 
 
-3.703*** 
DISPit+1 278 0.142 0.041 0.446 0.023 0.077 
 




SIZEit 286 13.507 13.645 2.104 12.178 14.773 
 
286 13.729 13.845 2.065 12.493 15.049 
 
-1.27 
TVOLit 286 2.318 1.968 1.448 1.373 3.034 
 
286 2.030 1.802 1.246 1.210 2.637 
 
2.547** 
SDit 286 0.021 0.020 0.009 0.016 0.024 
 
286 0.018 0.017 0.008 0.013 0.021 
 
4.165*** 
Floatit 286 83.186 93.360 21.484 77.920 98.240 
 
286 84.193 95.105 21.296 78.240 98.400 
 
-0.562 
BETAit 286 1.028 0.979 0.562 0.654 1.387 
 
286 0.991 0.994 0.577 0.560 1.363 
 
0.775 
BMit 286 0.646 0.566 0.642 0.280 0.924 
 




#RISKit 0 NA NA NA NA NA 
 
286 4.091 4.000 1.379 3.000 5.000 
 
NA 
%RISKit 0 NA NA NA NA NA 
 
286 1.342 1.308 0.398 1.021 1.639 
 
NA 
MATit 0 NA NA NA NA NA 
 
286 0.009 0.005 0.013 0.004 0.009 
 
NA 
This table presents summary statistics for variables used in our intertemporal analyses on the usefulness of auditor reporting regime 
change and the informativeness of risk information disclosed by the auditor. POST=1 if the premium listing company observation 
is from the post-adoption period, and 0 otherwise. T-statistics report the difference-in-means of the variables between the pre-period 
and post-period. Our sample encompasses two years before (2011-2012) and after (2013-2014) the new reporting regulation. Variable 
definitions and measures appear below. 
Market liquidity and risk perceptions indicators (measured in y = t+1 over six months from July 1st to December 31st to ensure that 
the annual report is publicly available because according to UK Companies Act 2006 public companies’ annual reports should be 
filed within six months of fiscal year ending on 31st of December) are as follows. 
SPREAD = the mean of the relative spread, which is calculated by dividing the difference between the daily ask and bid prices by 
the average of the daily ask and bid prices; TVOL = the mean daily trading volume divided by the number of outstanding shares; SD 
= the mean of the volatility (standard deviation) of the daily market returns; DISP = the standard deviation of analysts’ EPS forecasts 
for the firm’s currently unreported fiscal year (referred to as ‘‘FY1’’ in IBES terminology) scaled by the absolute value of the mean 
EPS forecast for the same fiscal year. 
Other variables (measured in y = t) are as follows. 
SIZE = the natural log of market value of equity; BM = book value of equity divided by market value of equity; Float = the percentage 
of shares that are not closely held; BETA is the coefficient loading on the market excess return in the Fama-French three-factor 
model; #RISK = the number of risks of material statement disclosed in the audit report; %RISK = the percentage of the number of 
words indicating risk in the audit report scaled by the total number of words in the audit report, where textual analysis of the audit 
report is processed using Diction 7 software employing the risk wordlist of Elshandidy and Shrives (2016). MAT = auditor disclosed 
materiality amount (£) for the financial statements as a whole, scaled by total assets; TVOL, and SD as defined above but measured 
in y = t. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails. 
 
Following Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and recently Gupta et al. (2018), market liquidity is 
captured using two proxies: 1- bid-ask spread (SPREAD) = the mean of the relative spread, which 
is calculated by dividing the difference between the daily ask and bid prices by the average of the 
daily ask and bid prices; 2- trading volume (TVOL) = the mean daily trading volume divided by 




user-perceived risk is captured using two proxies: 1- Volatility (SD) = the mean of the volatility 
(standard deviation) of the daily market returns; 2- analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) = the 
standard deviation of analysts’ EPS forecasts for the firm’s currently unreported fiscal year (referred 
to as ‘‘FY1’’ in IBES terminology) scaled by the absolute value of the mean EPS forecast for the 
same fiscal year. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Campbell et al., 
2014; Elshandidiy and Shrives, 2016) market liquidity and risk perceptions indicators are measured 
in y = t+1 over six months (from July 1st to December 31st) to ensure that the annual report, and 
hence auditor report, is publicly available because according to UK Companies Act 2006 public 
companies’ annual reports should be filed within six months of fiscal year ending on 31st of 
December. 
Consistent with the above-mentioned studies on the firm’s market liquidity and risk 
perceptions, the following control variables are included in our analyses of SPREAD, TVOL, SD, 
and DISP. SIZE = the natural log of market value of equity; BM = book value of equity divided 
by market value of equity; Float = the percentage of shares that are not closely held; BETA = the 
coefficient loading on the market excess return in Fama-French’s three-factor model, in addition 
to TVOL and SD as previously defined. All control variables are measured in y = t. Also, all 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails. 
The difference-in-means reported in Table 3.6 shows a stability in the control variables 
with the exception of TVOL and SD. This stability extends to our dependent variables, where we 
find no significant differences in the means of SPREAD, TVOL, and DISP within the pre- to post-
regulatory period. Only the mean of SD is found significantly higher in the post-regulatory period 
(t-statistic of -3.703 at the 1% level). These stable or insignificant univariate results qualitatively 
accord with prior research (e.g., Gutierrez et al. 2018; Reid et al., 2015, 2019). The time-related 
differences in the mean of SD are also consistent with the UK stock market behavior during 2011-
2015, where an increase in closing prices is noticeable (Gutierrez et al., 2018). Finally, the expanded 




new reporting regulation are collectively consistent with those previously obtained for one year 
after, and by prior studies (e.g., Gutierrez et al. 2018, Reid et al., 2019). That is, our sample 
descriptive statistics are consistent with prior studies on the expanded audit report and 
representative of the period in which our study is implemented.  
3.6.2.2. Intertemporal results of the new regulatory usefulness and ARD informativeness 
As indicated earlier, we examine the usefulness of the new reporting regulation by 
implementing time-series difference analyses using premium listed companies during the four years 
surrounding the new reporting regulation. In so doing, we use OLS regressions that control for 
other factors that prior research on the firm’s market liquidity and risk document to be related to 
SPREAD, TVOL, SD, and DISP (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Kothari et al., 2009; Gupta et 
al., 2018). Accordingly, we estimate the following models: 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1  =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛾3𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾4𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡   + 𝛾5𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑖,𝑡,  (3.5) 
𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +   𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾3𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡   +  𝛾4𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡,  (3.6) 
𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1  =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛾3𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾5𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡,
(3.7)   
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1  =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +   𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛾3𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡,   (3.8)  
where in this pre- to post-regulatory period analyses (i.e., time-series difference analyses for the 
premium listed companies), 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is our variable of interest. All variables are as previously 
defined; 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy indicator that takes one if the fiscal year-end is in the post-regulatory 
period and zero otherwise. 
Similarly, we examine the informativeness of ARD that is provided by the premium listed 
companies in the two years after the new reporting regulation using the following models: 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1  =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1#𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 %𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛾3𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾4𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡   +




𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1#𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 %𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾3𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡   + 𝛾4𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡,  
(3.10) 
𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1  =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1#𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 %𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛾3𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛾5𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑖,𝑡, (3.11)   
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1  =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1#𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 %𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛾3𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑖,𝑡,   (3.12)  
where all variables are as previously defined. Here, #𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 and/or %𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 are our variables of 
interest. 
These designs are consistent with those used in prior research on the expanded audit report 
(mainly Reid et al., 2015; Gutierrez et al., 2018; Lennox et al., 2019). That is important to enable 
clear and reasonable assessment of the usefulness the new reporting regime and the 
informativeness of ARD beyond that provided by prior research utilizing short-window analysis 
for investors’ reaction.  
Table 3.7. 
Intertemporal analyses of the usefulness of auditor reporting regime change  
 Market liquidity (y=t+1)  Risk perceptions (y=t+1) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SPREAD TVOL  SD DISP 
POST 0.000 0.170*  0.003*** 0.049 
 
(0.191) (1.662)  (5.667) (1.483) 
SIZE -0.006*** 0.166***  -0.001*** -0.020 
 
(-6.651) (3.765)  (-3.338) (-1.489) 
TVOL -0.000     
 
(-0.304)     
SD 0.110 36.967***    
 
(0.598) (3.955)    
Float -0.000** 0.018***  -0.000  
 
(-2.139) (4.797)  (-0.501)  
BETA    0.001  
    (1.248)  
BM    -0.000 0.212** 
 
   (-0.089) (2.448) 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant 0.130*** -2.205***  0.043*** 0.639** 
 
(5.693) (-3.192)  (7.041) (2.295) 
 
     




Adj. R-squared 0.461 0.209  0.251 0.197 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the OLS estimation to examine whether the new audit 
report regime is beneficial for complying companies. In Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 we employ time-series 
difference design for premium listed companies in the pre- and post- new reporting regulatory period. 
See Table 3.6 for variable details. T-statistics are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. 
 
Consistent with literature on general disclosure (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), we predict 
a negative (positive) coefficient on  𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 in our tests of 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1, (𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡+1), 𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1, 
and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1 implying more useful information is found by the users of premium listed 
companies’ information in the new reporting regime relative to the period before, that is, an 
increase (decrease) in firm’s market liquidity (risk perceptions). Drawing predictions in line with 
risk disclosures literature is somewhat complicated. However, since the context of the expanded 
audit report is relatively similar to that of risk factor disclosures (Item 1A of 10-K), we predict an 
increase in firm’s market liquidity and financial statement users’ perceived risk (Campbell et al., 
2014). That is, we predict a negative (positive) coefficient on 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 in our tests of 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1, 
(𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1, and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1) for the premium listed companies in the pre- to post-
regulatory period tests. Moreover, we predict a similar negative (positive) coefficient on 
#𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 and/or %𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 in our tests of 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1, (𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1, and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1). 
This suggests that market participants’ risk assessments are expected to result in decrease (increase) 
in information asymmetry (users’ perceived risk) (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; 
Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016). 
The time-series difference models 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Eq. 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8) of Table 3.7 display 
the coefficient estimates for premium listed companies in the pre- and post-regulatory period. 
Models 1 and 4 (Eq. 3.5 and 3.8) show statistically insignificant coefficients on 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 indicating 
that the new reporting regime is not useful in terms of the impact on SPREAD and DISP. 
However, Models 2 and 3 (Eq. 3.6 and 3.7) show statistically significant coefficients on 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 
suggesting that the new reporting regime is useful for investors of the premium listed companies. 




increase in market liquidity (TVOL), t-statistic of 1.662 at the 10% level) and an increase in 
investors’ risk perceptions (i.e., volatility of stock returns (SD), t-statistic of 5.667at the 1% level). 
Our evidence related to TVOL and SD accords with results from prior literature on risk or bad 
news disclosures (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014). Here, 
we are in a good position to verify this non-trivial usefulness for market participants by 
investigating whether ARD is, in a consistent manner, informative to the users of the premium 
listed companies. 
Table 3.8 reports intertemporal results of the informativeness of ARD (#RISK and/or 
%RISK). Under models 4, 6, and 8, the coefficient on %RISK is statistically significant in the 
expected direction (positive) with TVOL (t-statistic of 1.833 at the 10% level), SD (t-statistic of 
1.967 at the 10% level), and DISP (t-statistic of 1.755 at the 10% level), respectively. Additionally, 
under model 5, the coefficient on #RISK is positively statistically significant in terms of SD (t-
statistic of 2.149 at the 5% level). The impact on SPREAD, however, remains statistically 
insignificant. Collectively, these results suggest the informativeness of ARD. The economic 
significance of these results indicates that, all else being equal, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
%RISK (0.398; #RISK, 1.379) is associated with about 17%, 0.16% (0.14%), and 4.7% increase in 
TVOL, SD, and DISP, respectively. These results support our previous evidence regarding the 
usefulness of the new reporting regime, and, again, are consistent with prior literature on risk 
disclosure and firm’s market liquidity and users’ risk perceptions (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013; 
Campbell et al., 2014). These results are also in line with prior audit research suggesting the negative 
market reaction to auditor modified opinion, specifically if it is not expected (e.g., Frost, 1997; 
Taffler et al., 2004; Citron et al., 2008; Menon and Williams, 2010).  
Table 3.8. 
Intertemporal analyses of the informativeness of auditor risk disclosure  
 Market liquidity (y=t+1)  Risk perceptions (y=t+1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES SPREAD SPREAD TVOL TVOL  SD SD DISP DISP 
#RISK 0.002  -0.006   0.001**  0.023  
 




%RISK  -0.000  0.427*   0.004*  0.118* 
 
 (-0.057)  (1.833)   (1.967)  (1.755) 
SIZE -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.216*** 0.194***  -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.036* -0.034* 
 
(-5.719) (-5.861) (3.762) (3.325)  (-3.343) (-3.248) (-1.765) (-1.723) 
TVOL -0.001 -0.001        
 
(-0.810) (-0.740)        
SD 0.294 0.382 35.371** 30.004**      
 
(0.683) (0.870) (2.588) (2.217)      
Float -0.000 -0.000 0.018*** 0.018***  0.000 0.000   
 
(-1.624) (-1.586) (3.577) (3.544)  (0.372) (0.395) 
  
BETA      0.001 0.001   
      (1.134) (0.941)   
BM 
    
 0.000 0.000 0.339*** 0.322*** 
     
 (0.200) (0.316) (3.046) (2.738) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.105*** 0.107*** -2.313** -2.551***  0.042*** 0.040*** 0.758* 0.674 
 
(5.864) (5.464) (-2.533) (-2.885)  (7.636) (7.582) (1.753) (1.639) 
 
         
Observations 286 286 286 286  286 286 278 278 
Adj. R-squared 0.525 0.508 0.238 0.250  0.273 0.270 0.264 0.269 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the OLS estimation to examine whether the content of the expanded audit report 
is informative. Our sample encompasses the premium listed companies in the two years after the new reporting regulation. See 
Table 3.6 for variable details. T-statistics are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. 
3.6.2.3. Market participants’ perspective toward auditor disclosed materiality  
How do market participants interpret the disclosed materiality? This depends on whether the 
market sees the disclosed materiality as an indication of firm’s risk or audit effort. Livne et al. (2018) 
link between auditor determined materiality and audit effort. Since the practical concept of 
materiality represents the level of misstatements that the auditor accepts for the financial statements 
as a whole without changing the view about the fair presentation of a firm’s financial reporting, 
they employ materiality as a proxy for depth of audit effort. Thus, a relatively lower level of disclosed 
materiality can be seen by the firm’s users as a relatively higher effort exerted in the audit and vice 
versa. Consequently, the market is expected to appreciate a firm with a lower level of disclosed 
materiality due to the higher credibility it indicates about the audited outputs. Accordingly, if the 
disclosed materiality (MAT) is meaningful for information users, we would expect an increase in 




perceptions (i.e., positive SD, and/or DISP) for complying firms shown to receive relatively higher 
materiality (i.e., lower audit effort).50 Our expectations are, however, reversed if the information 
users respond to MAT as a signal of firm’s risk, i.e., high MAT indicates low risk and vice versa. 
Before testing the link between MAT and a firm’s market liquidity and users’ risk perceptions, 
following Livne et al. (2018), we check the assumption that MAT indicates audit effort by using 
OLS regression of MAT on audit fees (AUD_FEES) while controlling for other variables 
employed in prior research on audit fees (e.g., Choi et al., 2010). Using audit fees to proxy audit 
effort is common in literature (see Livne et al., 2018 for multiple references). Additionally, 
consistent with the highly persistent nature of audit fees (Doogar et al., 2015), we run a cross-
sectional analysis in the first year (2013) of adopting the expanded audit report. In the meantime, 
Livne et al. (2018) suggest a possible positive association between the number of risks of material 
statement and the breadth of audit effort. Accordingly, we estimate the following models: 
𝐴𝑈𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝐴𝑇, #𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾, 𝑜𝑟 %𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛼3𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼4𝐵𝑀 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛼6𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼7𝐵𝐼𝐺4 + 𝛼8𝐴𝑈𝐷_𝐿𝐴𝐺 + 𝛼9𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌 + 𝛼10𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶
+ 𝛼11𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐿 + 𝑒, (13) 
where other variables are as previously defined, AUD_FEES = the natural log of audit fees; ROA 
(return on assets) = net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; AUD_LAG = 
audit report lag in days from the fiscal year-end; EMPLOY = the squared root of the number of 
employees; INVREC = the sum of inventories and accounts receivable scaled by total assets; 
CACL (current ratio) = current assets divided by current liabilities. 
Table 3.9. 
OLS regressions of audit fees on auditor risk and materiality disclosures  
 VARIABLES AUD_FEES 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
MAT -10.845**   
 (-2.530)   
 
50 Consistent with this view, investors show a concern regarding the possibility that auditors may set a high materiality 
threshold in order to attract new clients and thus, undermine audit quality (FRC 2013c). This intuitively implies that 




#RISK  0.086**  
  (2.171)  
%RISK   0.280* 
   (1.901) 
SIZE 0.532*** 0.505*** 0.513*** 
 (13.220) (12.447) (12.726) 
LEV 0.592* 0.578* 0.699** 
 (1.886) (1.821) (2.231) 
BM 0.353*** 0.325*** 0.364*** 
 (3.958) (3.572) (4.053) 
ROA -0.963 -1.142* -1.145* 
 (-1.621) (-1.931) (-1.929) 
DISTRESS -0.001 -0.110 -0.163 
 (-0.004) (-0.621) (-0.902) 
BIG4 0.258 0.319 0.261 
 (1.042) (1.268) (1.042) 
AUD_LAG 0.006 0.005 0.004 
 (1.491) (1.331) (0.984) 
EMPLOY 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (5.234) (5.573) (5.525) 
INVREC 0.134 0.065 -0.006 
 (0.425) (0.205) (-0.019) 
CACL -0.084*** -0.082*** -0.082*** 
 (-3.291) (-3.189) (-3.197) 
    
Constant 5.085*** 5.045*** 5.065*** 
 (7.285) (7.161) (7.165) 
    
Observations 184 184 184 
Adj. R-squared 0.784 0.782 0.780 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the OLS estimation of audit fees on auditor risk and 
materiality disclosures. Where variables details are given in Table 3.2, AUD_FEES = the natural log 
of audit fees, ROA (return on assets) = net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets, 
AUD_LAG = audit report lag in days from the fiscal year-end, EMPLOY = the squared root of the 
number of employees, INVREC = the sum of inventories and accounts receivable scaled by total 
assets, CACL (current ratio) = current assets divided by current liabilities. T-statistics are clustered at 
the firm level and reported in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. 
 
The three models exhibited in Table 3.9 suggest an association between the content of the 
expanded audit report and the burden audit fees (t-statistic and significance level of: MAT = -2.530 
at 5%, #RISK = 2.171 at 5%, and %RISK = 1.901 at 10%). Collectively, these results are consistent 
with that of Livne et al. (2018) and support the association between MAT and ARD and audit 
effort. This further supports our previous findings related to the sense that ARD has, and gives 




illustrate users’ response to risk content rather than audit effort). This finding clarifies the argument 
that Gutierrez et al. (2018) deduce but are unable to capture, that the extent of audit fees may 
explain the positive relation between audit effort and auditor discussion of risks. Importantly, the 
ARD results should not be explained as meaning that the new reporting regime brings higher audit 
fees for the complying firms, because we did not intend to test this assumption and prior research 
proves insignificant impact on audit fees (Gutierrez et al., 2018; Reid et al., 2019). As mentioned 
before, audit fees are highly persistent and thus, the link between the risks of material misstatement 
and audit fees only becomes observable under the requirement of the new reporting regulation. In 
addition, the finding provides a rational for testing the possible influence that MAT may have on 
capital market behavior.   
Turning to Table 3.10, the intertemporal results under models 1, 2, and 4 for the premium 
listed companies in the two years after the new reporting regulation are consistent with our 
expectations. Specifically, we find a positive (negative) association between MAT and SPREAD, 
(TVOL), and DISP (t-statistics are 1.830, -1.827, and 1.772 at the 10% level, respectively). The 
coefficient on SD is also found positive but statistically insignificant. The economic significance of 
this finding indicates that, all else being equal, a one-standard-deviation increase in MAT variable 
is associated with about 0.7% (0.013 * 0.553), (-10.9%, 0.013 * -8.386), and 7% (0.013 * 5.369) 
increase (decrease) in SPREAD, (TVOL), and DISP, respectively. Summing up, our results suggest 
that the content of the expanded audit report is informative. 
Table 3.10. 
Intertemporal analyses of the informativeness of auditor disclosed materiality 
 Market liquidity (y=t+1)  Risk perceptions (y=t+1) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SPREAD TVOL  SD DISP 
MAT 0.553* -8.386*  0.099 5.369* 
 
(1.830) (-1.827)  (1.096) (1.772) 
SIZE -0.005*** 0.208***  -0.001*** -0.027 
 
(-6.403) (3.631)  (-3.111) (-1.441) 
TVOL -0.000     
 
(-0.161)     





(0.381) (2.754)    
Float -0.000* 0.018***  0.000  
 
(-1.970) (3.587)  (0.534)  
BETA    0.001  
    (1.097)  
BM    0.001 0.366*** 
 
   (1.065) (3.247) 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant 0.100*** -2.169**  0.038*** 0.650 
 
(5.143) (-2.381)  (5.758) (1.486) 
 
     
Observations 286 286  286 278 
Adj. R-squared 0.589 0.243  0.259 0.270 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the OLS estimation to examine whether the materiality 
threshold that is disclosed in the expanded audit report is informative. Our sample encompasses the 
premium listed companies in the two years after the new reporting regulation. See Table 3.6 for variable 
details. T-statistics are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. 
3.6.2.4. Intertemporal change analyses 
In order to test our results further, we conduct two intertemporal change examinations. In 
the first, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Reid et al., 2015, 2019) 
we test our results related to the usefulness of the new reporting regime by rerunning Eq. (3.5) to 
Eq. (3.8) while replacing our firm level analyses by within-firm changes analyses. That is, we employ 
our dependent and control variables as the change from y = t-2 to y = t-1 and from y= t-1 to y = 
t. Consequently, we replace the POST indicator by ∆POST, where ∆POST = 0 for change from y 
= t-2 to y = t-1 and ∆POST = 1 for change from y = t-1 to y = t (the year of first adoption of the 
new reporting regulation). In the time-series difference models, our unreported results show that 
the coefficient on (∆POST=0.193) remains positive in the TVOL test (t-statistic of 1.279) with 
marginally trivial statistical significance. For SD, the coefficient on (∆POST= 0.002) retains its 
statistically positive significance with a t-statistic of 1.980 at the 5% level. Overall, these results 
support our prior results regarding the usefulness of the new reporting regulation. 
Second, following previous risk disclosures studies (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Elshandidy 
and Shrives, 2016), we further test our results related to the expanded audit report informative 




%RISK, and MAT by ∆#RISK, ∆%RISK, and ∆MAT, where ∆ indicates the differences between 
a firm’s disclosed #RISK, %RISK, and MAT and the median for other firms in the same industry 
over two years after the new reporting regulation. Collectively, our unreported results are found 
consistent with those previously obtained from Tables 3.6 and 3.9. In sum, the intertemporal 
change findings provide additional evidence on the strong cause-effect relationship between our 
explanatory and dependent variables and thus, our results’ robustness.  
3.7. Conclusion 
Among other auditing standards applicable in many jurisdictions, the revised ISA 700 (UK 
and Ireland) was introduced in 2013 and mandated the expanded audit report. It requires the 
independent auditor to disclose the risks of material misstatement with the greatest effect on the 
audit, the application of materiality, and the scope of the audit. The fundamental premise 
underlying the new audit reporting standard is to improve the capital market environment for the 
complying firms (LSE premium listed companies). Employing this unique setting, we use several 
cross-sectional and intertemporal tests to explore two main research questions: 1- whether the 
expanded auditor’s report is not generic and thus, the new audit report regime may yield benefits 
to complying firms through lower information risk that translates into lower cost of equity, and 2- 
whether the reporting regulation change and information content of the expanded audit report 
affect information asymmetry and risk perceptions. 
In the cross-sectional tests, we find that firms receiving an expanded audit report with a 
higher level of risk disclosure exhibit significantly higher beta and cost of equity. Furthermore, we 
find significantly negative association between auditor disclosed materiality (that is negatively 
related to the assessed and identified risks of material misstatement) and idiosyncratic risk, beta, 
and cost of equity. These findings suggest that expanded auditor’s disclosure is not generic, rather 
associated with the information risk that a firm presents to investors. Therefore, firms complying 




relatively low risks of material misstatement inducing the auditor to specify a high level of 
materiality, can benefit from a lower information risk and a lower cost of capital. 
We use intertemporal tests, where we structure time-series difference and standard post-
regulatory panel designs, to investigate the economic usefulness of the audit report regime change, 
and the information content of expanded auditor’s disclosure. The evidence we find suggests that 
the new reporting regime is, on average, related to higher market liquidity (trading volume) and 
investors’ perceived risk (volatility of market returns). Particularly, the intertemporal results of the 
informativeness of the expanded audit disclosures show that a high level of ARD positively and 
significantly impacts the trading volume, volatility of market returns, and analyst forecast 
dispersion. Consistent with the argument that auditor determined materiality is negatively related 
to audit effort (Livne et al., 2018), our intertemporal results further indicate that market participants 
appreciate the firm with a lower level of disclosed materiality due to the higher credibility it indicates 
about the audited outputs. Specifically, we find a significantly positive (negative) impact of the 
determined materiality threshold (i.e., low audit effort) on bid-ask spread, (trading volume), and 
analyst forecast dispersion. 
Collectively, our cross-sectional and intertemporal tests, which control for other factors that 
previous studies show to be related to the above-mentioned measures, as well as endogeneity 
concern, provide direct evidence that the expanded auditor reporting is firm-specific and useful for 
financial statement users. This also is consistent with the notion that the expanded auditor’s report 
regime and information content are associated with significant economic consequences for both 
the complying firms and capital market participants. Our results complement prior experimental 
studies and archival research on the effect of the expanded auditor’s report and its content on the 
investors’ reaction. This, in turn, is supportive of the FRC decision to go beyond the traditional 
standardized pass/fail audit opinion on the financial statements and helps to relieve related 
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Appendices of Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.A. 
Elshandidy and Shrives’ (2016) risk wordlist 
risk*, loss*, decline*, decrease*, less, low*, fail*, threat, reverse*, against, catastrophe*, shortage, unable, 
challenge*, uncertain*, gain*, chance*, chances, increase*, peak*, high*, fluctuate*, differ*,diversify*, 
probable*, possible, significant*, against, subject, affect*, potential*, depend*, expose*, hedge*, vary*, likely, 
might, influence*, susceptible, viable 










Chapter 4. Internal control effectiveness, textual risk disclosure, and their usefulness: US 
evidence 
4.1. Introduction 
Previous research (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Schneider et al., 2009; Iliev, 2010; 
Clinton et al., 2014) indicates that an apparent void in the SOX and internal control literature relates 
to the benefits of Section 404 (b) (that obligates the external auditor of the accelerated filers to 
report on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting) in improving the reliability 
of financial reporting and ultimately whether this regulation is useful to the market.51 Meanwhile, 
knowing whether internal control effectiveness drives firms to efficiently disclose their risks 
externally, an important component for reliable information (AICPA, 1987; SEC, 2003a; PCAOB, 
2004), is still unexplored (Elshandidy et al., 2018).52 Additionally, exploring the usefulness of 
conveying such internal knowledge (i.e., textual risk disclosure (TRD) and SOX 404 (b) reporting) 
to the market are not conclusive (e.g., Schneider et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 2018; Elshandidy et al., 
2018). To address this issue, we raise two research questions. First, whether the internal control 
effectiveness (ICE) influences TRD. Second, whether ICE attestation by the external auditor and 
management’s TRD are useful to the market. 
According to PCAOB (2004) Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2), internal control material 
weaknesses (ICW) are considered the most severe form of internal control deficiencies (ICD) as 
compared to significant deficiencies and control deficiencies. An ICW implies that there is an 
information problem in the firm’s detecting and reporting system and is an indicator that the firm 
has ineffective internal controls (i.e., low quality) and thus, results in less reliable information 
 
51 Accelerated filers are the issuers that have a public float of at least $75 million as of six months before fiscal year-
end (SEC, 2005). 
52 On average, 80% of a typical annual report consists of textual disclosures with a great focus on risk-related 
information that is intrinsically crucial to grasp and interpret the numbers and representations of quantitative data 
(Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Dyer et al., 2017; Lo et al., 2017). Words used by managers to describe their operations are 
also found to be correlated with management activities, as well as stock returns and earnings (Loughran and McDonald, 




(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2013).53 Theoretical (e.g., Lambert et 
al., 2007) and empirical (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Kothari et al., 2009a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al., 2009) literature on general disclosure suggests that the quality of a firm’s information systems, 
including the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, affects information 
asymmetry and risk components of the firm’s cost of capital by the increase in the imparted 
disclosure. Prior TRD literature widely concerns two aspect: exploring the underlying drivers of 
risk disclosure and/or studying the usefulness of such disclosure (for a recent review see, 
Elshandidy et al., 2018). Literature, however, leaves a considerable gap around the incentives of 
TRD because TRD remains largely voluntary, despite the severity of regulations on risk disclosure, 
due to subjectivity in assessing firms’ risks and uncertainties (e.g., SEC, 1997, 2010; Hope et al., 
2016), and the informativeness of such disclosure is substantially unknown (Kravet and Muslu, 
2013).54 Consistent with this premise, we examine the relationship between ICE (as a driver or an 
incentive) and the level of TRD (where aggregate risk disclosure and the tone in risk news are 
considered), and the benefit of those two types of internal information that are carried to the 
market by the external auditor and management as follows.  
Broadly, SOX 404 requires management to establish and maintain an effective internal 
control system to significantly and positively reveal the firm’s unknown and inherent risk factors 
and uncertainties that affect internal management reports and, thus, decisions based on these 
reports so as to ensure the reliability of financial reporting (SEC, 2003b; Feng et al., 2009). 
Consistent with PCAOB (2004, 2007), prior research (e.g., Doyle et al., 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al., 2008, 2009; Donelson et al., 2017) posits that when there is an ICW, there is more than a remote 
likelihood that the internal control system is ineffective in detecting and disclosing risk factors and 
 
53 Consistent with prior research (e.g., Donelson et al., 2017), we use ICW reported by the external auditor under SOX 
404 (b) as it ensures credible and rigorous evaluation of internal control and, thus, to grant a greater power to our 
analyses. Additional details regarding ICW reported under SOX 404 (b) are provided in Section 4.4.1. 
54 This accords with the theoretical argument in which Dobler (2008) calls for exploration of risk disclosure incentives 
in the highly regulated countries, and empirical evidence derived from prior risk disclosure research in highly regulated 





contingencies on a timely basis. Consistent with this conjecture, we hypothesize that an effective 
internal control system reveals more risk factors and contingencies, and thereby enhances 
managers’ ability to disclose a higher level of risk information. 
Signaling theory underpins managers’ rational motives to disclose their firms’ risks. That is, 
the high level of TRD is employed as a signal of the effectiveness in identifying, measuring, and 
managing risk (e.g., Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016). Nevertheless, the above nexus may fail to 
completely observe the probable impact of ICE (proxied by ICW, so throughout the chapter, both 
are used interchangeably) on TRD because of managers’ tendency to withhold bad news about risk 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Kothari et al., 2009b). Therefore, in our further analyses, we test 
whether mangers would respond to the external auditor public report on their firms’ ICW. If 
managers respond, we expect mainly to observe a significant increase in disclosing bad news about 
risk because it becomes costly or difficult for managers to delay releasing bad news about risk after 
receiving an external auditor’s adverse opinion on their firm’s internal controls (Skinner, 1994; Bao 
et al., 2019).55  
Specifically, consistent with prior literature (e.g., Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Beneish et al., 
2008; Feng et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2013), we expect managers of firms reporting recurrent 
ineffective internal controls to be the most likely to change their TRD behavior (i.e., moving from 
a relatively lower to relatively higher level of TRD) for two possible reasons. First, these managers 
would become aware from the external auditor about their firms’ internal control risks. Second, 
since an external auditor’s adverse opinion on a firm’s internal controls (i.e., ICW exists) entails an 
adverse public signal, managers are expected to positively address this problem by providing more 
disclosure to guide their firms’ stakeholders. Consequently, pursuant to agency theory, an increased 
level of TRD (particularly, bad news about risk) can be observed in firms associated with recurrent 
ineffective internal controls as a response from managers (rather than the effectiveness of internal control system) 
 
55 For more discussion about the reasons why managers may disclose or withhold bad news, refer to Skinner (1994) 




to the expected increased uncertainty level that results from the ICW identified and publicly 
reported by the external auditor so as to reduce the public uncertainty and agency problems. 
Analyzing investor assessment of this internal knowledge conveyed to the market is crucial 
to investigate if it is useful (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Kothari et al., 2009a). This further is 
encouraged since the possible linkages between SOX 404 (b) and market assessment have failed to 
be evidenced (e.g., Dowdell et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2018), and, as noted earlier, the debate about 
the usefulness of TRD (e.g., Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016). Our chapter adds to internal control 
literature and US research (see Schneider et al., 2009 and Elshandidy et al., 2018) concerning the 
benefit of internal control and risk information provided under SEC requirements (e.g., SEC, 1997, 
2005) by providing combined evidence about the usefulness of both ICW reporting and TRD. 
More specifically, we argue that the aggregate level of risk disclosure and its good news, bad news, 
or net tone would alleviate (intensify) information asymmetry and investor-perceived risk and, 
thereby, reduce (increase) the expected negative market assessment due to an external auditor’s 
ICW reporting. There is no empirical study, to the best of our knowledge, on testing the market 
assessment of TRD by management and ICW reporting by the external auditor (in addition to their 
interaction). Our chapter also answers the calls by Schneider et al. (2009) and Gupta et al. (2018) 
for additional research on the market assessment of ICW reported by accelerated filers under SOX 
404 (b). Figure 1 portrays the research design. 
Our findings suggest that firms with an ineffective internal control system exhibit 
significantly lower levels of aggregate risk disclosure and its tone relative to firms with an effective 
internal control system. In our further analysis, we also document that the recurrently identified 
and publicly reported ICW prompts managers to significantly change their TRD behaviour by 
providing higher levels of aggregate risk disclosure and its tone relative to other firms. In terms of 
the informativeness of ICW reporting and TRD, we find that ICW reporting leads to a significant 
and positive increase in market illiquidity (proxied by bid-ask spread and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 




Additionally, results show that ICW reporting leads to a significant and positive increase in 
investor-perceived risk (proxied by volatility of market returns) when there are intertemporal 
changes in the effectiveness of internal controls, and/or when it is accompanied by a change in 
firms’ TRD relative to their industry norm. 
While our finding suggests that TRD is apparently statistically insignificant in terms of 
investor-perceived risk, it shows that the level of aggregate risk disclosure negatively and 
significantly impacts the information asymmetry by reducing the bid-ask spread. In contrast, a high 
level of aggregate risk disclosure would result in a significant decrease in market liquidity (i.e., higher 
illiquidity ratio) in firms that receive ICW reporting and have the nearest observable characteristics 
to non-ICW firms. When we distinguish the tone of the aggregate risk disclosure, results show that 
while bad news about risk implies trivial interest from the market participants, good news and net 
tone about risk entail a significant positive market liquidity (lower bid-ask spread and illiquidity 
ratio).  
The interaction results suggest that investors would rely on the meaningful information 
conveyed by TRD to revise their judgment on ICW reporting, particularly when ICW firms have 
the nearest observable characteristics to non-ICW firms. Specifically, our evidence suggests that 
investors negatively assess the conflict between the credible ICW reporting by the external auditor 
and management tone about risk (i.e., good news and net tone about risk). On the contrary, 
consistent with agency theory, managers can reduce information asymmetries around the ICW 
reported by the external auditor through providing greater amount of aggregate risk disclosure and 
its tone of bad news about the risk so that indicate their realization of their firms’ risks. 
We further show that ICW reporting, aggregate risk disclosure and bad news about risk (good 
news and net tone about risk) positively (negatively) affect investors’ reaction around the 10-K 
filing, and, as expected, this effect is decreased for firms with a rich communication environment.  




This figure illustrates the relationship between factors and variables associated with the study’s first research question (as 
exhibited above the horizontal solid line) and the second research question (as exhibited below the horizontal solid line).  
Solid boxes show the observable variables and thus, solid arrows present the direct/observable relations that are the 
main interest of our study.  
Dashed boxes show unobservable bodies and variables and thus, dashed arrows present the indirect/unobservable 




suggest the usefulness of the external auditor’s attestation on the firm’s internal controls and 










































Our findings have several theoretical and practical implications. First, they suggest that ICW 
affects not only the accuracy and quality of information used by managers and disclosed to 
Figure 4.1. Research design 
 
RQ1: whether the internal control effectiveness (ICE) influences textual risk disclosure (TRD)? 
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investors (as established in previous studies, see for example Feng et al. (2009) and Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2008)) but also the quantity of (risk) information. This, in turn, suggests that internal 
control effectiveness has broader implications than those previously documented in the literature 
and provides further support in favor of the benefit of SOX 404 (b) in improving the financial 
reporting reliability. Second, the ways in which the internal control system or external auditor’s 
opinion under SOX 404 (b) may help or prompt managers to increase their level of TRD and the 
impact of these different types of internal information on the market should also be of particular 
interest to regulators (e.g., AICPA; SEC; PCAOB) when assessing the related regulations. Third, 
our results extend the evidence provided by Clinton et al. (2014) regarding the negative implications 
of ICW presence and reporting for financial analysts and provide external validity and 
generalization to the experimental evidence on the informativeness of ICW reporting (Lopez et al., 
2009; Church & Schneider, 2016). Fourth, the results also manifest the importance of identifying 
the tone of disclosure in general (Kothari et al., 2009a), and particularly aggregate risk disclosure 
(Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016) to reach an insightful understanding of the drivers for and 
usefulness of TRD. Fifth, the evidence stems from our textual analysis draws investors’ intention 
toward the reliability and usefulness of information conveyed by the 10-K narratives. 
The insights provided by our chapter contribute to both internal control and risk disclosure 
literature. We add to the prior research (e.g., Dobler, 2008; Campbell et al., 2014) calling for the 
investigation of risk disclosure incentives by hypothesizing that the nexus between ICE and the 
level of TRD is two-fold, where the first is associated with the role of an effective internal control system 
in risk revelation and the second with the change in managers’ risk disclosure behavior as a response to 
the identification and publicly reporting of ineffective internal controls. This rationalizes the debate 
around the importance of SOX 404 (b) reports by accelerated filers in improving financial reporting 
reliability. We also contribute to the ongoing debate between academics (e.g., Gupta et al., 2018; 




related disclosures (focusing on risk) and SOX 404 (b) by investigating their informativeness to 
market participants and how TRD would reshape market assessment around ICW reporting.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2. discusses the theoretical 
considerations. Section 4.3. reviews related literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 4.4. 
describes the methodology and data. Section 4.5. discusses the empirical results, and provides 
further and robustness tests. Section 4.6. concludes, states limitations and suggests avenues for 
future research. 
4.2. Theory 
Agency theory underpins that it is important to control managers’ behavior through 
monitoring, e.g., employing accounting and auditing mechanisms, to reduce agency conflicts 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Accordingly, managers are motivated 
to expand resources on monitoring to alleviate the agency problems and thus, reduce investors’ 
claims on the firm (Deumes and Knech, 2008). In this, the effectiveness of internal controls can 
serve as a monitoring mechanism to reduce agency conflicts, since it provides managers with more 
reliable information for the sake of financial reporting (COSO 1992; DeFond 1992; Keasey and 
Wright 1993; Anderson et al. 1993). Specifically, internal control is an effective tool to detect and 
report unintentional errors, employee wrongdoing, unknown and inherent risk factors and 
uncertainties that affect internal management reports and, thus, decisions based on these reports 
so as to ensure the reliability of financial reporting (SEC, 2003b; Hay and Knechel 2005; Deumes 
and Knech, 2008; Feng et al., 2009; Kravet and Muslu, 2013). 
In addition, the external auditor’s reporting on ICE would affect information asymmetry and 
investors’ risk perceptions as follows (Deumes and Knech, 2008). Since the within-firm internal 
control activities are unobservable by investors, they are unable to grasp the nature, extent, and 
quality of internal controls. Consequently, the external auditor’s reporting on ICE would enable 




reliable information by maintaining effective internal controls. That is, reporting on ICE can reduce 
agency problems that would arise from managers’ possession of superior knowledge about internal 
control. Moreover, due to the credibility of the external auditor’s reporting on ICE, and to the 
extent that this reporting reassures investors about the financial reporting reliability, such reporting 
may affect information asymmetry and investors’ risk perceptions.  
Managers’ incentives to disclose on their firms’ risks and the usefulness of such disclosure 
can also be conceptualized by the agency and signaling theories (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973). Managers are motivated to provide a higher level of risk information 
to reduce agency costs by reducing information asymmetry. Besides, managers may disclose their 
firms’ risk exposure to signal to the market their ability and quality in detecting, measuring, and 
managing risk. Therefore, managers can employ risk disclosure to distinguish their firms from 
others that may be perceived as less effective in risk management (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Elshandidy and Shrives; Elamer et al., 2020). 
In summary, this chapter draws insights from the agency and signaling theories to explain 
the importance of attaining an effective internal control system that serves as a monitoring 
mechanism. In addition, the premises of these theories indicate the usefulness of ICE reporting by 
the external auditor and TRD by management. This usefulness can be observed in terms of 
reducing conflicts between agency parties, signaling the quality, reducing investors’ uncertainties 
and risk perceptions about the amount and time of future cash flows. 
4.3. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
4.3.1. The effectiveness of internal controls and textual risk disclosure 
According to AS2, internal control over financial reporting is a process designed by the 
company’s principal executive and officers so as to ensure the reliability of financial reporting for 
external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Empirical research 




that financial reporting reliability is driven by (is function of) the firm’s ICE. The effectiveness of 
a firm’s internal controls is determined through, among others, risk assessments and information 
and communication (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009). Consequently, an ineffective internal control 
system (i.e., where ICW exists) is likely to adversely affect the ability of  managers or their 
employees, in the normal course of performance, to detect and report risk factors and 
contingencies on a timely basis (Doyle et al., 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2009).  
Consistent with signaling theory, managers are motivated to provide a high level of risk 
information regarding how they effectively identify and manage their risks in order to distinguish 
their firms from other firms that do not manage risks or do so less effectively (Elshandidy and 
Shrives, 2016). In addition, providing a high level of risk information is a key mechanism managers 
use to establish or change investors’ risk expectations, reduce litigation risk, and improve the firm’s 
reputation for transparent and credible disclosure (Feng et al., 2009). Therefore, managers of firms 
with effective internal controls would be more capable and willing to disclose more TRD. 
Furthermore, prior research (e.g., Lisic et al., 2016) indicates that managers are more able to 
misappropriate company assets, extract rents from shareholders (e.g., engage in insider trading, see 
Skaife et al., 2013), and have discretion over financial reporting due to the lack of formal policies 
and procedures where internal controls are ineffective. Thus, when internal controls are weak, 
managers are expected to provide a lower level of risk information. 
Prior research that addressed the relationship between the firm’s internal control and 
information reliability other than risk disclosure indicates a positive association between ICE and 
the accuracy and quality of disclosed information (e.g., Doyle et al., 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2008; Chan et al., 2008; Feng et al., 2009). Previous studies also suggest various negative 
implications of a firm’s ICW for its financial reporting. Donelson et al. (2017) evidence a strong 
association between ICW and managers committing fraud, as well as signaling false integrity and 
reporting quality. Chen et al. (2017) find that the adverse effects of top managers’ information 




more severe in the presence of ICW. Examining the relationship between financial reporting quality 
and investment efficiency, Cheng et al. (2013) reveal that firms that report ICW show inefficient 
investment before the disclosure and this investment inefficiency is mitigated or eliminated in the 
period following the disclosure due to rectifying the problems in the internal control system. 
This discussion suggests that effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting is likely 
to have a causal association with firms’ efficiency in revealing and disclosing more risk factors and 
contingencies and thus, increases managers’ ability to disclose a high level of TRD. Alternatively, 
an ICW implies an information problem in the firm’s financial reporting system that results in 
inefficiency in risk detection and reporting. Therefore, we formulate the following directional 
hypothesis: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms with an effective internal control system tend to exhibit a significantly 
higher level of TRD relative to firms with an ineffective internal control system. 
4.3.2. The informativeness of the internal control reporting and textual risk disclosure  
Predicating on Lambert et al.’s (2007) theoretical framework, Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al. (2009) 
posit (and find) that the indirect real effect of a firm’s ineffective internal control over financial 
reporting translates into investors’ negative assessments of firm risk. Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al. (2009) 
also suggest that market participants’ assessments of a firm’s accounting signals are impaired when 
ICW is present. In line with that, Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) find that lenders see 
financial information is less valuable when a borrower’s financial statements are subject to ICW, 
and as a result, move toward credit-rating-based provisions. According to agency theory, firms can 
reduce information asymmetries either between the firm and market participants or between 
informed and non-informed investors, as well as the arisen uncertainties by providing a higher 
amount and quality of information (e.g., Beyer et al., 2010). Thus, in the US secondary loan market, 
El-Mahdy and Park (2014) conclude that loan-specific characteristics help to mitigate the market’s 




Similarly, in the capital market, when an external auditor adversely attests on a firm’s internal 
controls, which would result in a deterioration in the value of accounting information provided to 
the public, investors are expected to search for an alternate source of information, such as textual 
disclosures, to assess firm risk. Managers would also employ their narrative sections to reduce the 
market’s asymmetric information, uncertainty and thus, the expected negative assessment (Lev, 
1988; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
Consistent with this notion, previous studies on the link between market reaction and 
assessment of ICD reporting document a higher cost of equity (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009), 
negative stock price reactions (Beneish et al., 2008; Hammersley et al., 2008) and lower market 
liquidity (El-Mahdy and Park, 2014; Dowdell et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2018).56 In line with 
Bertomeu et al.’s (2011) theoretical argument that disclosing more information can decrease 
information asymmetry, inter alia, where there is an overlap in the information obtained by 
managers and investors (as in the situation where ICW is reported), Beneish et al. (2008) suggest 
that investors’ response, in terms of the abnormal returns and equity cost of capital, to an ICW 
report depends on recognizing the uncertainty information disclosed by firms. Further, Kim and 
Park (2009) suggest that a firm’s voluntary disclosure that reduces market uncertainty can mitigate 
the adverse influence of ICD reporting. 
In relation to informativeness, prior risk disclosure research (e.g., Hope et al., 2016; Akhigbe 
and Martin, 2008) suggests that risk information matters to the market. Consistent with Kravet and 
Muslu (2013), Campbell et al. (2014) find that a higher level of risk disclosure raises the market’s 
assessments of a firm’s risk, or so-called investors’ risk perceptions. Simultaneously, Campbell et 
al. (2014) conclude that this heightened level of risk disclosure reduces information asymmetry 
(e.g., bid-ask spread) among that same firm’s investors. This conclusion accords with the argument 
of Kravet and Muslu (2013) that risk disclosure is likely to reduce the investors’ perceived risk (e.g., 
 
56 Notably, attempts made by previous studies (e.g., Dowdell et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2018) toward market assessment 
of the most severe type of ICD (i.e., ICW) were either insignificant or inconsistent and left an unclear understanding 




volatility of stock returns) if it is expected and related to known risk factors (which would be 
relevant where ICW is reported). More specifically, Elshandidy and Shrives (2016) find that the 
tone of risk disclosure is directionally associated with the market’s assessment, where good, 
compared to bad, news about risk is found to mitigate information asymmetry and decrease 
investors’ risk perceptions, and vice versa.  
This discussion indicates that ICW reporting is expected to increase information asymmetry 
and investor-perceived risk, and the accompanying TRD is likely to reduce (increase) this negative 
perception by market participants through mitigating (intensifying) the market’s asymmetric 
information. It is worth noting that studying the behavior of information asymmetries and risk 
perceptions all together is somewhat tricky because, fundamentally, a high level of disclosures is 
likely to reduce (increase) investors’ information asymmetry (risk perceptions). In the same vein, 
during the time of high-risk perceptions, market liquidity would worsen because uninformed 
investors would protect their investment by raising prices against informed investors (e.g., 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Additionally, interpreting market 
liquidity and perceived risk can be comparatively complicated because their proxies may extend to 
related topics such as investors’ opinion divergence (e.g., Garfinkel, 2009). Nevertheless, our 
interest focuses on whether ICW reporting and TRD are informative to the market participants, 
and further if TRD benefits investors in judging a firm’s risk around auditor ICW reporting.57 This, 
therefore, leads to the following unidirectional hypothesis: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the level of TRD is informative and likely to mitigate (or strengthen) the market’s 
expected negative assessment of an ICW report.  
 
57 Qualitatively, our approach is consistent with prior TRD research (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 
2014; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016) and internal control studies (El-Mahdy and Park, 2014; Dowdell et al., 2013; 




4.4. Research Design 
4.4.1. Sample selection and data collection 
Our sample compiles data related to 10-K filings of listed firms on the SEC EDGAR 
database for fiscal years 2004-2006 ending on December 31 (reasons are given below). We require 
sample firms to have a SOX 404 (b) auditor opinion available on Compustat (i.e., our sample 
contains accelerated filers), and no missing data from Compustat, Datastream, and CRSP 
databases. Various identifiers, involving CIK of the Edgar filings and the prementioned databases’ 
codes such as TICKER, GVKEY and PERMNO, are used to merge our data. We exclude 1,669 
firm-years with Compustat equity market capitalization less than $75 million (or missing) at the 
fiscal year ends in order to keep the accelerated filers and minimize the possibility that a firm no 
longer exists.58 We also exclude 5,939 firm-years of foreign firms because they were not subject to 
SOX 404 until July 15, 2006 (July 15, 2007, for foreign firms with a public float of under $700 
million) and 8042 firm-years of financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) because of their distinct regulations 
and accounting practices (Chan et al., 2008; Iliev, 2010).   
Our sample retains only firms with a fiscal year end on December 31 to synchronize the time 
period of firms with ICW and without ICW, as well as exploring the impact of internal control and 
risk information on the market assessment in a precise and timely fashion (e.g., Chan et al., 2008; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Elshandidiy and Shrives, 2016). Our final sample is composed of 
3,043 firm-year observations, 222 of which have ineffective internal controls (i.e., at least one ICW 
exists at year-end). The number of observations decreases for the within-firm change analysis 
(1,937 firm-years) because this test requires data on the difference between successive years. Sample 
construction is outlined in Panel A of Table 4.1. 
 
58 Following prior research (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2008; Iliev, 2010; El-Mahdy and Park, 2014), 
we define accelerated filers by initially employing market capitalization as a proxy for public float because they are very 





In our analysis, consistent with prior research (e.g., Feng et al., 2009; Donelson et al., 2017; 
Clinton et al., 2014), we depend on ICW reported by the external auditor under SOX 404 (b) 
instead of that disclosed by management under SOX 404 (a) and SOX 302 because the latter is 
more ambiguous and less rigorous. Additionally, previous studies (Schneider et al., 2009) indicate 
that the external auditor, rather than management, is more effective in detecting and publicly 
disclosing ICW. For example, Donelson et al. (2017) suggest that using external auditor’s opinion 
as opposed to management disclosure is more accurate, especially if managers are fraudulent. 
Consequently, we consider that the internal control system is ineffective if the external auditor’s 
opinion is adverse (i.e., there is ICW), while it is considered as effective if the auditor’s opinion is 
clean.59  
December 2004 is the starting point of our sample because SOX is effective for accelerated 
filers for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004. By extending our sample to December 
2006, we override the criticisms of using a sample period limited to the first year of SOX 404 for 
studying the benefits of ICE and the impact on market assessment.60 We use this longer time period 
sample to establish intertemporal analyses for the association between ICW and TRD, as well as 
the impact of ICW reporting and TRD on market assessment, to test their usefulness. We end our 
sample in December 2006 for two main reasons. First, to avoid measurement error endogeneity 
bias results from the application of AS5 (which is related to a significant decline in the accuracy of 
identifying and reporting of existing ICW; see, SEC (2009); Rice and Weber (2012); Chasan (2013); 
PCAOB (2013); Schroeder and Shepardson (2016)) and the financial crisis in 2007 (e.g., Dedman, 
2016). Second, to avoid results bias due to the less or no variability of ICW reporting because prior 
studies (Feng et al., 2009; Dowdell et al., 2013; Schroeder and Shepardson, 2016) indicate that the 
 
59 It is worth noting that under AS2, representing our sample period, the external auditor was required to issue two 
separate reports on the financial statements and the internal controls over the financial reporting system. This, among 
other changes, was changed under AS5 (superseding AS2) which allows the auditor to issue a combined report for 
fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2007.    
60 Critics argue that significant transition difficulties make it less well suitable to identify cross-sectional variation in 
ICE in the first year of SOX 404, and, thus, contemporaneous audited reporting measures are not ideal to identify ICE 




proportion of firms reporting ineffective internal control decreases significantly over time, 
especially from the application of AS5 in 2007 onwards. For a sample period from 2004 to 2013, 
Chen et al. (2016, p. 15) are compelled to delete 14,326 observations from their main sample of 
18,593 firm-year observations, leading to a final sample of 4,267 firm-year observations (which is 
roughly similar to our final sample), “because these firms do not exhibit variation in the ICW variable during 
the sample period.”61 Obviously, like prior research (e.g., Rose‐Green et al., 2011), we are not testing 
an old setting, rather employ the most appropriate setting for our study. 
4.4.2. Textual risk disclosure analysis62  
The clean textual content of our sample 10-K filings, after eliminating HTML, ASCII-
encoded graphics, and tables, is used because we focus on the narrative sections. Dyer et al. (2017) 
document that textual disclosure on both risk factors and internal control is not confined to a single 
section of the 10-K but spreads and interweaves across all the sections. Thus, employing TRD 
analysis that encompasses the entire 10-K is reasonable and consistent with our study’s purpose.63 
In order to capture the TRD in the 10-K narratives, we employ Elshandidy and Shrives’ (2016) 
complete risk wordlist, which is consistent with that of Kravet and Muslu (2013), as both relied on 
searching the entire sections of annual reports or 10-K fillings. Following Elshandidy and Shrives 
(2016), we classify the aggregate risk words in terms of tone into good or bad news about risk. 
After excluding neutral words that reflect neither the up nor the downside (e.g., significant, 
probable, and differ) from aggregate risk words, a word that reflects the positive side of the risk, 
i.e., potential gains and opportunities, is classified as good news about risk, while a word that 
reflects the negative side of the risk, i.e., potential losses/threats, is classified as bad news about 
 
61 Attempting to address these limitations on ICW as proxy for ICE, Buslepp et al. (2019) suggest the misclassification 
of audit-related fees as an alternative proxy for ICE. This proxy is, however, limited to the M&A setting and developed 
using the unaudited disclosures of management. 
62 We acknowledge Bill McDonald for providing access to his data repository. 
63 That is, drawing investors’ attention toward the fact that TRD embraces a wider spectrum of risk factors (e.g., 
operational and legal risks) relative to the risk of ICW over financial reporting, managers may trace the advances in 
TRD to indicate their grasp of these risks (i.e., bad news about the risk) and their efforts to manage and remediate it 




risk. Accordingly, we identify each filing’s aggregate risk disclosure, good news, and bad news about 
risk using the terms shown in Appendix B.  
Following textual analysis literature (see the review of Loughran and McDonald (2016)), we 
employ automated textual content analysis using Diction 7 software to measure each filing’s 
aggregate risk disclosure, its tone of good or bad news and thus the net tone of the risk. The 
aggregate risk disclosure score is calculated by the percentage of words that are contained in the 
complete risk wordlist (i.e., the number of words indicating the aggregate risk scaled by the total 
number of words in the 10-K). Similarly, each filing is further assessed based on its tone of good 
or bad news about risk. The score of good news about risk is calculated by the percentage of words 
that are classified as having a positive side, while the percentage of words that are classified as 
having a negative side is calculated to measure the score of bad news about risk. The score for net 
tone of risk is calculated as the net difference between good and bad news about risk. 
Following prior research (e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016), we 
check the reliability and validity of the TRD scores generated by the complete risk wordlist as 
follows. The reliability of the aggregate risk disclosure scores and tone of risk (good news, bad 
news, and net tone of risk) is tested using Cronbach’s alpha. This statistical test enables to judge 
the extent to which a dataset captures a particular underlying construct. The Cronbach’s alpha of 
82.99% for the computed scores of the TRD implies that the internal consistency between the 
aggregate risk disclosure and its tone is higher than the generally accepted value in the social science 
of 70% (Abraham and Cox, 2007). In terms of the validity check, we test the correlation between 
TRD scores that are generated by the complete risk wordlist of Elshandidy and Shrives (2016) and 
that of Kravet and Muslu (2013).64 Our full sample’s results show that both risk wordlists are highly 
correlated (r = 0.85 at the 1% significance level), which implies that the two risk wordlists in 
 
64 The risk wordlist of Kravet and Muslu (2013) comprises 20 risk-related keywords (where * implies that suffixes are 
allowed): can/cannot, could, may, might, risk*, uncertain*, likely to, subject to, potential*, vary*/varies, depend*, 




common capture a large proportion of risk disclosure from the 10-K narratives. Taken together, it 
is concluded that the computed TRD scores are both valid and reliable. 
4.4.3. Empirical model 
To test H1 and H2, we employ a fixed effects model using all internal control audited data 
for our sample period. Using a fixed effects model enables us to account for changes in TRD as a 
result of the effectiveness of internal controls during the period of the study (equation 4.1), plus 
changes in market assessment or benefit as a result of the observed risk information and ICW 
(equation 4.2).65 The model also accounts for bias that would arise in the dependent variable due 
to firm and/or industry-specific effects; it also excludes the effects of time-invariant covariates. 
Then, we additionally estimate a propensity-matched pairs sample to test H1 and H2. The 
propensity score matching technique is chosen consistent with Donelson et al. (2017) because it 
facilitates to obtain a sample of non-ICW firms that have the nearest observable characteristics to 
ICW firms. The matched pairs technique also allows us to control for possible correlated omitted 
variables. To this end, we use the possible determinants of ICW (e.g., Doyle et al., 2007b) to 
estimate a logit model of the probability of ICW (equation 4.3). We also employ a fixed effects 
model to test H1 (equation 4.1) and H2 (equation 4.2) using the estimated propensity-matched 
pairs sample. 
𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵𝑜 + 𝐵1 𝐼𝐶𝑊𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑗  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑗
𝑗=1
+ 𝑖𝑡  (4.1) 
In equation 4.1, TRD, in separate tests, equals the score of aggregate risk disclosure 
(AGG_RISK), and the scores of the tone of risk as good news (GOOD_RISK), bad news 
(BAD_RISK), or net tone of risk (NET_RISK). ICW, our independent variable of interest, is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if the external auditor issued an adverse opinion on the 
 
65 Unreported post-estimation tests of Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier and Hausman are used to assess the 
choice between the panel and OLS regressions. In our analyses, we also adjust the standard errors for serial dependence 




firm’s internal control system (ICW exists), and zero if the opinion is clean (ICW does not exist). 
Following prior literature on TRD (e.g., Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016) and 
internal control (e.g., Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Feng et al., 2009), 
our set of control variables includes inside ownership concentration and capital structure, which 
we employ as surrogates for agency problems in addition to two dummy variables: big four auditors 
as a surrogate for external audit quality and auditor opinion on financial statements. In addition, 
we control for firm characteristics including size, profitability, liquidity, performance, and growth, 
as well as market beta. The definitions and measures of these control variables are provided in 
detail in Appendix A.   
𝑀𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1 𝐼𝐶𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2 𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3 𝐼𝐶𝑊 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑗
𝑗=1
+ 𝑖𝑡  (4.2) 
In equation 4.2, MA denotes market assessment (i.e., informativeness) which, in separate 
tests, is proxied by market liquidity as represented by bid-ask spread (SPREAD) and Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ); investor-perceived risk as represented by the volatility of market 
returns (SD).66 These dependent variables are measured, based on daily data, as the average over 
60 trading days period beginning two trading days after the 10-K filing (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 
2013; Campbell et al., 2014). Consistent with prior research (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; 
Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016), we make our examining period long enough for investors to assess 
TRD and ICW reporting, but short enough to limit the influence of confounding events. Regarding 
our independent variables of interest, TRD and ICW are as defined in equation 4.1, while 𝑇𝑅𝐷 ∗
𝐼𝐶𝑊 represents their interaction so as to capture whether TRD is informative to make investors 
revise their assessment about ICW reporting. Control variables are common to those present in 
 
66 Bid-ask spread and stock return volatility are well-established proxies for market liquidity and investor-perceived risk 
in accounting literature (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia; Campbell et al., 2014; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Elshandidy and 
Shrives, 2016). Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure is one of the most widely used liquidity proxies in the finance 
literature (Lou and Shu, 2017). It can be explained as the daily price response associated with one dollar of trading 
volume, thus serving well in capturing stock liquidity and price impact. For more details about the measure’s 




equation 4.1, but, consistent with prior research on the informativeness of general disclosure and 
TRD (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016) and 
internal control (e.g., El-Mahdy and Park, 2014; Dowdell et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2018), we further 
control for dividends payout (dichotomous) and other market factors of the book to market ratio 
and trading volume. All independent and control variables are measured at fiscal year-end 𝑡, and 
detailed variable definitions and measures are provided in Appendix A. 




Equation 4.3 indicates the logit model used to estimate our propensity-matched pairs sample. 
Again, following Donelson et al. (2017), we employ the control variables used in equation 4.2 as 
the model’s predictors because Doyle et al. (2007b) suggest these control variables as possible 
determinants of ICW over financial reporting. By so doing, we obtain the predicted probabilities 
required to generate our matched-pairs sample. By only retaining pairs with scores that match 
within 0.05, we test H1 and H2 using fixed effects regressions. 
4.5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
4.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel B of Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for the explanatory, control as well as 
dependent variables (for equation 4.1: TRD including aggregate risk, its tone of good news, bad 
news, and risk net tone; for equation 4.2: bid-ask spread and illiquidity ratio as proxies for market 
liquidity and the mean of the volatility of market returns as a proxy for investor-perceived risk). 
These descriptive statistics are shown for the entire dataset that consists of 3,043 firm-year 
observations, of which 222 firm-year observations have ineffective internal controls (i.e., at least 
one ICW exists at year-end). Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails to mitigate 




Over the sample period where the external auditor attestation on the internal controls 
becomes into effect, on average, the percentage of words that reflect aggregate risk information 
represents about 1.30% relative to the total number of words disclosed by US non-financial firms 
in their 10-Ks. On average, about 0.48% of the 10-Ks words suggesting bad news related to risk, 
while 0.35% of words suggest good news about risk. This implies that about 0.47% (1.30% - 0.48% 
- 0.35%) of the 10-Ks words represent a neutral tone associated with risk disclosure. With net tone 
about risk averaging about -0.13%, likely, as a result, the US non-financial firms’ sentiment in their 
10-Ks becomes marginally more pessimistic (or less optimistic) in disclosing risk-related 
information when external auditors start to opine on their internal control system.  
Table 4.1. 
Panel A: Sample details 
Sample selection Firm-year observations 
All Compustat firms for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006 33233 
Excluding: 
Foreign firms 5,939 
Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) 8042 
Firms with a fiscal year end other than December 31  7,065 
Auditor disclaimer of opinion on internal control or delayed filing 6,341 
Companies with Compustat equity market capitalization less than $75 million (or 
missing) at the end of their fiscal endings 
1,669 
Missing data of audit, financial, ownership structure and market information  1134 
Final firm-year observations 3,043 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
Textual risk disclosure (TRD):     
AGG_RISK 3043 1.294 1.288 0.281 1.102 1.481 
BAD_RISK 3043 0.476 0.463 0.125 0.386 0.549 
GOOD_RISK 3043 0.346 0.335 0.138 0.242 0.432 
NET_TONE 3043 -0.131 -0.129 0.150 -0.232 -0.032 
Market assessment (usefulness) indicators:     
SPREAD 3043 0.192 0.126 0.194 0.078 0.225 
ILLIQ 3043 0.138 0.016 0.393 0.004 0.078 
SD 3043 0.022 0.020 0.011 0.015 0.026 
Explanatory and control variables:    
ICW 3043 0.073 0.000 0.260 0.000 0.000 
INSIDE_OWN 3043 0.205 0.157 0.193 0.034 0.302 
DEBT_EQU 3043 0.702 0.371 1.563 0.026 0.868 
AUD_OPIN 3043 0.467 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
BIG_4 3043 0.917 1.000 0.276 1.000 1.000 




ROE 3043 0.069 0.116 0.331 0.039 0.189 
CR 3043 2.796 1.960 2.471 1.310 3.230 
FFO 3043 0.171 0.167 0.557 0.071 0.349 
GROWTH 3043 0.202 0.129 0.341 0.052 0.261 
BETA 3043 1.329 1.231 0.683 0.846 1.734 
BM 3043 0.414 0.373 0.227 0.248 0.551 
TRAD_VOL 3043 0.849 0.680 0.643 0.418 1.079 
DIVIDENDS 3043 0.426 0.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 
Panel A of this table summarizes our sample construction. Panel B of this table presents summary 
statistics for the dependent variables used to test H1, i.e., TRD including aggregate risk disclosure and 
its tone of good news, bad news, as well as risk net tone. It also comprises dependent variables used 
to test H2, denotes market assessment indicators including bid-ask spread and Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity ratio as proxies for market liquidity, and the mean of the volatility (standard deviation) of 
market returns as a proxy for investor-perceived risk. ICW is the main independent variable of interest 
related to H1, while our set of control variables includes inside ownership concentration and capital 
structure which we employ as surrogates for agency problems in addition to two dummy variables for 
big four auditors as surrogate for external audit quality, and auditor opinion on financial statements. 
In addition, we control for firm characteristics including size, profitability, liquidity, performance and 
growth, as well as market CAPM beta. The main independent variables of interest related to H2 
include ICW and TRD including aggregate risk disclosure and its tone implies whether it is good news 
or bad news and the net tone of the risk information. In addition to the control variables used for H1, 
we further control for dividends payout (dichotomous) and other market factors of the book to 
market ratio and trading volume. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails. Variable 
definitions, measures, and sources are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Furthermore, we examine the difference-in-means between ICW and non-ICW firms using 
a t-statistics test (unreported for brevity).67 Comparative to non-ICW firms, the univariate tests 
indicate that ICW firms are more likely to disclose relatively less (more) good news about risk and 
net tone about risk (bad news about risk) (|t|-statistics of 3.085, 4.817 at the 1%, and 2.332 at the 
5% significance level, respectively). This initially supports our hypothesis that managers of firms 
with effective internal controls would be in a better position to signal more good news and net 
tone about the risk (Feng et al., 2009; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016), whereas, the cost of the 
publicly reported ICW may prompt managers to respond by increasing higher bad news about the 
risk (Skinner, 1994; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Kothari et al., 2009b; Bao et al., 2019). The t-tests 
show statistically insignificant difference between aggregate risk disclosure levels for ICW and non-
ICW firms. This result, though unexpected, accords with Elshandidy and Shrives’ (2016) finding 
that aggregate risk disclosure is less likely to be associated with firms’ environmental incentives. 
 
67 Since the univariate test (as opposed to the multivariate analysis) gives evidence regarding the effect of each variable 




The univariate tests additionally reveal greater information asymmetry and investor-risk 
perceptions for ICW firms in comparison to non-ICW firms (|t|-statistics of 3.964 and 4.427 at 
the 1% level, respectively). This provides initial support to our hypothesis that ICW reporting is 
informative to market participants. In terms of the control variables, we observe that ICW firms 
are more likely to receive an unqualified audit opinion on their financial statements, and are more 
likely to have higher market beta, book to market ratio, and trading volume than non-ICW firms 
(|t|-statistics of 2.283, 4.703, 2.475, and 2.379 at the 5% significance level or better, respectively). 
We also observe that ICW firms are smaller, have lower profitability and are less likely to report 
dividends payout than non-ICW firms (|t|-statistics of 5.644, 2.826, and 5.879 at the 1% 
significance level, respectively). Overall, these statistically significant differences are consistent with 
results obtained from studies on the determinants of ICW (e.g., Doyle et al., 2007b), and so are 
valid to be used in estimating our ICW logit model in equation 4.3. These results also illustrate the 
importance of controlling for these innate firm characteristics in our analyses. 
Table 4.2 reports the pair-wise correlations (Pearson product moment correlations are 
exhibited on the upper-right-hand portion, and Spearman rank-order correlations are exhibited on 
the lower-left-hand portion). For the sake of facilitation, we discuss the Pearson correlations but 
note that the Spearman rank-order correlations are generally consistent with the Pearson 
correlations. The aggregate risk disclosure is found positively associated with both bad news (0.81) 
and good news (0.73) about risk, which implies that US non-financial firms significantly employ 
the tone of risk information to communicate signals about risks involved in their aggregate risk 
disclosure. Consistent with our descriptive statistics, the ICW variable is negatively (positively) 
correlated with good news (-0.06) and net tone about risk (-0.09) (bad news about risk; 0.04). The 
ICW variable also reveals a positive correlation with bid-ask spread (0.07) and the volatility of stock 
return (0.08). As expected, market liquidity and risk perception proxies exhibit relatively large 
positive correlations (SPREAD and ILLIQ (0.82), SD and SPREAD (0.31), and SD and ILLIQ 




correlation with the volatility of stock return (0.04). Consistent with Elshandidy and Shrives (2016), 
good news and net tone about risk are positively (negatively) correlated with market liquidity 
(investor-perceived risk) proxies, while bad news about the risk has opposite directions; |r| ranging 
from about 0.07 to about 0.21.68 
4.5.2. Testing H1 and H2 using the entire sample 
Table 4.3 shows results related to H1, which addresses whether ICE influences the level of 
TRD. Across each of the four models’ estimations, ICW is negatively associated with the level of 
aggregate risk disclosure, its tone of bad news, good news and net tone of risk. Despite the 
statistically trivial result in respect of bad news about risk (it becomes statistically significant at the 
5% level in our propensity-matched sample, which we utilize later), this finding collectively 
indicates that firms with an ineffective internal control system exhibit significantly lower levels of 
risk information, particularly in terms of aggregate risk disclosure (t-statistic -2.009 at 5% 
significance level), its tone of good news (t-statistic -2.720 at 1% significance level) and the net tone 
about risk (t-statistic -1.988 at 5% significance level). That is, all else being equal, the economic 
significance of having effective internal controls is related to higher TRD at 3.09% (0.040/1.294) 
of the mean of aggregate risk disclosure, 1.68% (0.008/0.476) of the mean of bad news, 6.36% 
(0.022/0.346) of the mean of good news and 9.92% (0.013/0.131) of the mean of the net tone 
about risk. This evidence supports H1 that, compared to having effective internal controls, the 
existence of an ICW implies an information problem in the firm’s detection and reporting system. 
Consequently, managers of firms with ICW are less likely to disclose high levels of TRD because 




68 In addition, the correlation coefficients are also used to diagnose multicollinearity. The unreported variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) are less than 10, ranging from 1.03 to 1.62, which implies that multicollinearity is not inherent in our 





Pearson (top) and Spearman (bottom) correlation coefficients 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 AGG_RISK  0.806 0.728 -0.003 -0.024 -0.023 0.044 -0.003 -0.017 -0.048 0.037 0.012 -0.039 0.055 0.086 0.076 -0.008 0.127 -0.005 0.082 -0.007 
2 BAD_RISK 0.796  0.331 -0.520 0.072 0.031 0.089 0.042 -0.011 -0.036 0.023 -0.001 -0.075 -0.108 0.175 -0.052 -0.050 0.189 0.051 0.082 -0.121 
3 GOOD_RISK 0.726 0.341  0.630 -0.165 -0.096 -0.142 -0.056 -0.055 0.037 0.095 0.081 0.229 0.319 -0.226 0.237 -0.033 -0.088 0.016 -0.063 0.292 
4 NET_TONE 0.029 -0.468 0.627  -0.209 -0.113 -0.206 -0.087 -0.040 0.066 0.069 0.075 0.273 0.380 -0.352 0.258 0.011 -0.237 -0.024 -0.126 0.369 
5 SPREAD -0.018 0.079 -0.179 -0.234  0.815 0.314 0.072 0.190 -0.053 -0.095 -0.209 -0.495 -0.278 0.156 -0.232 -0.035 -0.002 0.160 -0.258 -0.169 
6 ILLIQ -0.003 0.077 -0.197 -0.249 0.869  0.208 0.026 0.136 -0.057 -0.088 -0.156 -0.315 -0.140 0.111 -0.106 -0.027 -0.067 0.125 -0.226 -0.079 
7 SD 0.055 0.129 -0.190 -0.280 0.427 0.496  0.080 0.134 -0.092 -0.154 -0.097 -0.427 -0.268 0.219 -0.181 0.112 0.314 -0.094 0.182 -0.310 
8 ICW 0.002 0.040 -0.055 -0.086 0.126 0.134 0.122  0.029 0.010 0.041 -0.035 -0.102 -0.051 -0.011 -0.002 -0.014 0.085 0.045 0.043 -0.106 
9 INSIDE_OWN -0.017 -0.020 -0.076 -0.052 0.300 0.365 0.226 0.047  0.028 -0.092 -0.102 -0.246 -0.046 0.075 -0.018 -0.018 0.028 -0.007 -0.130 -0.076 
10 DEBT_EQU -0.116 -0.138 0.112 0.232 -0.172 -0.284 -0.306 -0.040 -0.102  0.084 0.079 0.232 0.081 -0.172 -0.053 -0.026 -0.022 -0.048 -0.020 0.081 
11 AUD_OPIN 0.038 0.028 0.092 0.069 -0.106 -0.196 -0.191 0.041 -0.109 0.168  0.079 0.246 0.024 -0.152 -0.001 -0.042 -0.121 0.096 -0.002 0.112 
12 BIG_4 0.008 -0.005 0.076 0.079 -0.231 -0.260 -0.135 -0.035 -0.124 0.166 0.079  0.287 0.043 -0.118 -0.033 -0.023 0.022 0.030 0.044 0.084 
13 LN_TA -0.047 -0.105 0.240 0.317 -0.656 -0.825 -0.560 -0.107 -0.310 0.541 0.240 0.303  0.290 -0.435 0.147 -0.094 -0.244 0.106 -0.058 0.465 
14 ROE 0.027 -0.182 0.317 0.441 -0.410 -0.439 -0.280 -0.119 -0.111 0.137 0.020 0.059 0.347  -0.241 0.503 -0.100 -0.186 0.001 -0.072 0.277 
15 CR 0.103 0.180 -0.195 -0.337 0.227 0.328 0.368 -0.007 0.168 -0.521 -0.189 -0.109 -0.519 -0.249  -0.195 0.079 0.259 -0.050 0.178 -0.283 
16 FFO 0.078 -0.079 0.197 0.223 -0.262 -0.195 -0.121 -0.055 -0.019 -0.361 -0.038 -0.030 0.006 0.474 0.064  -0.042 -0.062 -0.016 0.004 0.121 
17 GROWTH 0.015 -0.103 0.049 0.128 -0.095 -0.050 0.178 -0.010 -0.022 -0.089 -0.062 -0.017 -0.083 0.135 0.091 0.108  0.111 -0.122 0.202 -0.146 
18 BETA 0.135 0.197 -0.071 -0.224 0.074 0.123 0.403 0.076 0.096 -0.220 -0.105 0.019 -0.234 -0.165 0.337 -0.036 0.149  -0.077 0.395 -0.295 
19 BM -0.002 0.032 0.041 0.010 0.229 0.196 -0.093 0.047 -0.022 0.095 0.103 0.045 0.126 -0.295 -0.067 -0.165 -0.174 -0.081  -0.156 0.064 
20 TRAD_VOL 0.085 0.094 -0.069 -0.135 -0.317 -0.293 0.239 0.041 -0.112 -0.126 0.018 0.062 -0.018 0.008 0.216 0.061 0.235 0.415 -0.176  -0.283 
21 DIVIDENDS -0.005 -0.127 0.293 0.387 -0.244 -0.309 -0.430 -0.106 -0.144 0.288 0.112 0.084 0.463 0.336 -0.335 0.062 -0.159 -0.287 0.085 -0.323  
This table reports the correlation coefficients of all variables that are related to test H1 (ICE and TRD) and H2 (market assessment to the disclosed risk information and reported 
ICW). Bold numbers indicate significance based on two-tailed t-tests, at the .05 level or better. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% on both tails. Variable definitions, 




Our results extend the conclusions drawn by prior research by suggesting that ICW affects 
not only the accuracy  (e.g., Feng et al., 2009) and quality (e.g., Chan et al., 2008) of information or 
decisions by managers (e.g., Cheng et al., 2013) but also the amount of their TRD in the 10-K 
filings. Turning to the control variables, firm size and market beta appear to be the most influential 
factors on the level of TRD, either for the aggregate risk disclosure or its tone of bad news, good 
news and net tone about the risk. These results are consistent with prior research on risk disclosure 
(e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016), where risky firms are motivated to 
detail their risk exposure and procedures followed to mitigate it. Large firms are more likely to own 
resources required for establishing a strong risk management system that are able to detect and 
convey risk information efficiently. 
Table 4.3. 
Fixed effect panel regressions of the impact of ICE on TRD  
VARIABLES AGG_RISK BAD_RISK GOOD_RISK NET_TONE 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Explanatory variable:     
ICW -0.040** -0.008 -0.022*** -0.013** 
 (-2.009) (-1.127) (-2.720) (-1.988) 
Control Variables:     
INSIDE_OWN 0.013 0.004 0.007 0.006 
 (0.235) (0.174) (0.319) (0.367) 
DEBT_EQU -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.626) (-0.223) (-0.261) (0.044) 
AUD_OPIN 0.013 0.008** 0.003 -0.006* 
 (1.416) (2.370) (0.647) (-1.801) 
BIG_4 0.014 0.009 -0.005 -0.015 
 (0.374) (0.585) (-0.452) (-1.481) 
LN_TA 0.066*** -0.006 0.039*** 0.044*** 
 (3.063) (-0.693) (4.254) (5.354) 
ROE 0.006 -0.021* 0.019* 0.040*** 
 (0.170) (-1.732) (1.696) (5.121) 
CR 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.003* 
 (0.574) (1.317) (-0.111) (-1.850) 
FFO 0.017 0.000 0.015** 0.015** 
 (0.947) (0.010) (2.493) (2.487) 
GROWTH -0.015 -0.013** 0.001 0.015*** 
 (-0.970) (-2.085) (0.206) (2.878) 
BETA 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.007* -0.006* 
 (2.772) (3.306) (1.767) (-1.727) 
Constant 0.772*** 0.482*** 0.065 -0.413*** 
 (5.159) (8.552) (1.011) (-7.221) 
     




R-squared 0.015 0.016 0.022 0.048 
F-value 2.616*** 2.580*** 4.151*** 8.493*** 
This table reports the coefficients on the explanatory variables of the fixed effects panel regression models. It 
examines H1 to answer the first research question about whether ICE (proxied by ICW) influences TRD? Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. T-statistics in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05 and * p<0.1. Variable definitions, measures, and sources are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Table 4.4 presents results related to H2 — whether ICW reporting by the external auditor 
and TRD by management are useful to the market. Across regression estimates for market liquidity 
(SPREAD and ILLIQ) and investor-perceived risk (SD), results suggest that ICW reporting is 
statistically not significant to the market participants. This finding accords with previous research 
(e.g., Dowdell et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2018) that argues but fails to find any evidence on the 
usefulness of ICW reported by the auditor to the capital market. That is, the evidence obtained 
from our entire sample in terms of the informativeness of the ICW reporting suggests negligible 
usefulness to market liquidity and investors’ perceived risk and thus, partially does not support H2. 
Gupta et al. (2018) suggest the rich information context preceding the release of SOX 404 (b) 
report as a potential factor that distorts observation of the usefulness of ICW reporting. Therefore, 
in order to mitigate such distorting factors, we conduct subsequent tests focusing our analysis on 
a propensity-matched sample to inspect the market assessment of ICW reporting while ICW firms 
have the nearest observable characteristics to non-ICW firms.  
Table 4.4. 
Fixed effect panel regressions of the impact of ICW reporting and TRD on market liquidity and investor-perceived risk 
 Market liquidity (t+1)  Investor-perceived risk (t+1) 
VARIABLES SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD  ILLIQ ILLIQ ILLIQ  SD SD SD 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)  Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) 
Explanatory variables: 
ICW -0.026 -0.043 0.009  -0.083 -0.116 0.002  0.000 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.667) (-0.993) (0.825)  (-0.861) (-1.074) (0.095)  (0.119) (0.620) (1.017) 
AGG_RISK -0.030**    -0.030    -0.001   
 (-2.212)    (-1.028)    (-0.570)   
BAD_RISK  0.020    0.131    -0.002  
  (0.385)    (1.053)    (-0.620)  
GOOD_RISK  -0.091***    -0.178**    0.001  
  (-2.943)    (-2.555)    (0.259)  
NET_TONE   -0.063*    -0.172**    0.001 
   (-1.774)    (-2.024)    (0.397) 
AGG*ICW 0.025    0.065    0.001   
 (0.788)    (0.847)    (0.384)   




  (0.474)    (0.606)    (0.109)  
GOOD*ICW  0.078    0.168    -0.000  
  (1.212)    (1.043)    (-0.050)  
NET*ICW   0.009    0.009    -0.001 
   (0.115)    (0.067)    (-0.208) 
Control variables: 
INSIDE_OWN 0.039 0.040 0.040  0.103 0.105 0.106  0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.093) (1.112) (1.107)  (1.321) (1.351) (1.361)  (0.761) (0.753) (0.745) 
DEBT_EQU 0.003 0.003 0.003  0.002 0.002 0.002  -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
 (1.405) (1.454) (1.451)  (0.544) (0.600) (0.585)  (-1.676) (-1.679) (-1.680) 
AUD_OPIN 0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.018 -0.020 -0.019  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.046) (-0.049) (-0.086)  (-1.414) (-1.512) (-1.504)  (-5.242) (-5.209) (-5.248) 
BIG_4 0.072** 0.071** 0.071**  0.132** 0.131** 0.130**  0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (2.364) (2.362) (2.364)  (2.098) (2.089) (2.068)  (2.306) (2.293) (2.281) 
LN_TA -0.096*** -0.093*** -0.095***  -0.138*** -0.131*** -0.132***  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-7.052) (-7.126) (-7.300)  (-4.428) (-4.531) (-4.662)  (-3.517) (-3.592) (-3.592) 
ROE -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.072***  -0.123*** -0.117*** -0.116***  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-4.182) (-4.106) (-4.065)  (-2.943) (-2.773) (-2.755)  (-0.267) (-0.305) (-0.294) 
CR -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***  -0.012* -0.013* -0.013**  -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
 (-2.851) (-2.924) (-2.993)  (-1.887) (-1.948) (-1.970)  (-1.864) (-1.854) (-1.861) 
FFO -0.007 -0.006 -0.007  0.001 0.003 0.003  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.715) (-0.624) (-0.674)  (0.038) (0.128) (0.112)  (0.104) (0.089) (0.081) 
GROWTH -0.005 -0.004 -0.004  -0.009 -0.007 -0.007  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.575) (-0.496) (-0.443)  (-0.391) (-0.309) (-0.300)  (0.646) (0.618) (0.636) 
BETA 0.011 0.010 0.010  0.032** 0.030* 0.030*  -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
 (1.570) (1.483) (1.408)  (2.008) (1.876) (1.875)  (-1.717) (-1.684) (-1.713) 
TRAD_VOL -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043***  -0.065** -0.065** -0.064**  -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (-3.468) (-3.452) (-3.479)  (-2.112) (-2.112) (-2.091)  (-2.098) (-2.092) (-2.120) 
BM 0.194*** 0.189*** 0.190***  0.404*** 0.391*** 0.393***  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (6.143) (6.082) (6.087)  (4.791) (4.805) (4.838)  (-0.724) (-0.641) (-0.655) 
DIVIDENDS 0.001 0.001 0.000  -0.009 -0.009 -0.009  0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.069) (0.057) (0.028)  (-0.168) (-0.166) (-0.164)  (0.420) (0.416) (0.409) 
Constant 0.785*** 0.756*** 0.735***  0.892*** 0.811*** 0.797***  0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 (8.315) (8.048) (8.043)  (4.322) (4.294) (4.139)  (6.623) (6.641) (6.635) 
            
Observations 3,043 3,043 3,043  3,043 3,043 3,043  3,043 3,043 3,043 
R-squared 0.159 0.160 0.157  0.086 0.089 0.088  0.054 0.054 0.054 
F-value 9.892*** 8.996*** 9.454***  4.988*** 4.515*** 4.898***  6.074*** 5.437*** 6.020*** 
This table reports the coefficients on the explanatory variables of the fixed effects panel regression models. It examines H2 to answer 
the second research question about whether ICE attestation by the external auditor and management’s TRD are useful to the market? 
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. T-statistics in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
and * p<0.1. Variable definitions, measures, and sources are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Table 4.4 also shows that the level of aggregate risk disclosure negatively and significantly 
impacts information asymmetry by reducing the bid-ask spread (t-statistics -2.212 at the 5% 
significance level). To put this in an economic perspective, all else being equal, a one-standard-
deviation increase in aggregate risk disclosure is associated with 0.84% (-0.030 * 0.281) lower bid-




Campbell et al. (2014) about the impact of aggregate risk disclosure on bid-ask spread. This 
evidence is also consistent with the theoretical literature (e.g., Diamond, 1985; Amihud and 
Mendelson 1986) on the unidirectional influence of disclosure on reducing the information 
asymmetry. While this statistically and economically significant evidence suggests higher 
confidence in the fairness of stock transactions and increased trading volume,69 unexpectedly, 
aggregate risk disclosure is apparently statistically insignificant in terms of investor-perceived risk. 
When we distinguish the good news and bad news about risk (i.e., aggregate risk disclosure 
tone), shown under Models 2, 5 and 8 in Table 4.4, the results suggest that market participants are 
more likely to appreciate good news compared to bad news about risk. Whilst bad news 
information attracts trivial interest from the market, good news about risk entails a significant 
positive market liquidity. Specifically, good news about risk is associated with a lower SPREAD 
and ILLIQ (t-statistics -2.943 and -2.555 at the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively). That 
is, all else being equal, a one-standard-deviation increase in good news about risk results in -1.26% 
(-0.091 * 0.138) decrease in SPREAD and 2.46% (-0.178 * 0.138) decrease in ILLIQ. Similar 
inferences are derived from the net tone about risk (obtained by the adjusted score of good news 
about risk after deducting the score of bad news, which are reported under Models 3, 6 and 9 in 
Table 4.4), where t-statistics are -1.774 and -2.024 for the SPREAD and ILLIQ  at the 10% and 
5% levels of significance, respectively. 
Here, results about the good news and/or tone about risk in a firm’s 10-Ks suggest a decrease 
in the firm’s information asymmetry and thus, more active buyers and sellers of the security and 
tighter bid-ask spreads (Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016). Like the aggregate risk disclosure, the tone 
of good and bad news about risk show statistically insignificant effect on investor-perceived risk. 
While the insignificant finding for volatility is unexpected to us with the significant impact of TRD 
on market liquidity, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) attribute such a finding to other factors, such as 
 
69 In unreported analyses, we affirm this conclusion by using trading volume as a proxy for market liquidity (e.g., Leuz 




the type of investors attracted to the firm and infrequently traded stocks, that influence volatility 
and are unrelated to investor-perceived risk.70 In addition, with respect to the interaction between 
ICW reporting and TRD, our entire sample analysis fails to discover any statistical significance to 
the market. Collectively, our findings are partially consistent with H2, that the level and tone of 
aggregate risk disclosure in the 10-K are informative. 
4.5.3. Testing H1 and H2 using the propensity-matched pairs sample 
Panel A of Table 4.5 presents logit regression estimates drawn by equation 4.3 for the 
probability of ICW.71 We match 222 firm-year observations for the treatment group, i.e., firms with 
a reported ICW, to their pairs from firm-year control group observations, i.e., firms without any 
ICW during the entire sample period. Panel B of Table 4.5 presents the t-test results for the 
effectiveness of the mean of matched covariates between treatment and control subsamples. 
Thereafter, following prior studies (e.g., Rose‐Green et al., 2011; Donelson et al., 2017), we employ 
a multivariate model to gain more precise estimates of testing H1 and H2 using equations 4.1 and 
4.2, respectively, as follows. 
Table 4.5. 
Propensity score results 
Panel A: Logit regression of propensity score matching  Panel B: Covariate balance 








INSIDE_OWN 0.212  0.225 0.241 0.374 
 
(0.529)     
DEBT_EQU 0.087**  0.755 0.871 0.483 
 
(2.107)     
AUD_OPIN 0.522***  0.541 0.514 0.570 
 
(3.324)     
BIG_4 -0.139  0.883 0.883 1.000 
 
(-0.556)     
LN_TA -0.331***  6.283 6.213 0.597 
 
(-4.635)     
ROE -0.167  0.009 -0.002 0.714 
 
(-0.731)     
CR -0.139***  2.704 2.792 0.676 
 
70 Managers’ sensitivity to providing their firms’ private information to avoid public attention that would motivate 
undesirable action and reduce their firms’ cash flow is another possible reason (e.g., Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016). 
71 Consistent with prior research on the determinants of ICW (e.g., Doyle et al., 2007b), we find that firms that received 
an unqualified audit opinion on their financial statements, and that they are smaller, have lower current ratio, dividends 





(-3.118)     
FFO 0.178  0.166 0.145 0.641 
 
(1.441)     
GROWTH -0.341  0.185 0.156 0.271 
 
(-1.416)     
BETA 0.341***  1.536 1.549 0.854 
 
(2.895)     
TRAD_VOL 0.182  0.948 0.925 0.731 
 (1.557)     
BM 1.087***  0.451 0.445 0.802 
 (3.409)     
DIVIDENDS -0.530**  0.239 0.261 0.585 
 (-2.486)     
Constant -1.119**   
  
 
(-2.182)   
  
      
Observations 3,043  222 222 444 
Area under the ROC Curve 0.704     
Pseudo R-squared 0.068   
  
 
Panel C: Fixed effect panel regressions of TRD on treatment and control groups of ICW 
 VARIABLES AGG_RISK BAD_RISK GOOD_RISK NET_TONE 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
ICW -0.110* -0.045** -0.049* -0.007  
(-2.008) (-2.509) (-1.946) (-0.362) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.628 0.223 0.071 -0.191  
(0.796) (0.631) (0.317) (-0.930) 
     
Observations 444 444 444 444 
R-squared 0.170 0.148 0.155 0.112 
F-value 11.54*** 7.296*** 17.09*** 12.22*** 
 
Panel D: Fixed effect panel regressions of market assessment indicators on the treatment and control groups of ICW, 
TRD, and their interaction 
Market liquidity (t+1)  Investor-perceived risk (t+1) 
VARIABLES SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD  ILLIQ ILLIQ ILLIQ  SD SD SD 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)  Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) 
ICW 0.114 0.191* 0.039  0.411** 0.497*** 0.014  -0.005 -0.001 0.003 
 (1.100) (1.757) (1.245)  (2.129) (2.682) (0.282)  (-0.405) (-0.100) (0.633) 
AGG_RISK 0.029    0.299**    -0.005   
 (0.377)    (2.188)    (-0.543)   
BAD_RISK  0.244    0.694    0.003  
  (0.882)    (1.620)    (0.189)  
GOOD_RISK  -0.142    0.168    -0.013  
  (-0.615)    (0.489)    (-0.613)  
NET_TONE   -0.191    -0.151    -0.015 
   (-0.697)    (-0.343)    (-0.835) 
AGG*ICW -0.100    -0.359**    0.004   
 (-1.066)    (-2.384)    (0.370)   
BAD*ICW  -0.605**    -1.233***    -0.017  




GOOD*ICW  0.219    0.085    0.025  
  (1.378)    (0.325)    (0.871)  
NET*ICW   0.379*    0.524    0.022 
   (1.765)    (1.600)    (1.007) 
Control 
variables 
Included Included Included  Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Constant 1.126** 1.046* 1.064*  1.054 0.971 1.177  0.026 0.021 0.018 
 (2.152) (1.988) (1.900)  (1.373) (1.259) (1.444)  (0.883) (0.941) (0.878) 
            
Observations 444 444 444  444 444 444  444 444 444 
R-squared 0.305 0.373 0.344  0.437 0.480 0.437  0.209 0.243 0.232 
F-value 23.14*** 110*** 76.92***  71.66*** 116*** 33.37***  12.15*** 20.55*** 17.94*** 
Panel A of this table reports the results of propensity score matching logit regression where ICW is the dependent variable. 
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Z-statistics in parentheses. The ICW Model includes variables 
the are contained in market assessment models and consistent with ICW determinants suggested by Doyle et al. (2007b). 
Panel B of this table reports the covariate balance between matched pairs. T-test statistics are for the difference between 
treatment group (those with auditor-reported material weaknesses) and control group (those without auditor-reported 
material weaknesses). Panel C of this table reports coefficient estimates and the model summary for the fixed effects panel 
regressions of aggregate risk disclosure and its tone on treatment and control groups of ICW. Control variables presented in 
Table 4.3 are included. Panel D of this table reports coefficient estimates and the model summary for the fixed effects panel 
regressions of market assessment indicators on the treatment and control groups of ICW, TRD, and their interaction. Control 
variables presenting in Table 4.4 are included. 
There are 222 firm-year observations for the treatment group, which are matched to 222 firm-year control group 
observations. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the industry level (2-Digit SIC). T-statistics in parentheses. 
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Panel C of Table 4.5 reports coefficient estimates of regressing aggregate risk disclosure and 
its tone on ICW utilizing 444 observations from the treatment and control samples. Again, our 
tests of H1 using equation 4.1 show supportive results to that obtained from the entire sample. 
Collectively, our results retain their signs and significance (except net tone about risk, which turns 
insignificant). Specifically, we find that the level of aggregate risk disclosure and its tone of good 
news and bad news about the risk are statistically and negatively associated with having ineffective 
internal controls (t-statistic -2.008, -1.946 at 10%, and -2.509 at the 5% significance level, 
respectively). That is, all else being equal, the economic significance of having effective internal 
controls is related to higher TRD at 8.51% (0.110/1.292) of the mean of aggregate risk disclosure, 
9.26% (0.045/0.486) of the mean of bad news, 15.03% (0.049/0.326) of the mean of good news 
and 4.35% (0.007/0.161) of the mean of the net tone about risk.72 This evidence supports H1. 
Turning to the market assessment of ICW reporting and TRD (tests of H2 using equation 
4.2), Models 2, 4 and 5 under Panel D of Table 4.5 indicate that reporting ICW leads to a significant 
 




and positive increase in market illiquidity (t-statistics 1.757 at 10% level for SPREAD of under 
Model 2, and 2.129 and 2.682 at the 5% and 1% significance levels for ILLIQ of Model 4 and 
Model 5, respectively).73 This evidence adds to previous research on the usefulness of ICW reported 
by the external auditor to the capital market (e.g., Dowdell et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2018). It also 
accords with the experimental results of Lopez et al. (2009) and Church and Schneider (2016) about 
the value-relevance of ICW reporting and complements the findings of Clinton et al. (2014) that 
illustrate that analysts’ coverage declines following ICW reporting. Consistent with the theoretical 
premise of Lev (1988), and empirical evidence of Gupta et al. (2018) with regard to SOX 302, all 
else being equal, the economic significance of receiving an adverse eternal auditor opinion under 
SOX 404 (b) is likely to be associated with a higher (lower) information asymmetry (market 
liquidity) up to 240.10% (0.497/0.207) of the mean of ILLIQ. 
With respect to aggregate risk disclosure and the tone in risk news, despite many results 
missing statistical significance, their directions are generally consistent with those from the entire 
sample. It is worth noting that the positive significant relationship between AGG_RISK and 
ILLIQ under model 4 (t-statistic 2.188 at the 5% significance level) does not contradict the 
corresponding conclusion obtained from the entire sample because, the direction of aggregate risk 
disclosure is unexpected until we distinguish its tone (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009a; Kravet and Muslu, 
2013; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016). For example, Kravet and Muslu suggest that the direction of 
risk information depends on whether the revealed risk information entails known or unknown risk 
factors. Therefore, consistent with prior research on risk disclosure, which demonstrates the 
unidirectional influence of aggregate risk disclosure (e.g., Diamond, 1985; Amihud and Mendelson 
1986; Brown and Tucker, 2011; Hope et al., 2016), our tests for the informativeness of the 
aggregate risk disclosure are fundamentally interested in the overall effect, regardless of the sign. 
 
73 The superior statistics offered by ILLIQ may result from the strong association that it has with the expected stock 




Thus, all else being equal, the economic significance of this finding suggests that a one-standard-
deviation increase in AGG_RISK would result in 8.34% (0.299 * 0.279) increase in ILLIQ. 
Further to the above partial support for to H2 regarding the informativeness of ICW 
reporting and TRD, the interaction results (under Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 for market liquidity, in Panel 
D of Table 4.5) elucidate that TRD meaningfully conveys useful information that investors utilize 
to revise their judgment on ICW reporting. Driven by bad news about risk (t-statistics -2.086 and 
-3.277 at the 5% and 1% significance levels for SPREAD and ILLIQ, respectively), aggregate risk 
disclosure accompanies ICW reporting significantly and positively impacts the market liquidity 
proxied by ILLIQ (t-statistic -2.384 at the 5% significance level). However, when ICW reporting 
is accompanied by net tone of risk disclosure (good news residuals), market liquidity (proxied by 
SPREAD) is significantly and positively decreased (t-statistic 1.765 at the 10% significance level). 
This finding suggests that investors may negatively assess the conflict between the credible adverse 
attestation by the external auditor on the reliability of firm’s information and management net tone 
about risk (Kothari et al., 2009a). On the contrary, consistent with agency theory, managers can 
reduce information asymmetries around the adverse public signal conveyed by the external auditor 
through providing a higher amount of aggregate risk disclosure and its tone of bad news about the 
risk to indicate their realization of their firms’ risks (e.g., Lev, 1988; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; 
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Beyer et al., 2010). This evidence also accords with Bertomeu et al.’s 
(2011) theoretical argument that disclosing more information can decrease information asymmetry 
where there is an overlap in the information attained by managers and investors. Besides, empirical 
studies (e.g., Beneish et al., 2008; Kim and Park, 2009; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; El-Mahdy and 
Park, 2014) indicate that market participants positively (or less negatively) assess the disclosed 
information (including TRD) if that information is recognized, expected, and/or related to known 
risk factors (such as ICW reporting). Again, the findings derived form our matched-pairs sample 




4.5.4. Further and robustness tests 
4.5.4.1. Change analysis 
Prior research (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016) proposes a 
change analysis technique in order to mitigate endogeneity concerns related to correlated omitted 
covariates and reverse causality, as well as to establish a strong cause-effect relationship between 
explanatory and dependent variables.74 Consistent with prior research, in Table 4.6 we define the 
changes in the aggregate risk disclosure and its tone of bad news and good news about risk, and 
net tone of risk, respectively, as the differences between a firm’s scores and the median score for 
other firms in the same industry over the years of study. Panel A of Table 4.6 indicates that ICW 
significantly leads to differences in the aggregate risk disclosure and its tone of bad news, good 
news and net tone of risk in firms’ 10-Ks relative to their industry norm. As expected, and 
qualitatively consistent with prior findings, results suggest a lower level of aggregate risk disclosure, 
bad news (while statistically insignificant; t-statistic -1.097), good news and net tone about risk are 
associated with firms with ICW (t-statistics -1.971 and -1.985 at the 5% for AGG_RISK and 
NET_TONE, and -2.595 at the 1% significance level for GOOD_RISK). 
Table 4.6. 
Fixed effect panel regressions results of the impact of ICW on changes in TRD and their usefulness 
Panel A: The impact on the change of TRD  
VARIABLES ΔAGG_RISK ΔBAD_RISK ΔGOOD_RISK ΔNET_TONE 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
ICW -0.040** -0.008 -0.022*** -0.013** 
 (-1.971) (-1.097) (-2.595) (-1.985) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included 
Constant -0.515*** 0.016 -0.269*** -0.275*** 
 (-3.346) (0.284) (-4.233) (-5.547) 
     
Observations 3,043 3,043 3,043 3,043 
R-squared 0.015 0.016 0.022 0.049 
F-value 2.691*** 2.825*** 3.925*** 8.911*** 
 
Panel B: The impact on market assessment indicators 
 Market liquidity (t+1)  Investor-perceived risk (t+1) 
VARIABLES SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD  ILLIQ ILLIQ ILLIQ  SD SD SD 
 
74 It is important to note that our fixed effects model applied in our above level analysis is adequately able to consider 




 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)  Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) 
ICW 0.006 0.006 0.008  0.000 -0.002 0.001  0.002** 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.652) (0.733) (0.920)  (0.014) (-0.125) (0.051)  (2.078) (1.815) (1.797) 
ΔAGG_RISK -0.031**    -0.031    -0.001   
 (-2.227)    (-1.055)    (-0.549)   
ΔBAD_RISK  0.021    0.132    -0.002  
  (0.415)    (1.055)    (-0.644)  
ΔGOOD_RISK  -0.093***    -0.181***    0.001  
  (-3.013)    (-2.590)    (0.299)  
ΔNET_TONE   -0.064*    -0.174**    0.001 
   (-1.809)    (-2.034)    (0.441) 
ΔAGG*ICW 0.029    0.076    0.001   
 (0.852)    (0.975)    (0.289)   
ΔBAD*ICW  0.035    0.128    0.002  
  (0.330)    (0.615)    (0.241)  
ΔGOOD *ICW  0.108*    0.214    -0.003  
  (1.688)    (1.322)    (-0.257)  
ΔNET*ICW   0.025    0.025    -0.003 
   (0.327)    (0.179)    (-0.429) 
Control variables Included Included Included  Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Constant 0.746*** 0.734*** 0.743***  0.853*** 0.812*** 0.820***  0.052*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 (7.920) (7.964) (8.115)  (3.963) (4.047) (4.160)  (6.556) (6.654) (6.653) 
            
Observations 3,043 3,043 3,043  3,043 3,043 3,043  3,043 3,043 3,043 
R-squared 0.159 0.161 0.157  0.087 0.089 0.088  0.054 0.054 0.054 
F-value 9.927*** 9.021*** 9.453***  4.993*** 4.520*** 4.896***  6.086*** 5.458*** 6.037*** 
This table reports the coefficients on the explanatory variables and the summary of the fixed effects panel regression models. Panel 
A shows the regressions of changes in TRD on ICW. Control variables presented in Table 4.3 are included. Panel B shows the 
regressions of market assessment indicators on ICW, changes in TRD, and their interaction. Control variables presented in Table 
4.4 are included. Δ denotes change in the aggregate risk disclosure, bad and good news about risk, and net tone of risk, respectively. 
The change (Δ) indicates the differences between a firm’s scores and the median score for other firms in the same industry over the 
years. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. T-statistics in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05 and * p<0.1. Variable definitions, measures, and sources are provided in Appendix A. 
  
Remarkably, Models 7, 8 and 9 in Panel B of Table 4.6 show that ICW reporting leads to a 
significant and positive increase in investor-perceived risk (t-statistics 2.078 at the 5% level, 1.815 
and 1.797 at the 10% significance level, respectively). Thus, all else being equal, the economic 
significance of receiving ICW reporting is likely to be associated with an increase of investor-
perceived risk up to 9.09% (0.002/0.022) of the mean of the market returns volatility (SD). This 
finding concurs with Kothari et al.’s (2009a) argument that the credibility and timeliness differences 
in the negative disclosures by source significantly increase stock return volatility. Consistent with 
the notion that the volatility of stock returns increases (is diverged) if the revealed risk information 
is unexpected and unknown (Shalen, 1993, Kravet and Muslu, 2013, Campbell, et al., 2014), we 




indicates the differences between each variable in year t+1 and in year t (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al., 2008; Feng et al., 2009). The unreported results show a significant and positive increase in SD 
to ICW (t-statistics 2.344, 2.351, and 2.301 at the 5% significance level, respectively). Collectively, 
this evidence indicates that not only negative or risk disclosures by management, analysts, and 
business press increase investors’ perceived risk (Kothari et al., 2009a) but also the credible ICW 
reporting by the external auditor. This further validates and extends the findings of Lopez et al. 
(2009), Clinton et al. (2014), and Church and Schneider (2016) regarding the implications of ICW 
reporting for investors’ risk perceptions and analysts’ forecasts, respectively. It is also in line with 
previous studies on the link between market reaction to ICD reporting document a higher cost of 
equity (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009) and negative stock price reactions (Beneish et al., 2008; 
Hammersley et al., 2008). That is, in turn, a further support for our H2. 
In sum, results under Models 1 to 6 of Panel B on the ΔAGG_RISK, ΔBAD_RISK, 
ΔGOOD_RISK and ΔNET_TONE indicate the informativeness of these unique kinds of risk 
information. Additionally, we observe that SPREAD under Model 2 is significantly and positively 
increased with the interaction between good news about risk and ICW reporting (t-statistic 1.688 
at the 5% level). This is a further support to our previous finding showing a negative investors’ 
assessment in existence of the conflict between a credible adverse external auditor’s opinion on the 
reliability of the firm’s information and management tone about risk (Kothari et al., 2009a). 
Collectively, these results are qualitatively consistent with our previous finding that stemmed from 
the level analysis, as shown in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5.    
4.5.4.2. Managers’ TRD behavior as a response to the publicly reported ICW  
In the previous analyses, we posited and found that the level of TRD (either aggregate risk, 
and its tone of good news and bad news and the net tone about the risk) is negatively associated 
with a firm’s ineffective internal controls. However, as we discussed before in Section 4.1., the 
external auditor’s identified and publicly reported ICW would prompt managers to provide more 




Meckling, 1976; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Deumes and Knechel, 2008). This change in TRD 
behavior would occur especially if the ICW is recurrent due to managers’ awareness of ICW and 
the adverse public signal that the reported ICW implies. According to Feng et al. (2009), managers 
would change their disclosure behavior because that publicly conveyed ICW could, inter alia, lead 
the market to discount their normal disclosure. We, following Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008), Feng 
et al. (2009) and Donelson et al. (2017), address this issue by conditioning this behavior on 
managers’ awareness about ICW identified by the external auditor, providing further and robust 
insights into how managers respond to the auditors’ attestation on their firms’ ICE.75  
In Panel A of Table 4.7, we estimate equation 4.1 and include a dummy variable 
(ICW_FIXED) that takes a value of 1 when there is an adverse opinion of external auditor on the 
firm’s internal controls in two successive years and zero otherwise. The level analysis fixed effect 
regressions of aggregate risk disclosure and its tone on ICW remain consistent with our previous 
results in Table 4.3. Meanwhile, the coefficients on ICW_FIXED, i.e., recurrence of ICW, indicate 
that managers of firms that in two successive years received an adverse opinion from the external 
auditor on their internal controls significantly respond by providing high levels of aggregate risk 
disclosure and its tone of good news and bad news about the risk (t-statistics 2.848, 2.637 and 2.248 
at the 1%, 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively). 
Table 4.7. 
Results for the change of internal control effectiveness and management behavior 
Panel A: Fixed effects panel regressions of TRD on recurrence of ICW 
 VARIABLES AGG_RISK BAD_RISK GOOD_RISK NET_TONE 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
ICW -0.049** -0.011 -0.025*** -0.014**  
(-2.343) (-1.410) (-2.933) (-2.035) 
ICW_FIXED 0.116*** 0.033** 0.039*** 0.013 
 (2.848) (2.248) (2.637) (1.028) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.777*** 0.483*** 0.066 -0.412*** 
 (5.226) (8.630) (1.040) (-7.204)  
    
Observations 3,043 3,043 3,043 3,043 
 
75 There is considerable evidence of managers’ motive to respond to risks and disclose on it (e.g., Kasznik and Lev, 
1995; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Miihkinen, 2012; Taylor et al., 2010; Campbell et al., 2014). Kim and Park (2009) 
indicate that managers would disclose risk information as an uncertainty-clearing disclosure, and the impact of that 




R-squared 0.018 0.018 0.024 0.049 
F-value 2.939*** 2.716*** 4.172*** 7.764*** 
 
Panel B: Fixed effects panel regressions of within-firm changes in TRD on changes in ICE (remediation versus 
recurrence) 
VARIABLES Δ AGG_RISK Δ BAD_RISK Δ GOOD_RISK Δ NET_TONE 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
ADV_ADV 0.096** 0.029* 0.038** 0.014 
 (2.203) (1.895) (2.260) (0.842) 
UNQ_ADV -0.022 -0.009 -0.009 -0.001 
 (-0.711) (-0.662) (-0.786) (-0.072) 
ADV_UNQ 0.006 0.001 0.009 0.007 
 (0.240) (0.138) (0.885) (0.984) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.069*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.005** 
 (10.092) (7.214) (8.226) (2.202)  
    
Observations 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,937 
R-squared 0.019 0.020 0.016 0.034 
F-value 2.668*** 2.897*** 2.803*** 5.050*** 
Panel A of this table shows our level analysis and reports the coefficients on the explanatory variables and the 
summary of the fixed effects panel regression models. ICW_FIXED is a dummy variable equal to 1 when 
there is an adverse internal control opinion in two successive years. Panel B of this table shows our change 
analysis and reports the coefficients on the explanatory variables and the summary of OLS regression models 
(the drop in sample size returns to the requirement of data on the difference between successive years). Δ 
denotes change in the aggregate risk disclosure, bad and good news about risk, and net tone of risk, 
respectively. The change is also applied for the control variables. The change (Δ) indicates the differences 
between a firm’s score in year t+1 and its score in year t. ADV_ADV, UNQ_ADV, and ADV_UNQ are three 
dummy indicators of the change in internal control effectiveness where they imply a status where a firm 
receives two successive adverse internal control opinion, receives an adverse internal control opinion after an 
unqualified opinion, or receives an unqualified internal control opinion after an adverse opinion. These three 
distinct groups are introduced relative to a status where a firm has an effective internal control system 
(UNQ_UNQ).  
The two analyses of Panel A and Panel B allow us to answer our question of whether managers respond to 
the external auditors’ attestation on internal control effectiveness. Control variables presented in Table 4.3 are 
included. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. T-statistics in parentheses. 
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. Variable definitions, measures, and sources are provided 
in Appendix A. 
 
Panel B of Table 4.7 shows our within-firm change analysis, where changes in the TRD  
indicate the differences between a firm’s score in year t+1 and its score in year t. We define four 
distinct cases of the change in ICW and test their effects on within-firm changes in TRD. For these 
cases, we employ three dummy indicators of the change in internal control effectiveness, where 
ADV_ADV implies a status of a firm receiving two successive adverse internal control audit 
opinions (i.e., recurrence of ICW), UNQ_ADV implies a status of a firm receiving an adverse 
internal control audit opinion after an unqualified opinion, and ADV_UNQ implies a status of a 




remediation of ICW). These three distinct statuses are introduced relative to a status in which a 
firm has an effective internal control system (UNQ_UNQ). Following prior studies (e.g., 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008) we utilize OLS regressions to avoid the probably vulnerable 
application of the fixed effect model when variables have a little within-group variation (Allison, 
2009). Employing equation 4.1, but with the three defined dummy variables instead of the ICW 
variable, we find a significant positive coefficient only on ADV_ADV in terms of its effect on 
within-firm changes in aggregate risk disclosure, and its tone of good news and bad news about 
risk (t-statistics 2.203, 2.260 and 1.895 at the 5%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively).  
Managers’ observed response to the identified and publicly reported ICW by positively 
increasing the level of TRD (particularly, bad news about risk) is not ipso facto unexpected to us. 
Kothari et al. (2009b), consistent with agency theory, indicate that managers typically prefer to keep 
bad news undisclosed up to a threshold level where it becomes too costly or difficult for managers 
to withhold. Literature fundamentally links this threshold to incentives that managers face and that 
affect their willingness to accelerate the disclosure of bad news.76 For example, Skinner (1994) and 
Bao et al. (2019) illustrate that litigation risk and reputation concerns prompt managers to quickly 
release bad news. Thus, the adverse public signal conveyed by the credible audit report on a firm’s 
internal control represents a certain point at which it is seen as too costly and difficult for managers 
to not reveal bad news about their firm’s risk.  
Consistent with Feng et al.’s (2009) quality finding, our evidence suggests that whether 
managers’ awareness about their firms ICW precedes or follows ICW definition by the external 
auditor, the observed changes (increased quantity) of their TRD are prompted by the identified and 
publicly reported ICW. That is, the external auditor’s adverse opinion on a firm’s internal controls 
prompts managers to increase their level of TRD to indicate their grasp of their firms’ risks (i.e., 
 




bad news about the risk) and their effort to manage it (i.e., good news about risk), an so, in turn 
reduce uncertainties and agency problems.77 
4.5.4.3. Corporate communication environment and market reaction 
In an untested argument, Gupta et al. (2018) suggest that the rich information context 
surrounding the dissemination of information, particularly SOX 404 (b) opinion, would probably 
mitigate observing investors’ reaction to such disclosures. Prior event studies, however, indicate 
that it is expected to find investors’ reaction around the filings if those filings convey incremental 
information content (e.g., Gutierrez et al., 2018). Therefore, testing Gupta et al.’s (2018) argument, 
we use a short-window test expecting to find a short-term market reaction to the information 
content of ICW reporting and TRD because of the change of investors’ expectations about a firm’s 
future discount rate, cash flows and the reliability of financial reporting. We also expect that 
investors would react more (less) intensely to risk information of firms with a poorer (richer) 
communication environment.  
Table 4.8.  
Testing market reaction to ICW reporting and TRD 
VARIABLES  ABRET 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
ICW  0.010** 0.009** 0.009** 
  (2.282) (2.070) (2.050) 
AGG_RISK  0.009***   
  (2.622)   
BAD_RISK   0.035***  
   (3.751)  
GOOD_RISK   -0.016**  
   (-2.382)  
NET_TONE    -0.026*** 
    (-3.591) 
ANALYST  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000* 
  (2.592) (2.820) (1.892) 
ANALYST*ICW  -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
  (-1.954) (-1.697) (-1.695) 
AGG*ANALYST  -0.001***   
  (-2.582)   
BAD*ANALYST   -0.002***  
   (-3.574)  
 
77 Our unreported results also suggest that neither the recurrence nor remediation of ICW seems significant to the 
market participants. Results on the informativeness of ICW and the observed changes in TRD between firms and their 




GOOD*ANALYST   0.001*  
   (1.889)  
NET*ANALYST    0.002*** 
    (3.144) 
Control variables  Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.030*** 0.030*** 0.038*** 
  (3.796) (3.944) (5.465) 
     
Observations  2,870 2,870 2,870 
R-squared  0.098 0.103 0.101 
F-value  10.71*** 10.20*** 10.81*** 
This table reports the coefficients on the explanatory variables and the summary of OLS regression models. 
It examines market reaction to ICW reporting and TRD using the cumulative absolute abnormal returns 
(ABRET) of three days surrounding the 10-K filing date. This analysis incorporates the role of corporate 
communication environment proxied by analyst following (ANALYST; to which data availability reduces 
sample size). Control variables presenting in Table 4.4 are included. Robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level. T-statistics in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Following prior research (e.g., Botosan 1997; Miller 2010), we employ analyst coverage 
(ANALYST) as a proxy of the firm’s communication environment. Following prior literature (e.g., 
Garfinkel, 2009; Brown and Tucker, 2011; Hope et al., 2016), we measure the informativeness of 
ICW reporting and TRD by estimating equation 4.2 while using short-window analysis employing 
the sum of the absolute value of the three-day abnormal returns surrounding the 10-K filing date 
(using market-adjusted model methodology, where the market return is the return on the CRSP 
value-weighted index).78 Using the cumulative absolute abnormal returns (ABRET) enables us to 
capture the average change in investors’ beliefs around the public dissemination of risk information 
(Gutierrez et al., 2018). Additionally, we include industry and year fixed effects to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
As expected, across the three models reported in Table 4.8, we find a positive (negative) 
association between ABRET and ICW AGG_RISK and BAD_RISK (GOOD_RISK and 
NET_TONE) (t-statistics up to 2.282 at the 5%, 2.622 at the 1%, 3.751 at the 1%, -2.382 at the 
 
78 Our untabulated results remain qualitatively unchanged to use of the standard CAPM market-model, Fama-French 





5% and -3.591 at the 1% significance level, respectively).79 That is, ICW reporting, aggregate risk 
disclosure and bad news about the risk (good news and net tone about the risk) positively 
(negatively) affect investors’ reaction. Thus, ICW reporting and TRD are useful.80 It also seems 
that the investors’ reaction in the ±1 event-day test is owing to unexpected information content of 
the released ICW reporting and TRD (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013).  
Moreover, results from Models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 4.8, where the positive (negative) effects 
of ICW, AGG_RISK and BAD_RISK (GOOD_RISK and NET_TONE) on ABRET are 
decreased for firms with higher analyst following, i.e., when analyst coverage increases: 
ANALYST*ICW (t-statistics -1.954, -1.697 and -1.695 at p<0.1, respectively); AGG*ANALYST 
(t-statistic -2.582 at p<0.01); BAD*ANALYST (t-statistic -3.574 at p<0.01); GOOD*ANALYST 
(t-statistic 1.889 at p<0.1); NET*ANALYST (t-statistic 3.144 at p<0.01), strongly accord with our 
expectations that a firm’s communication environment can decrease or increase the incremental 
information conveyed to investors by ICW reporting and TRD. 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter explores the impact of ICE on the level of TRD (aggregate risk disclosure and 
its tone including good news, bad news, and net tone about risk). The chapter also examines the 
usefulness of the ICW reporting and TRD. After controlling for a variety of innate firm 
characteristics that previous research proposes to be related to incentivizing TRD, and market 
assessment of risk information conveyed by management and internal control attestation by 
external auditor, our study offers four major results. 
 
79 Using ABRET to measure the usefulness of ICW reporting and TRD does not require prediction of the direction 
of investors’ reaction (e.g., Brown and Tucker, 2011; Doyle and Magilke, 2013; Hope et al., 2016). Our expectations, 
however, are consistent with the theoretical (Shalen, 1993) and empirical (Garfinkel, 2009) literature showing a positive 
correlation between the information content of a disclosure and the divergence of investors’ opinions. That is, larger 
ABRET, that represents greater information content to a released disclosure, is associated with larger divergence in 
investors’ opinions. 
80 In untabulated tests, we included the interactions between ICW and TRD. Given the shortness of our test period, 
we found insignificant coefficients on the interaction terms, which is consistent with our earlier expectation that 




First, firms with an ineffective internal control system exhibit significantly lower levels of 
aggregate risk disclosure and its tone relative to firms with an effective internal control system. 
Second, consistent with agency theory, the recurrently identified and publicly reported ICW, which 
represents an adverse public signal, prompts managers to significantly change their TRD behavior 
by providing higher levels of aggregate risk disclosure and its tone relative to other firms. Third, 
firms reporting ICW are likely to have more information asymmetry and investor-perceived risk 
relative to control firms. In spite of the seemingly insignificant effect of TRD on investor-perceived 
risk, results suggest TRD increases market liquidity. Our evidence also shows that TRD conveys 
meaningful information that investors may utilize to revise their judgment on ICW reporting. 
Fourth, we illustrate that the information content of ICW reporting and TRD affect investors’ 
reaction around the 10-K filing, particularly for firms with a weak communication environment. 
Overall, our results suggest the importance of ICE in addition to the usefulness of ICW reporting 
and TRD.  
Our results have several contributions to both internal control and risk disclosure literature 
and suggest broader implications to the reporting on internal control effectiveness and risk factors 
than previously documented. We, however, acknowledge the probable following limitations. First, 
our market assessment analysis could be slightly affected by the contemporaneous news such as 
internal control certificates by management under SOX 302 and/or SOX 404 (a) or risk 
information released by other outlets of corporate communication, including conference calls, 
financial analysts’ reports and/or online resources. Second, bid-ask spread and stock market 
volatility may proxy for more than only market liquidity and investor-perceived risk (Garfinkel, 
2009). Third, for purposes of accuracy, comparability and data availability, we test SOX 404 (b) 
during the implementation of AS2. By November 15, 2007, however, AS5 replaced AS2, providing 
a reduction in control auditing requirements and thereby negatively impacting both the 
effectiveness of firms’ internal control systems and precision of external auditor’s opinion on the 




control inferences, generalizing them to the less rigorous SOX 404 (b) under the AS5 setting should 
be cautious and we present this point for a further investigation by future research. Future research 
can also investigate the moderating role of external auditor characteristics like expertise and/or 
internal corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., board of directors and managerial incentives) for 
the associations amongst or between internal control, narrative-related disclosures, and market 
reactions. A fruitful expansion of the present study would be to investigate whether and how 
internal control may incentivize TRD and the informativeness of TRD in the debt market. 
Inspecting the effects of company-level versus process-level weaknesses is another potential 
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Appendices of Chapter 4 
Appendix 4. A. Variable definitions. 
Variable Definition, measures and sources Unit 
Aggregate risk disclosure 
(AGG_RISK) 
 
All risk information that are exhibited in the narrative sections of the 10-K. The score is the percentage of the number of words indicating 
risk in the narrative sections of the10-K divided by the total number of words in the 10-K. Textual analysis is processed using Diction 7 
software employing the risk wordlist of Elshandidy and Shrives (2016) and SEC EDGAR 10-K form filings accessed through Bill McDonald 
data repository. The textual analysis is used to further identify the tone of aggregate risk disclosure as introduced below.  
% 
Bad news about risk 
(BAD_RISK) 
All feasible information about risk that exhibits bad news in the narrative sections of the 10-K. The score is the percentage of the number 
of words indicating bad news in the narrative sections of the10-K divided by the total number of 10-K words. 
% 
Good news about risk 
(GOOD_RISK) 
 
All feasible information about risk that exhibits good news in the narrative sections of the 10-K. The score is the percentage of the number 
of words indicating good news in the narrative sections of the10-K divided by the total number of 10-K words. 
% 
Net tone about risk 
(NET_TONE) 
The net influence derived from good news about risk (optimistic residual). The score is the difference between the percentage of good news 
and the percentage of bad news about the risk. 
% 
ICW A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the opinion of the external auditor on the effectiveness of internal control is adverse (ICW 










• Measured by the ratio of total debt to total equity. Data source is Datastream. • / 
Beta (BETA) • Reflects systematic risk and is measured as CAPM beta estimated using weekly returns requiring a minimum of 30 and maximum of 50 
observations. Data source is CRSP.  
• # 
Firm size (LN_TA) • Measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Data source is Compustat. • LN# 
Growth (GROWTH) Measured as the ratio of net sales, [(salest/salest-1) − 1]. Data source is Datastream. / 
Profitability (ROE) • Measured by the return on equity ratio as net income before preferred dividends dividing by the year-end common equity. Data source is 
Datastream. 
• / 
Liquidity (CR) • Measured by the current ratio as total current assets dividing by total current liabilities. Data source is Datastream. • / 
Performance (FFO) • Captured by the ratio of net funds from operations to total liabilities. Data source is Compustat. • / 
Dividend payout 
(DIVIDENDS) 
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firms pays dividends, and 0 otherwise. Data source is Compustat. 0,1 






A dummy value that equals 1 if the auditor issued a qualified opinion on financial statements and 0 otherwise. Data source is Compustat. 
•  
0,1 





Measured by the percentage of the mean of the daily trading volume by the number of outstanding shares. Data source is CRSP.  % 
Market liquidity (t+1) 
Bid-ask spread 
(SPREAD) 
It is the mean of the relative percentage of spread, which is calculated by dividing the difference between the daily ask and bid prices by the 
average of the daily ask and bid prices. It is measured (in t+1) over a 60 trading days period beginning two trading days after the 10-K filing. 
Data source is CRSP. 
% 
Market liquidity (t+1) 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 
ratio 
(ILLIQ) 
It is the mean of the daily ratio of absolute value of stock return divided by dollar trading volume, multiplied by ten million. It is measured 




Standard deviation (SD) 
It is the mean of the volatility (standard deviation) of the daily market returns. It is measured over a 60 trading days period beginning two 




abnormal returns (ABRET) 
It is the sum of the absolute value of the three-day abnormal returns surrounding the 10-K filing date (using market-adjusted model 










Appendix 4.B. The complete risk wordlist, and examples of risk-related disclosures  
Risk-related keywords Examples 
Aggregate risk  
Risk, Risks, Risky, Riskiness, Loss, Losses, Decline, 
Declined, Decrease, Decreases, Decreased, Less, Low, 
Lower, Fail, Fails, Failed, Failure, Threat, Reverse, 
Reversed, Against, Catastrophe, Catastrophy, 
Catastrophic, Shortage, Expose, Exposes, Exposed, 
Exposure, Unable, Challenge, Challenged, Challenges, 
Uncertain, Uncertainty, Uncertainties, Gain, Gains, 
Chance, Chances, Increase, Increases, Increased, Peak, 
Peaked, High, Highest, Higher, Hedge, Hedging, 
Diversify, Diversified, Diversification, 
Diversifications, Fluctuate, Fluctuated, Fluctuation, 
Fluctuations, Differ, Differed, Difference, 
Differences, Different, Differential, Differentiate, 
Differentiated, Differentiation, Probable, Probably, 
Probability, Probabilities, Possible, Possibly, 
Significant, Significantly, Significance, Against, 
Subject, Affect, Affects, Affected, Affecting, Potential, 
Potentially, Depend, Depends, Depended, Depending, 
Vary, Varies, Likely, Might, Influence, Influenced, 
Susceptible, Viable 
0000003673 
The commodity price risk exposure results from market fluctuations in... 
The operation of power generation facilities involves many risks, including the risk of breakdown or failure of equipment, 
fuel interruption and performance below expected levels of output or efficiency. 
Management is unable to provide assurance that the ultimate cost of decommissioning the Cook Plant will not be 
significantly different than current projections. 
 
0000004904 
We are therefore exposed to the risk that these contractors and other counterparties could breach their obligations to us. 
Should the counterparties to these arrangements fail to perform, we may… that may exceed our contractual prices and 
almost certainly cause delays in that and related projects. 
This would cause our financial results to be diminished, and we might incur losses or delays in completing construction. 
We depend on transmission facilities… This dependence exposes us to a variety of risks. 
The risk of potential loss in fair value attributable to our exposure to interest rates… 
 
0000898173 
Our future performance is subject to a variety of risks and uncertainties. 
The market price of our common stock may be volatile and could expose us to securities class action litigation. 
Failure to meet such expectations, even slightly, could have an adverse effect on the market price of our common stock.  
…failure to exercise the renewal option would result in a significant economic penalty.        
 
 
Good news about risk  
Gain, Gains, Chance, Chances, Increase, Increases, 
Increased, Peak, Peaked, High, Highest, Higher, 





The sale resulted in a gain of $94.8 million… 
AE Supply entered into two treasury lock agreements to hedge its exposure to changing United States Treasury interest 
rates on the forecasted issuance of long-term, fixed-rate debt in April 2002. 
Retail electric revenue increased due to higher kWh sales resulting from increases in the average number of customers 
served and customer usage.      
 
0000004904 
We manage our exposure by establishing risk limits and entering into contracts to offset some of our positions (i.e., to 
hedge our exposure to… 
Our investment strategy for our employee benefit trust funds is to use a diversified mixture of equity and fixed income 
securities to preserve the capital of the funds and to maximize the investment earnings in excess of inflation within 
acceptable levels of risk. 




Favorable weather during summer and fall also increased our revenues above expected norms. 
 
0000898173 
We believe we will increase the sales to professional installers and will continue to have a competitive advantage over our 
retail competitors… 
We have found that the more progressive marketing concepts utilized in the DIY portion of our business have also resulted 




Bad news about risk 
Risk, Risks, Risky, Riskiness, Loss, Losses, Decline, 
Declined, Decrease, Decreases, Decreased, Less, Low, 
Lower, Fail, Fails, Failed, Failure, Threat, Reverse, 
Reversed, Against, Catastrophe, Catastrophy, 
Catastrophic, Shortage, Expose, Exposes, Exposed, 
Exposure, Unable, Challenge, Challenged, Challenges, 





International operations are subject to certain additional risks inherent in conducting business outside the United States, 
including… 
Market liquidity has significantly declined over the past three years. 
Among other things, significant price volatility... and overall declines in electricity demand and in the economy, generally, 
have contributed to this slowdown. 
Catastrophic events may exceed reserves or insurance, if any, for repairs, which may adversely impact Allegheny’s results 
of operations and financial condition. 
The suit alleges that the Board and senior management breached fiduciary duties to AE that have exposed AE to the 
securities class action lawsuits. 
 
0000004904 
We are exposed to risk from changes in the market prices of… 
Recent lawsuits by the EPA and various states filed against us highlight the environmental risks faced by generating 
facilities, in general, and….  
Our revenues and results of operations from selling power are subject to market risks that are beyond our control.  
We attempt to manage our exposure by establishing and enforcing of risk limits and risk management procedures. These 




We may fail or be unable to discover liabilities of businesses that we acquire for which we, as a successor owner or 
operator, may be liable.    
Downturns in the stock market may cause the price of our common stock to decline.      
If similar litigation were instituted against us, it could result in substantial costs and a diversion of our management's 
attention and resources, which could have an adverse effect on our business. 





Chapter 5. Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis aims to contribute to literature by addressing a considerable gap about the 
importance and usefulness of textual disclosures (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2016; Dyer et al., 
2017; Elshandidy et al., 2018). For this purpose, three empirical chapters are developed with the 
objective of addressing three unexplored research questions: first, do textual disclosures provide 
an incremental explanatory power that predicts corporate failure? (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 
2016); second, does the expanded auditor reporting, that recently became effective in the UK and 
worldwide, have economic benefits for the capital market? (e.g., Gutierrez et al., 2018; Lennox et 
al., 2019); third, does internal control effectiveness drive a firm to externally disclose its risks, and 
if so, how, and do the reporting on those risks and the effectiveness of internal controls impact 
market indicators? (e.g., Schneider et al., 2009; Elshandidy et al., 2018). 
The theoretical foundation offered by legitimacy (e.g., Suchman, 1995; Deegan, 2002), 
agency (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lambert et al., 2007), and signaling (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; 
Spence, 1973) theories is outlined here as the basis that serves the research background and for 
rationalizing the findings of this thesis and relating those findings to the evidence from prior 
research. As presented by the first empirical chapter, the propositions of legitimacy and signaling 
theories underpin that managers are motivated to disclose on their firms’ prospect of failure in 
order to maintain or repair legitimacy, to avoid reputation loss and litigation risk, and to reduce 
cost of capital. The second empirical chapter draws insights from the agency theory to explain the 
usefulness of expanded audit report to capital market participants. That is, the information content 
of the expanded audit report, which goes beyond the traditional standardized pass/fail audit 
opinion on the financial statements, is consistent with the notion that a firm’s commitment to 
expanded levels of disclosure should reduce information asymmetry, and hence alleviate the agency 
problem. Similarly, turning to the third empirical chapter, the quality of a firm’s information 
systems, including the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, affects the 




imparted disclosure. Besides, under normal conditions, signaling theory posits that managers are 
motived to disseminate information on their firms’ risks so as to change risk expectations, reduce 
litigation risk, improve reputation for transparent and credible disclosure, and, thus, distinguish 
their firms from other firms that do not manage risks or do so less effectively. 
Consequently, this thesis develops the three empirical essays to address the incremental role 
of textual disclosures (which are also referred to as narrative-related disclosures) in corporate failure 
(CF) prediction, as well as how such disclosures (particularly that of risk) relate to internal control 
effectiveness and ultimately the usefulness to the capital market participants, as follows. 
In the first essay (Chapter 2), we investigate the predictive ability of narrative-related 
disclosures by creating a comprehensive list of CF-related keywords. This wordlist enables us to 
capture the CF sentiment in annual report narratives, i.e., CF-Disclosure. Our results show that 
greater incidence of CF-Disclosure in the annual reports is strongly associated with a higher 
likelihood of CF, in both the year immediately prior to failure and the penultimate year. The 
evidence we find also suggests that CF-Disclosure offers an incremental predictive ability relative 
to accounting, market and macroeconomic variables that are widely used in the classical CF 
prediction models. Therefore, CF-Disclosure is feasible in enhancing the explanatory power of the 
models that predict CF. Additionally, we observe that a financially distressed firm becomes more 
vulnerable when financial constraints occur, which would accelerate the CF incident. Various 
robustness tests confirm the credibility of the incremental explanatory power of CF-Disclosure for 
CF prediction. 
In the second essay (Chapter 3), we consider the UK’s unique setting, where the revised ISA 
700 (UK and Ireland) in 2013 mandated the expanded audit report, which requires the independent 
auditor to disclose on risks of material misstatement with the greatest effect on the audit, the 
application of materiality, and the scope of the audit. Accordingly, we investigate: first, whether the 
expanded auditor’s report exhibits information specific to the audited company (thereby the new 




translates into lower cost of equity); second, whether the reporting regulation change and 
information content of the expanded audit report affect information asymmetry and risk 
perceptions.  
In cross-sectional tests, we find that firms receiving an expanded audit report with a higher 
level of disclosure on risks of material misstatement (which we refer to as auditor risk disclosure) 
exhibit significantly higher beta and cost of equity. Furthermore, we find significantly negative 
association between auditor disclosed materiality (which is negatively related to the assessed and 
identified risks of material misstatement) and idiosyncratic risk, beta, and cost of equity. These 
findings suggest that expanded auditor disclosure is not generic, but is associated with the 
information risk that a firm presents to investors. Therefore, firms complying with the new 
reporting rule, which have relatively more reliable financial reporting, i.e., have relatively low risks 
of material misstatement inducing the auditor to determine a high level of materiality, can benefit 
from a lower information risk and a lower cost of capital.  
Additionally, we use intertemporal tests, where we structure time-series difference and 
standard post-regulatory panel designs, to investigate the economic usefulness of the audit report 
regime change, and the information content of expanded auditor disclosure. The evidence we find 
suggests that the new reporting regime is, on average, related to higher market liquidity (trading 
volume) and investors’ perceived risk (volatility of market returns). Particularly, the intertemporal 
results of the informativeness of the expanded audit disclosures show that a high level of auditor 
risk disclosure positively and significantly impacts the trading volume, volatility of market returns, 
and analyst forecast dispersion. Consistent with the argument that auditor-determined materiality 
is negatively related to audit effort (Livne et al., 2018), our intertemporal results further indicate 
that market participants appreciate the firm with a lower level of disclosed materiality due to the 
higher credibility it indicates about the audited outputs. Specifically, we find a significantly positive 
(negative) impact of the determined materiality threshold (i.e., low audit effort) on bid-ask spread, 




Collectively, our cross-sectional and intertemporal tests, which control for other factors that 
previous studies show to be related to the above-mentioned measures, as well as endogeneity 
concern, provide direct evidence that the expanded auditor reporting is firm-specific and useful for 
financial statement users. This also is consistent with the notion that the expanded auditor’s report 
regime and information content are associated with significant economic consequences for both 
the complying firms and capital market participants. Our results complement prior experimental 
studies and archival research on the effect of the expanded auditor’s report and its content on the 
investors’ reaction. This, in turn, is supportive of the FRC decision to go beyond the traditional 
standardized pass/fail audit opinion on the financial statements and helps to relieve related 
concerns that PCAOB has recently expressed. 
In the third essay (Chapter 4), we investigate the impact of internal control effectiveness 
(ICE) on the level of textual risk disclosure (TRD; i.e., aggregate risk disclosure and its tone 
including good news, bad news, and net tone about risk). We also examine the usefulness of the 
internal control material weaknesses (ICW) reporting and TRD. After controlling for a variety of 
innate firm characteristics that previous research proposes to be related to incentivizing TRD, and 
market assessment of risk information conveyed by management and internal control attestation 
by the external auditor, this study offers four major results.  
First, firms with an ineffective internal control system exhibit significantly lower levels of 
aggregate risk disclosure and its tone relative to firms with an effective internal control system. 
Second, consistent with agency theory, the recurrently identified and publicly reported ICW, which 
represents an adverse public signal, prompts managers to significantly change their TRD behavior 
by providing higher levels of aggregate risk disclosure and its tone relative to other firms. Third, 
firms reporting ICW are likely to have more information asymmetry and investor-perceived risk 
relative to control firms. In spite of the seemingly insignificant effect of TRD on investor-perceived 
risk, results suggest that TRD increases market liquidity. Our evidence also shows that TRD 




reporting. Fourth, the study indicates that the information content of ICW reporting and TRD 
affect investors’ reaction around the 10-K filing, particularly for firms with a weak communication 
environment.  
Overall, our results suggest the importance of ICE in addition to the usefulness of ICW 
reporting and TRD. Our results have several contributions to both internal control and risk 
disclosure literature and suggest broader implications to the reporting on internal control 
effectiveness and risk factors than previously documented.  
In summary, the results given above principally add to literature on the importance and 
usefulness of textual disclosures: first, by indicating the feasibility of textual disclosures in 
objectively and directly predicting CF and enhancing the explanatory power of CF classical 
prediction models, second, by supporting the view of FRC (followed by IAASB and PCAOB) that 
the expanded audit report is useful for both the complying companies and capital market 
participants, and third, by expanding prior research on the importance of ICE to improve financial 
reporting reliability and showing the usefulness of ICE reporting and TRDs to capital market 
participants. 
The results summarized above have some distinctive implications. First, the additional role 
of textual disclosures in rendering early warning alerts about failure prospect is imperative to help 
interested parties (e.g., FRC) to take either preventive or remedial actions. It also helps in improving 
the classical CF prediction models. Second, addressing regulators’ (FRC, IAASB, & PCAOB) 
concerns by documenting the significant economic consequences of expanded audit report regime 
and information content for both the complying companies and capital market. Speaking directly 
to IAASB and PCAOB about auditor disclosure on the determined materiality as an important 
component of the expanded audit report. Third, showing the broader implications and rationalizing 
the debate around the importance of ICE (SOX 404(b)) in improving financial reporting reliability. 
The evidence of the usefulness of ICE reporting and TRD should be of particular interest to 




Consistent with prior research in the field, this thesis is subject to some caveats that might 
be viewed as promising avenues for future research. The results of Chapter 2 should be interpreted 
taking into consideration the following limitations. First, despite the rational premise of our legal 
and financial definition of CF, it could be a consequence of various reasons such as an ethical 
problem of management, like committing fraud (Hsu and Wu, 2014). Second, annual reports are 
used because they represent a key source of information for investors. Nevertheless, other outlets 
of corporate communication (e.g., financial analysts’ reports, conference calls and/or online 
resources) could contain unique signals of the likelihood of failure. Third, this study adopts a 
quantity-based methodology in measuring CF-Disclosure, without gauging the quality. These 
limitations might provide avenues for future research on CF. 
Although endogeneity is a general problem in capital market research, and despite our 
powerful research design to address this problem, the inability to find reasonable counterfactuals 
to premium-listed companies in the UK setting might be seen as one limitation of Chapter 3. We 
also acknowledge the following probable limitations for Chapter 4. First, our market assessment 
analysis could be slightly affected by contemporaneous news such as internal control certificates 
by management under SOX 302 and/or SOX 404 (a) or risk information released by other outlets 
of corporate communication, including conference calls, financial analysts’ reports and/or online 
resources. Second, bid-ask spread and stock market volatility may proxy for more than only market 
liquidity and investor-perceived risk (Garfinkel, 2009). Third, for purposes of accuracy, 
comparability and data availability, we test SOX 404 (b) during the implementation of AS2. On 
November 15, 2007, however, AS5 replaced AS2, reducing control auditing requirements and 
thereby negatively impacting the effectiveness of firms’ internal control systems and the precision 
of the external auditor’s opinion on internal control (Schroeder and Shepardson, 2016). Although 
this does not limit our internal control inferences, generalizing them to the less rigorous SOX 404 
(b) under the AS5 setting should be cautious and we suggest further investigation of this point in 




Future research can also investigate the moderating role of external auditor characteristics 
like expertise and/or internal corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., board of directors and 
managerial incentives) for the associations amongst or between internal control, narrative-related 
disclosures, and market reactions. A fruitful expansion of the present study would be to investigate 
whether and how internal control may incentivize TRD and the informativeness of TRD in the 
debt market. Inspecting the effects of company-level versus process-level weaknesses is another 
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